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ABSTRACT  
 
EXTRACTIVISM AND RESISTANCE: MEDIA, PROTEST AND POWER IN 
ECUADOR 
   
MAY 2017 
 
DIANA CORYAT, B.F.A. NEW YORK UNIVERISTY 
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by:  
Sonia E. Alvarez  
Martha Fuente-Bautista 
 
 
This dissertation examines the symbolic and material dimensions of media power and 
social movement cultural production in a Latin American post-neoliberal context, 
through the case study of Yasunidos –an anti-extractivist, youth social movement– and its 
fight to stop the Ecuadorian government’s plans to drill for oil in the Yasuní region of the 
Amazon. The project is located within two bodies of literature: cultural analysis of social 
movement media and cultural production within new waves of global protest, and studies 
of extractivism and post-development in Latin America. It advances the concept 
of mediated cultural politics to tell the story of a movement that, through creative media 
practices, protest and direct democracy, mobilized society over these issues. At the same 
time, the study analyzes how a so-called progressive Latin American government uses 
different forms of statist media power to halt the movement. The research design includes 
a qualitative, mixed-methods ethnography of the movement, as well as archival work, 
analysis of media texts on the struggle, and visual analysis of movement-based cutlural 
production. The analysis reveals the contradictions of 21st century socialist states, and the 
implications that extractivism and statist media power have on processes of 
democratization in Latin America. It offers some reflections on the post-development 
imaginaries emerging from contemporary anti-extractivist movements.  
 
Keywords: Amazon, Ecuador, extractivism, Latin American social movements, media 
power, mediated cultural politics, post-development, Yasunidos, Yasuní ITT  
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CHAPTER 1 
NEW WAVES OF PROTEST IN ECUADOR’S CITIZEN REVOLUTION 
1.1 Introduction: The end of the Yasuní ITT initiative gives rise to a new movement  
 On August 15, 2013, Ecuadorian President Correa announced the suspension of 
one of his signature projects, Yasuní ITT.1 This project, conceived by Ecuadorian 
ecologists, was adopted by President Correa in June 2007 shortly after he assumed office. 
The goal was to raise sufficient funds from the global North to leave 920 million barrels 
of oil in the ground in the Yasuní National Park.  In addition to being one of the most bio-
diverse regions in the world, the Yasuní is home to several indigenous pueblos and 
nacionalidades (peoples and nationalities), including nomadic groups that have avoided 
contact and colonization since European contact.2  Claiming that the initiative had not 
raised sufficient funds, President Correa announced that the government would proceed 
with “Plan B,” oil extraction of this beloved national treasure. 
 The evening that the announcement was delivered, thousands of citizens gathered 
peacefully in the Quito’s historic center and plazas around the country to hold candlelight 
vigils for the Yasuní. Vigils had begun even before the announcement, as rumors spread 
about the government’s change of direction. Two days later, on August 17, 2013, nation-
wide protests erupted across the nation. Collective disillusionment about the 
abandonment of the Yasuní ITT project spread rapidly across Ecuador through word-of-
mouth, traditional media and social networks. Public forums, marches and protests were 
quickly organized in cities and towns across Ecuador, similar to the way word spread 
                                                          
1 ITT refers to oil blocks Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini, named after rivers in the Yasuní. 
2 The presence of the Taromenare and Tagaeri had been acknowledged in the government’s Yasuní ITT 
documents, but once plans changed, maps were adjusted and their presence was subsequently denied.  
  
 
 
 
 
2 
during Occupy Wall Street and other recent waves of protest across the globe. The 
following day, on August 18, 2013, the Yasunidos collective was founded by urban 
young people in Quito. Yasunidos would go on to build an unprecedented, enduring, 
mediated field of protest that would challenge the Correa government on its extractive 
politics in the Amazon and elsewhere.  
 The strong reaction by citizens to the government’s decision to exploit the Yasuní 
was due, in part, to the success that Ecuadorian social movements had in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s in rejecting the neoliberal order that had become the law of the land. 
Later, those movements participated in crafting the path-breaking, progressive 2008 
Constitution, which include the rights of Nature (the first Constitution in the world to 
declare Nature a subject of rights); territorial rights for indigenous peoples; and 
obligatory previous consultation in territories where extractive activities were proposed. 
All of these rights were at stake in the Yasunidos case.  
 Ironically, national and global indignation was also fueled by the resounding 
success of the government’s Yasuní ITT media campaign, which, since 2007, had 
passionately communicated the irreplaceable value of the Yasuní for Ecuador and the 
global community. The radical, post-neoliberal proposal to “keep the oil in the ground”3 
fostered pride and ecological consciousness in many Ecuadorians, and brought positive 
international attention to President Correa. Now, in an apparent reversal4, the government 
would launch another multi-million dollar media campaign designed to build public 
                                                          
3 The first campaign to “keep the oil in the ground” was in Nigeria.  
4 Those who closely followed the management of the Yasuní National Park and Yasuní ITT initiative had 
valid reasons to doubt the government’s commitment to leaving the oil in the ground, including 
documented extractive activities in neighboring Block 31 by Petroamazonas (the state oil company) and 
China’s growing presence in Ecuador as a lender, investor, and purchaser of Ecuadorian oil. See Los 
Taladros Petroleros (2013); Martinez (2009); Ross (2014). 
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consent for its plans to move ahead with oil drilling. This time it would not be an easy 
sell, given the popularity of the Yasuní ITT initiative. In fact, the mediated battle between 
Yasunidos and the Correa government, and the events that would take place during the 
following year, would mark a point of inflection in Ecuadorian politics. It would 
influence how people viewed the government, its use of media, and its undemocratic 
treatment of social movements and citizens.  
 Correa’s “Plan B” was consistent with the overall trend of the Latin American 
progressive governments5: a combination of intensifying resource extraction and 
criminalizing protest. Gudynas (2014), a leading scholar on issues related to resource 
extraction and post-extractivist approaches, defines extractivism as activities in which 
natural resources (oil, mining, agriculture, and monoculture such as cultivation of shrimp 
and soy) are extracted in large volumes, and/or high intensity, and that are mainly 
oriented toward exportation as materia prima, or with minimal processing (p. 80). 
Svampa (2013) proposes that such extractivist politics are part of a new economic and 
political-ideological order, “the Commodities Consensus”, indicating a phase that follows 
“the Washington Consensus” (p. 117). This “boom” in state-led resource extraction had 
been driven and sustained by the rise in international prices for raw materials.6 Yet, while 
these practices fueled economic growth and public investment, they also led to greater 
inequality and a new cycle of protests across the Americas, which focused on the defense 
of territories targeted for exploitation (Gudynas, 2012). In this “eco-territorial turn”’ new 
                                                          
5 Governments often included in the list of progressive governments are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
6 These prices declined dramatically in the global market in 2014. 
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languages of valoration traverse socio-environmental struggles across the continent” 
(Svampa, 2011, p. 185).    
Yasunidos is part of the new wave of resistance to these governments’ neo-
extractivist practices. Gudynas (2012) differentiates between “classic” extractivism 
(heavily dependent on foreign investors, who take most of the profits), and “neo” 
extractivism, in that it is structured and defended differently, with greater state 
protagonism, and profits directed towards social investment (I use both terms 
interchangeably). However, Gudynas points out that, despite nationalist rhetoric, states 
continue to depend on investment by transnational actors. Also, governments defending 
their extractivist practices argue that the social and ecological costs are minimal, and that 
profits will be directed toward Amazonian communities, unlike in previous governments.  
One if the contributions of this study are that it brings together social movement 
scholarship, post-development literature, and media studies, which have not always been 
in dialogue.   
1.2 Overview of dissertation project 
 My dissertation is a case study of Yasunidos, an anti-extractivist social movement 
that emerged in Ecuador on August 18, 2013. This movement, over the course of nine 
intense months, sought to halt the Ecuadorian government’s plan to drill for oil in the 
Yasuní, one of the most biodiverse regions in the world. It accomplished this through 
creative protest and direct democratic mechanisms. The case study is also about how the 
Ecuadorian government responded to this movement in the most undemocratic way 
through its statist power and expanded media power. It calls attention to the 
contradictions that have arisen, as the government has abandoned a key ecological 
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project, to keep the oil in the soil in the Yasuní. The case study examines the highly 
mediated, cultural battle between them, in which the issues of extractivism and the 
meaning of development are central. As the study details, Yasunidos is a new, 
horizontally-organized, ecological social movement that broadly incorporates students, 
feminists, eco-feminists, indigenous, mestizo, urban, rural and Amazonian individuals 
and communities. Many of the young people who quickly adhered to the movement did 
not have previous experience with social movements or organizing (I examine Yasunidos 
identity in more detail in Chapter 2). One of its key successes is that it was able to put 
society in movement. At a time when protest was at a low point in Ecuador, this mediated 
battle got the entire country thinking and talking about the Yasuní.  
I have chosen to examine the Yasunidos case for a number of reasons: 1) It brings 
to the foregound one very interesting, particular case about a movement that is part of a 
new wave of resistance to extractivism in the progressive states; 2) it calls attention to 
how processes of democratization from below can not only challenge state power but can 
enact and capture post-development imaginaries that are taking hold in the region; 3) it 
examines the repressive, undemocratic practices of the Ecuadorian government as it 
pursues resource extraction, with an emphasis on how statist media power is used to 
repress and criminalize social movements and protest actions; and 4) it sheds light on 
state-social movement conflict from a much-needed communications perspective.  
I argue that a communication perspective is essential for several reasons: a) it 
highlights how state media practices violate the communication rights framework that 
was inscribed in the 2008 Constitution; b) it demonstrates how the government’s 
communication practices are intrinsically related to its political practices, given the 
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unprecedented expansion of the government’s material and symbolic media power,; and 
c) it underscores the mediated cultural politics of a new movement, which include using 
new technologies to circulate images of street protest, political art and embodied 
practices that contest the meaning of extractivism and development in Ecuador.  
 The broader context for this study is the increasing tensions between the so-called 
gobiernos progresistas (progressive governments) and the social movements that helped 
bring them to power, as they seek to make governments accountable to their pledges to 
privilege alternative development models.     
 This study provides a communications perspective in its analysis of state-social 
movement relations. This is particularly relevant in Ecuador, where the government has 
used its ever-expanding media power to justify its extractive politics, and question the 
legitimacy of citizens, journalists and social movements who oppose such practices. By 
media power I follow Couldry’s (2003) conceptualization, which encompasses media’s 
symbolic and material dimensions, and emphasizes its definitional power, which 
influences and shapes the whole of social space.  
 Applying a communication lens to this mediated conflict led me to analyze how 
Yasunidos has communicated dissent on an uneven playing field in which it has had to 
confront not only state power, but also the state’s media power. I conceptualize such 
movement practices as mediated cultural politics, by which I mean social movements’ 
mediated cultural expressions that interrupt hegemonic meanings. The Yasunidos’ 
mediated cultural politics are centered on counter-hegemonic meanings of development, 
or what is also referred to as post-development (Escobar 2014) or post-extractivism 
(Gudynas 2012). In the Ecuadorian context, disputes about the nature of development 
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often entail the use of the concept Buen Vivir or Sumak Kawsay in the indigenous Kichwa 
language (literally, good living), an indigenous concept integrated into the 2008 
Ecuadorian Constitution, which points to sustainable, non-capitalist models of 
development in which living beings and the natural environment take precedence over 
material wealth (Acosta, 2012). However, the government has deployed the concepts of 
development and Buen Vivir in the service of extractivist projects, with promises that 
extraction will bring material wealth to the Amazon. Hence, my focus on these dialogical 
concepts of media power and mediated cultural politics are lenses with which I analyze 
the battle over these contested meanings between the Ecuadorian government and 
Yasunidos.  I am in dialogue with contemporary, critical left Latin American and Latin 
Americanist scholars, especially those who have been documenting, assessing and 
theorizing this era of the progressive left governments. These conceptual frameworks are 
discussed in Section 1.4 of this introduction.  
 My dissertation examines three related questions:   
1) How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of struggle against extractivist 
politics in Ecuador?  
a. How has the mediatization of the conflict becme a constitutive part of the 
struggle?  
2) How has the Correa government reconfigured media power in Ecuador? 
a. How has it used its media power to delegitimize and criminalize 
Yasunidos and other social actors that oppose oil drilling in the Yasuní? 
3) How has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power? 
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a. How has Yasunidos deployed a mediated cultural politics of post-
development, thereby challenging the state’s extractivist discourses and 
practices? 
Analyzing these questions reveals the cultural battle being waged over the 
meaning of extractivism and development in 21st century Latin America, in a context 
fraught with contradictions. They illuminate tensions between democratizing processes 
led by social movements, and the increasingly undemocratic practices of extractivist 
states. In referring to processes of democratization, I follow Latin American scholars that 
take distance from the analysis of democracy as a specific kind of regime, but rather view 
processes of democratization as “spaces of experience and experimentation that arise 
from specific historical, geographical and cultural conditions” (Ramirez, 2012, p. 107). 
Nor should democracy be understood as solely emanating from electoral politics or from 
political elites, but also from social movements and other sectors of civil society 
(Dagnino et al., 2008; Ramirez, 2012).  
1.3 Regional contexts   
1.3.1 Latin America’s “left turn”  
 In Latin America, a profound process of capitalist restructuring gained 
momentum through the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Svampa, 2011; Ospina, 2013; Grupo Permanente de Trabajo sobre Alternativas al 
Desarrollo, 2013). The effects of these policies led to the de-nationalization and 
widespread privatization of public and natural resources, including the deregulation, 
privatization and concentration of media and telecommunication industries (Hintz, 2011; 
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Mastrini and Becerra, 2011).7 In the 1990s and 2000’s, responding to the devastating 
effects of neoliberalism, social movements across the Americas organized massive 
mobilizations, including the Zapatista uprising in Mexico,8 civil society protests in 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, and indigenous uprisings in Bolivia and Ecuador. These 
social movements were responsible, in part, for the subsequent wave of electoral victories 
of Left-leaning parties and movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. 
While there has not been a single route taken by the progressive governments, 
there has been a correlation among their rhetoric, legislative actions and foreign relations 
policies that reflect nationalist, anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist militancy. Zibechi 
(2010) suggests that the regional political reality has been reconfigured in several 
interrelated ways: the fight to overcome U.S. domination; the presence of anti-imperial 
tendencies and the inclusion of alternative visions of development. A fourth dimension, 
which is in tension with alternative visions of development, has been the national-popular 
projects that have prioritized industrialization. Notably, Lander (2013) argues that these 
projects and tendencies coexist to varying degrees in each state, and that none can be 
analyzed as if they were unitary, coherent, or free of tensions and contradictions. 
In what is now widely referred to as the retorno al Estado9 (return of the state), a 
common goal among the progressive Latin American governments has been to strengthen 
the state as a strategic, regulatory body (DeMoraes, 2011). This has led to a measure of 
                                                          
7 By 1983, approximately 85% of the media was under private ownership in Latin America (see Mastrini 
and Becerra 2011). 
8 The Zapatista uprising notably took place on the same day that the Free Trade Agreement between the 
U.S. and Mexico went into effect, January 1, 1994 
9 The phrase in Spanish is taken from Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.). (1985). 
Bringing the state back in. Cambridge University Press. 
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growth in social spending in health, education, salaries and public works, and the 
implementation of policies that seek to redistribute resources more equitably.10  Yet, 
while these governments take on ambitious modernization projects with public funds 
derived from natural resource extraction, and mediated rhetoric celebrates popular power, 
the question has been raised as to what democratic participation means in these contexts, 
especially when social movements and their demands have been routinely delegitimized 
(Daza et al., 2013; Lander, 2013; Martínez, 2009; Ospina et al., 2013). For this reason, 
many scholars and activists now refer to the progressive governments as the so-called 
progressive governments.  
In this study, I use this term “so-called” when I wish to draw attention to the gap 
between the rhetoric and extractive practice of these governments. However, I continue to 
refer to them (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela) as 
progressive to acknowledge a rupture with the neoliberal governments of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, and the ushering in of a new era in Latin America which began with the 
election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. I also seek to distinguish between these 
governments and contemporary right-wing, neoliberal governments. At the same time, to 
varying degrees, they are all less anti-neoliberal, socialist and democratic than their 
rhetoric or practices. With regards to extractivism, they have deepened extractive 
practices, and in addition, have criminalized social movements, among other anti-
democratic actions. Many scholars agree that the era of progressive governments has 
ended or is coming to an end due to increasing contradictions, or their replacement by 
                                                          
10 However, as DeSouza Santos (2010) points out, while the main focus has been on lifting the most 
vulnerable sectors of society out of poverty, this does not necessarily mean that the interests of the wealthy 
and powerful have been negatively affected.  
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right-wing governments (At the time of writing, Argentina and Brazil now have right-
wing governments). 
1.3.2 Restructuring symbolic and material power: media battles and reforms  
Another key piece involved in the return of the state has been the progressive 
governments’ undertaking of precedent-setting media reforms, and media battles with 
private media companies. These processes have been partial, uneven and conflictive, and 
have played out differently in each country. Generally speaking, these reforms have 
sought to curb the unchecked growth of private media groups that was enabled by 
neoliberal (de)regulatory frameworks established during the latter part of the 20th century. 
They have also been part of broader strategies to counter the negative campaigns that 
private media companies and other political opponents have waged against them. In the 
cases of Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, these strategies have also included suing, 
taking over, shutting down, managing and controlling private media companies. 
Arguably, building a strong presence in the media is one of the principal ways in which a 
government can communicate with its citizens; publicize its worldview nationally and 
internationally, and contest oppositional factions. And, as private media companies have 
been critical of, and have taken oppositional positions to these governments, rolling back 
private media has been a key strategy to curtail their power. Private national media and 
international organisms such as Reporters Without Borders have framed the structural 
reforms as hindering freedom of expression and freedom of the press. However, while 
these institutions claim to stand on the value of freedom of expression, scholars and 
media reform advocates point out that private media are mostly defending freedom of 
  
 
 
 
 
12 
expression for a small group of corporations (Cerbino et al., 2014; DeMoraes, 2011; 
Ramos, 2010).   
Scholars argue across a continuum both for and against government-led media 
reform. For example, Brazilian scholar DeMoraes (2011, p.17) has argued the need for 
government regulation of media concentration, given that “… the state is the only 
institution that can safeguard cultural diversity as a fundamental element of citizenship. 
… [and hence] the importance of legislation that takes into account freedom of 
expression as a constitutive part of communication rights.” DeMoraes proposes that state 
investment has been central to the development of most key industries, and that 
investment in the media industry is equally important.  On the other hand, while 
Waisbord (2011, 2012) acknowledges that private media are at the forefront of the 
opposition to these governments, he argues that unregulated statism is also worrisome, 
particularly in a region with a legacy of government discretionalism, weak accountability 
and the concentration of presidential power.  
Communication scholars have sought to theorize and characterize new 
configurations of media power in Latin America by extending the study of populism and 
populist practices to the study of media reform. Waisbord (2011) proposes five 
characteristics of populist media politics as practiced in “neo-populist” governments: 1) It 
divides media into those who support, and those who are against the government, while 
effacing the practice of independent journalism; 2) It targets specific media companies 
and journalists, but does not seek to completely eliminate private media; 3) It seeks to 
revamp rather than overturn private media, using Executive powers to punish and reward 
groups according to their stance toward and media treatment of the government; 4) It 
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seeks to strengthen and expand state-controlled media under the direction of the 
Executive; and 5) It supports legislation that strengthens the regulatory power of the 
Executive with respect to media content (often framed as social responsibility). 
Moreover, Waisbord (2011) argues that the discrediting of, and retaliation against, 
specific media outlets and journalists have had a chilling effect on private media as they 
reinforce a climate of self-censorship. While I do not use the framework of populism or 
neo-populism in this study, all of the characteristics cited by Waisbord resonate in the 
case of Ecuador, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
For Hintz (2011), there are a range of factors that should be considered in 
analyzing whether and to what extent media policies are favorable to civil society. 
Among them are the extent of media concentration; how national laws are implemented; 
transnational influences; support for community media; and whether or not independent 
voices and cultural production are promoted (or repressed) by the state. Barriers to civil 
society-oriented policies includes a lack of: independence of legislative bodies to the 
Executive; transparency by government agencies; and comprehensive and consistent 
response to media concentration.  These criteria are highly relevant to my analysis of 
statist media power in Ecuador.  In the same way that the progressive governments 
cannot be analyzed as a whole, media practices and reforms have had dramatically 
different trajectories in each country. The contribution of this study to this body of 
literature is the examinination of not only Ecuador’s media reforms, but actual media 
practices, and how they were enacted in conjunction with extractive practicws. I also 
analyze how other legislation and state actions, not directly related to communication but 
to protest and criminalization of social actors, have enabled or constrained public and 
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political expression by media actors, social movements and citizens.   
To conclude this section, while early literature about the so-called Latin American 
“pink tide” tended to either romanticize or demonize these processes, especially relating 
to the more “radical” administrations of Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales 
(Garretón et al., 2003, Hershberg and Rosen, 2006; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; 
Weyland, et al., 2010), recent literature has sought to critically take stock of the impacts 
of the first decade of state transformation and reform in the region (Stahler-Shock, 
Vanden and Becker, 2013). Though rarely discussed in the same study, my dissertation 
addresses two arenas of criticism of the “so-called” progressive governments, extractivist 
projects and media practices of the Ecuadorian government. These two practices must be 
put in conversation, especially in that the government has used its media power to 
legitimate its extractivist practices.  
1.3.3 Contradictions and conflicts: from progressive constitutions to neo-extractive 
practices. 
The governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have sought to transform the 
state, in part, through the creation of progressive, conceptually innovative constitutions, 
which have purported to advance radical democratic agendas under the rubric “Socialism 
of the 21st Century (Ellner, 2014).11 Given the constituent assembly processes that 
ensued, characterized by democratic debate as well as polarizing political conflict, these 
constitutions (Bolivia 2009, Ecuador 2008, Venezuela 1999) incorporated the input of 
                                                          
11 21st Century Socialism differs in several aspects from 20th century socialism, first and foremost, because 
the centralized state and complete control of the market is not a goal of these governments. 21st Century 
Socialism, a term first used by Chavez in Venezuela, is geopolitically specific and refers to a post-
neoliberal era in which these governments have rejected the dominance of the U.S., Europe and 
transnational organisms such as the World Bank. Correa has defined Ecuador as a 21st century socialist 
state. 
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social movements and diverse sectors of society. Given the recent founding of these 
constitutions, and the participatory nature of their crafting, there has been a high level of 
investment in them by diverse social actors. As such, they are sites of permanent 
construction, interpretation, debate, and contention (Lander, 2013). This is particularly 
true in instances where there are large gaps between what was inscribed in these 
constitutions, and actual state practices.  
One of the biggest sources of conflict between these states and indigenous, 
environmental, ecological and feminist social organizations and movements has been the 
expansion of extractivist practices. In fact, many scholars and activists argue that 
extractivism is the main threat to the environment, indigenous communities, rural 
women’s lives, and to territorial integrity of indigenous populations in Latin America 
(Lander, 2013; Seoane, 2013; Svampa, 2013). While extractive activities have increased 
in virtually all Latin American countries in the 21st century, the difference between right-
wing and progressive government approaches to resource extraction has been that the 
latter have applied more state controls, have taken a greater share of the profits, and have 
reinvested some of the profits in social spending and public works. However, despite the 
investment, many activists argue that extractive activities contradict the spirit and letter 
of the new constitutions. The case of Yasunidos offers an example of how democracy has 
been eroded in Ecuador due to extractivist policies and practices. An analysis that makes 
such connection can contribute to the democratization studies, as it is one that is rarely 
made. 
Factors that have driven the expansion of extractive frontiers have included the 
high prices of materia prima on the international market, which has provided 
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governments with funds for social services and infrastructure, which in turn has helped 
them to preserve their legitimacy and electoral support. Unfortunately, commitments to 
transform the economic and productive model, to honor territorial rights of indigenous 
groups and the rights of Nature, have not been fulfilled (Lander, 2013). Instead, 
extractivist activities have been framed by “so-called” progressive governments as 
essential for “progress,” “development” and “modernization,” and to eradicate poverty 
and attain Buen Vivir. The governments of Morales, Correa and Chavez pledged to 
deepen democracy, and to push representational democracy towards more participatory, 
radical forms. However, extractivist practices have eroded processes of democratization. 
They have led to the violation of rights and have generated diverse forms of violence, 
including: the forced eviction and militarization of communities; the contamination of 
ecosystems leading to severe health issues; the criminalization of protest and jailing of 
activists. In Ecuador, Uruguay and Bolivia, governments have ended up eliminating or 
compromising referendums, previous consultation, and other participatory mechanisms 
when faced with citizen resistance. In Bolivia and Ecuador, new restrictions have been 
put on the legal formation of social organizations, and some organizations have been 
closed or threatened with closure (Ecuador’s Decree 16, and the subsequent closure of 
Pachamama Foundation is discussed in Chapter Three) (Seone et al., 2013). Maristella 
Svampa’s assessment sums it up: 
It is clear that the expansion of the border of rights (collective, territorial, 
environmental) met limits in the growing expansion of the borders of exploitation 
of capital, in search of goods (bienes), land and territories, and threw to the ground 
emancipatory narratives which had raised strong expectations, especially in 
countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador. (Svampa, 2015, p. 91). 
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To sum up this section, the continuation and deepening of extractive practices have 
revealed the contradictions between the rhetoric and practices of Left governments, and 
their violation of new constitutional mandates. However, these anti-democratic practices 
are being met with new waves of protest and other forms of resistance.   
1.3.4 Latin American anti-extractivist protest and social movements 
 Opposition and resistance to resource extraction is as old as resource extraction 
itself. In the past and still today, many struggles are waged at the local level. But with the 
intensification of extractive projects across the Americas, and the subsequent growth of 
national, regional and international activist networks, recent conflicts have gained greater 
visibility.12 Some of the more notable cases have provoked massive citizen marches and 
international solidarity campaigns, including Famatima (a town in Northern Argentina 
that successfully expulsed four mining companies in a decade)13; Tipnis (construction of 
a highway through indigenous lands and national park in Bolivia); Yasuní (planned oil 
exploitation in indigenous lands and national park in Ecuador); and Cajamarca and 
Tambogrande (mega-mining projects in Peru) (Gudynas, 2014).  
Many of the movements involved in these struggles were also active in the anti-
neoliberal protests in the late 1990s and early 2000s. So, what is the relationship between 
these different moments, and what are the characteristics of these new waves of protests 
and movements? Seone et al. (2013) argue that the current movement activity takes place 
                                                          
12 Important anti-extractivist networks include AIDESEP (Peru); CLAES (Latin American region); 
CONACAMI (Peru); and Oil Watch (international), among others. 
13 Origlia, Gabriela. (2015). Famatina: la historia de un pueblo que en nueve años expulsó a cuatro mineras. 
La Nación November 8th. Retrieved from: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1843559-famatina-la-historia-de-un-
pueblo-que-en-nueve-anos-expulso-a-cuatro-mineras 
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in a distinct political context in which there is a new configuration of forces in the region. 
Conflicts have grown in size and number as progressive governments at the helm not 
only break their pledges to dismantle the extractive model, but intensify it. Seone et al. 
further argue that in the current phase of a supposed rupture with neoliberal regimes, 
governments have repositioned extractivism as necessary. As such, “the myth of progress 
is reborn from progresismo.” (Gudynas, 2014a, p. 150).  
Post-extractivism is a concept that points toward the development of strategies 
and alternatives to extractivist projects. Ecuador’s Yasuní ITT campaign to keep the oil in 
the ground was one of the most notable proposals, in that the Ecuadorian government 
took on this citizen-led campaign. In fact, Ecuador was one of the first countries to 
propose a post-petrol state. The campaign to “keep the oil in the soil” originally emerged 
from Amazonian communities that were against oil extraction in their territories, and was 
subsequently taken on by the ecologist movement. The idea became a more concrete 
proposal in Oil Watch’s position paper in June 2005, and became part of the Plan de 
Gobierno 2007-2011. The proposal was eventually proposed officially by the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines in 2007 (Acosta, et al., 2013). Such history makes clear that social 
movement protest and proposals have led to changes in the laws and constitutions. 
Unfortunately, the story also reveals that despite legal and constitutional mandates, the 
progressive governments have failed to provide substantive alternatives to development.  
 Hence, while governments continue to embrace their ¨progressive¨ label, they 
cling to older models of development and resource extraction. In response, resistance to 
these models are growing, and are gaining more visibility inside and outside of the 
region. While there is a great deal of literature about extractivism, few of these studies 
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frame the conflicts as cultural battles in which competing imaginaries about the meaning 
of development are at stake. Nor has the role of media and mediation on these conflicts 
been much studied. This dissertation makes a contribution to the study of this new wave 
of protest by analyzing how mediation and counter-hegemonic, post-development 
imaginaries have shaped these conflicts. Ecuador’s vibrant ecological movement and the 
Yasuní ITT initiative are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. 
1.3.5 Ecuador: From a progressive constitution to extractivist practices 
In 2007, Rafael Correa, a relatively unknown economics professor who had held 
one government position prior to becoming president, ushered in Ecuador’s so-called 
“left turn,” branding it the Citizens’ Revolution.  At that conjecture, the project 
represented the collective construction of the majority of Ecuadorians that had recently 
deposed three presidents in less than a decade. (Vega, 2013, p. 103). Once elected, Correa 
called for a Constituent Assembly. Social movement actors and many other citizens were 
part of the process. While fraught with tensions and contradictions, the end product was a 
progressive, truly innovative (though far from perfect) Constitution.  
   The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution integrated the Indigenous concept of Buen 
Vivir or Sumak Kawsay, which points to an alternative, sustainable, non-capitalist model 
of development. For many, the inclusion of Buen Vivir means conceptualizing 
development as a way of life in which living beings and the natural environment take 
precedence over material wealth (Acosta, 2012; Gudynas, 2009; Lander, 2013). 
Instrinsically tied to the notion of Buen Vivir is the recognition that indigenous, 
afrodescendent and other pueblos’ have collective rights to maintain and develop their 
cultural identities and ancestral territories. These rights include the timely and obligatory 
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consulta previa (previous consultation) regarding any government or government-
sanctioned plans to prospect, extract or commercialize non-renewable resources on 
collectively-owned lands. In Chapter Four, I argue that this constellation of concepts and 
rights has impacted the imaginaries of the citizenry, particularly a new generation that 
Yasunidos represents.   
 One of the most celebrated articles in the Ecuadorian 2008 Constitution is that 
Nature is a subject of rights. This is the first constitution in Latin America, and the world, 
to incorporate this right. Nature is defined in Article 71 of the constitution as “where life 
is reproduced and carried out.” 14 Taken together, these concepts and corresponding rights 
open the door towards a conception of democracy that transcends tenets of liberal 
democracy. However, these were not new concepts in Ecuador. The founding documents 
of CONFENAIE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía 
Ecuatoriana), created in 1980, and documents of other indigenous organizations such as 
the UNAE (Unión de Nativos de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana, 1976) contained passages that 
expressed their rejection of oil drilling and other forms of resource extraction, and 
included the care for Nature as essential for life (Berrios & Cuevas, 2014).  
 Most of the ecological organizations initially supported Correa, especially given 
the Yasuní ITT pledge. However, this support would not last. Despite the path-breaking 
2008 Constitution, extractivist projects increased in scale and intensity, causing conflicts 
between the government and ecological and territorial social movements.  The 
contradictions between rhetoric and practice were glaringly evident: even as the 
government deployed their campaign Yasuní Depende de Ti (the Yasuní depends on You) 
                                                          
14 All translations from Spanish to English in this thesis are mine, unless otherwise noted.  
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in October 2007, it granted an environmental license to Petrobras for Block 31, a territory 
inhabited by two indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation. The break between the 
government and ecologists was definitive when the Mining Law was approved in 2009, 
which opened the way towards mega-mining. This law permits transnational companies 
to develop the mining industry with opencast or mountain top mining. When Alberto 
Acosta resigned from his role as President of the Constituent Assembly in protest because 
of the way in which the government imposed its will in the decision-making processes, 
Correa began to attack the ecological sector much more openly. In 2009, on an Enlace 
Ciudadano (the president’s television and radio show), he directed three insults against 
ecologists that he would continue to use. He accused ecologists of being “infantiles” 
(childish); “aniñados” (privileged, spoiled), and of having “barrigas llenas” (full bellies) 
(LaTorre Tomás, 2009). These insults were meant to strip ecologists of legitimacy in the 
eyes of indigenous actors, Amazonian communities, and public opinion in general. The 
underlying message of these attacks is that the privileged, urban sector, who has never 
known hunger, could not understand the needs of Amazonian communities. For Correa, 
the ecological movement represented all that was contrary to his modernist project of 
“progress”. 
 On March 5, 2012, the government signed the first mega-mining agreement with 
Ecuacorrientes S.A. (a Canadian-Chinese enterprise) for 25 years. Three days later, over 
20,000 indigenous, campesino and other social actors marched from Zamora to Quito. 
The amount of citizen support encountered along the route was substantial, perhaps 
surprising given the overwhelming popularity of the administration at that time. In 
addition to this being the first large mobilization since Correa came to power, Ospina 
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(2013) encountered a few notable items, including the “disproportionate” (p. 28) 
government publicity campaign which sought to discredit the marchers, and the 
deployment of a government-facilitated counter march. These practices have since 
characterized the way in which the government has dealt with protest.  
As this brief section details, initial enthusiasm for Correa’s Citizen Revolution by 
social movements has increasingly given way to conflict and opposition. As Escobar 
(2010) argues, the so-called progressive governments have demonstrated that, despite 
pledges to transform the development model, there is still a lack of engagement with a 
post-capitalist, alternative forms of modernity that could potentially lead to significant 
changes in this model.  
1.4 Theoretical Overview  
1.4.1 Theoretical frameworks and perspectives 
This dissertation seeks to make theoretical, methodological and empirical 
contributions to the fields of critical media theory and social movement studies, two 
bodies of literature that I bring into conversation in this study. Principally, I utilize two 
conceptual frameworks, statist media power and mediated cultural politics, to analyze the 
conflict between the Ecuadorian government and Yasunidos, as they engage in broader 
cultural struggles over meanings of extractivism, development, and Buen Vivir. In 
addition to analyzing the contours of statist media power, I explore its limitations, and 
how social movements interrupt it. I am also in dialogue with social movement 
scholarship that analyzes the media practices of social movements and the symbolic 
dimensions of struggle.  
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1.4.2 Statist media power  
Within media studies, I am in conversation with scholarship relating to the 
concept of media power. This concept has mainly been used in the study of media 
institutions in Western liberal democracies, which tend to focus on the power of media 
corporations (Couldry, 2003; Freedman, 2014). On the contrary, my study focuses on the 
communicational dynamics at play in state-social movement relations in the context of a 
Latin American media system that is markedly different than liberal democratic media 
systems. In Ecuador (as in the other Left governments in the region), the typical Latin 
American configuration of media power, in which the state and private media are allies, 
has been transformed under Correa. By making explicit dimensions of statist media 
power, I emphasize both its symbolic and structural aspects, and ways in which they 
reinforce each other. I use the concept of statist media power to call attention to the 
Ecuadorian government as the main holder of media power. My study differs from 
scholars that study the changes underway in Latin American media institutions by 
focusing on state-private media relations (including those that use populism as an 
analytical framework). It is rare to find studies that analyze the impact that reconfigured 
media power has had on social movements in both media and social movement studies.   
This study analyzes the reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador since 2007, 
when Rafael Correa assumed the presidency. While private media has historically been a 
dominant force in Ecuador, as in much of the world, I would argue that, during the time 
period under discussion, the government had unprecedented media power given the 
collusion of state and media meta-capital (which I refer to as statist media power). I trace 
the way in which Correa’s administration has dramatically reshaped media and 
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communication practices in Ecuador, and examine the significance that such practices 
have had for social movements. I extend Nick Couldry’s (2003) conceptual elaboration of 
media power, which emphasizes its symbolic dimensions and its definitional power, 
which influences and shapes the whole of social space. Drawing on Bourdieu (1989) but 
taking into account mediatization15 processes that were less pronounced at the time when 
Bourdieu wrote, Couldry argues that media power is generated in and across fields, 
particularly the journalistic and political fields. He extends Bourdieu’s concept of the 
meta-capital of the state, which refers to the state’s power over other fields, arguing that 
only the media’s meta-capital can compete with that of the state’s meta-capital. I apply 
this concept to the Ecuadorian context, in which media meta capital is an integral part of 
the state’s meta-capital. In Ecuador, the government’s media power potently traverses the 
journalistic and political fields, impacting all fields of power and social space. Hence, 
statist media power is a critical site at which I interrogate symbolic as well as materialist 
struggles between the government and social movements. I also draw on Des Freedman’s 
(2014) work on media power. While he also takes into account the symbolic aspects of 
media power, and how it can shape, modify, promote and reinforce particular ideologies, 
his analysis remains anchored in media power’s unequally distributed allocation of 
resources. 
 I chart the reconfiguration of statist media power, its symbolic and material 
dimensions, in several ways. In Chapter 3, I analyze how the Correa government has 
wrought substantive changes through its communication practices, media reforms,  
                                                          
15 Without entering into the long-standing theoretical debate about mediatization, I am simply referring to 
media’s pervasive influence over social space. Mediatization assumes that media practices are constitutive 
of the social construction of reality (Couldry 2014).  
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legislative and judicial actions. I track the way the government has used its statist media 
power to seek consensus for its extractivist politics, as it simultaneously has sought to 
delegitimize dissenting voices. I also examine how the Enlace Ciudadano (Citizen’s Link, 
also referred to in this study as EC) has been the main platform for the government to 
communicate its agenda and ideological course.  
 My study also interrogates the limitations and excesses of statist media power. 
Des Freedman (2014) offers some useful thoughts about resistance to media power. 
Freedman’s theorization of media power is, as he states, mainly relevant to countries with 
“pluralist political arrangements and intensively marketized economic systems where the 
configuration of media power is formally separate from but intertwined with the state” (p. 
3). However, he proposes that media power is not as impermeable as often thought. He 
also argues that readers actively interprete media texts (a common argument in cultural 
studies literature). As his own empirical studies have shown, including in the cases where 
dominant media strongly asserts certain editorial lines.  
1.4.3 Mediated cultural politics 
 If we compare Yasunidos or any other social movement’s media power with that 
of the government’s, it is evident that these groups are at a disadvantage. So, 
theoretically, how can we account for the ways in which Yasunidos has been able to 
interrupt the government´s media power? I propose that the notion of mediated cultural 
politics is crucial for understanding how Yasunidos has mobilized counter-hegemonic 
meanings, proposed alternatives to the prevailing order, shaped collective imaginaries, 
and generated a common ground of struggle on a national level. They have done so in the 
  
 
 
 
 
26 
face of the government’s unprecedented power to represent its version of the Yasuní 
story.  
The idea of mediated cultural politics fuses two distinct conceptualizations. The 
first is Alvarez et al.’s (1998) cultural politics framework. Despite important theoretical 
contributions about the constitutive role of culture in social movements, scholars who 
have studied contemporary Latin American social movements have rarely analyzed or 
linked cultural politics or cultural production to political action (Alvarez et. al. 1998; 
Escobar, 1992). Recent scholarship on Latin American anti-extractivist social movements 
bears witness to the lack of attention given to how movements deploy cultural politics in 
social struggles (Acosta et al, 2013; Gudynas 2013; Seone et al. 2013). On the contrary, 
Alvarez et al. (1998) have argued for the centrality of culture, pointing out that a focus on 
culture does not necessarily mean that historical context and structural inequalities are 
neglected. Dissatisfied with the disciplinary borders that framed the analysis of Latin 
American social movements, Alvarez et. al. (1998) drew attention to “how social 
movements operate at the interface of culture and politics.” (p. xi).  By simultaneously 
examining “the cultural in the political and the political in the cultural” (p. xi) they 
propose that a cultural politics is enacted “when movements deploys alternative 
conceptions of ‘woman, nature, race, economy, democracy or citizenship’ that trouble 
and resignify dominant discourses and practices (199, p. 6). Methodologically, we can 
track such “deployment of alternative conceptions” and their impact on diverse publics 
by studying the texts, images, videos, rituals, etc. that movements produce and circulate. 
Similarly, Escobar contends that “social movements must be seen equally and 
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inseparably as struggles over meanings as well as material conditions, that is, as cultural 
struggles” (1992, p. 69). He argues that:  
[S]ymbolic creativity in everyday life is vibrant, if somewhat invisible; it involves 
language, the body, performance rituals, work, and both individual and collective 
identities. It is essential for social movement research to tap into this level of 
popular practice….It is out of this reservoir of meanings … that people give shape 
to their struggle. (1998, p.71).  
 
 Escobar distinguishes this notion of culture from those that understand it as 
“something embedded in a set of canonical texts, beliefs and artifacts and characterized 
by a certain abstract universality” which in effect, renders invisible the daily lives and 
practices of people and movements (1998, p. 70). The cultural politics approach also 
departs from notions of culture as unified, fixed, or as either traditional practices, nation-
based, or as high art. Following these scholars, this dissertation takes seriously the way in 
which Yasunidos mobilized culture to appeal to counter-hegemonic, post-development 
imaginaries about the intrinsic value of leaving the oil in the ground in the Yasuní.  
Secondly, I draw on Jesus Martín-Barbero´s understanding of mediation as socio-
cultural manifestations that traverse and give meaning to the process of communication 
(Gámez 2007, p. 208). In the past few years, scholars have veered away from 
technologist or romantic notions of activist media use. Rather they have theorized the 
complex processes that traverse social movements and their media practices. Lievrouw  
(2011) has called for a theoretical bridge between interpersonal interaction and media, 
proposing that mediation can indicate the use of technology to extend or enhance 
communication. It also can refer to “the interpersonal process of participation or 
intervention in the creation and sharing of meaning” (p. 4). These two dimensions are 
“complementary and mutually determining aspects of the whole phenomenon of 
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communication, rather than analytically separate and competing domains.” (p. 4). A 
focus on mediation displaces a restrictive focus on the media and rather focuses on social 
actors and processes that shape meanings and social imaginaries. A recent edited volume 
on social movements and mediation processes (Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCurdy, 2013) 
contributes greatly to bringing these two bodies of literature together. In said volume, 
McCurdy (2013, p. 6) prefers to view media as an environment that activists “live with, 
live in and live through.” Other scholars extend social movement concepts: Mattoni 
(2013) shifts Tilly and Tarrow’s conceptualization of repertoires of contention to 
repertoires of communication , in order to examine mediated social practices. In another 
instance, Constanza-Chock (2013) coined the phrase transmedia mobilization to refer to 
the range and layering of media practices and communication platforms used by activists. 
Scholars such as John Downing (2000) have been emphasizing diverse forms of 
mediation for decades. 
Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics have been deployed through an array of 
media, including social media, alternative media, and myriad artistic and cultural 
manifestations incorporated into protest actions. Beyond thinking about mediation as 
mere tools or strategies, I address the potent symbolic effect of mediation in the shaping 
of belief systems and social imaginaries. In the case of the meaning of Buen Vivir and 
development, the government and Yasunidos have engaged in a symbolic, mediated 
confrontation over their meaning. To grasp how power dynamics play out on a symbolic 
terrain requires perceptive theoretical tools. A mediated cultural politics framework 
allows for the articulation between creative and political expression, without diminishing 
one dimension in favor of the other. It allows us to see the practices of art and media-
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making (including painting, murals, ritual performance or street theater, producing radio 
or video, etc.) as relevant to the everyday work of meaning-making and movement-
building.  And crucial for the study of social movements, it can shed light on processes 
that a sole focus on media power might not detect.  
My analysis of Yasunidos protests and other actions through a mediated cultural 
politics framework has rendered visible the underside of media power. Even while the 
Ecuadorian government wields statist media power, and therefore a greater capacity to 
represent social reality, Yasunidos has constructed counter-hegemonic representations 
from below that resonated widely with diverse publics. Hence, as explored in Chapter 4, 
a mediated cultural politics framework theoretically, methodologically and empirically 
challenges the idea that statist media power always has the upper hand in shaping 
understandings of reality. I examine the multiple ways in which Yasunidos has 
confronted the government’s media power, and how it has mobilized alternative notions 
of development and Buen Vivir with symbols and images crafted from below and shared 
horizontally. Such mediated cultural politics directly confronts the government’s distinct 
use of the same concepts to justify opening the Yasuní to further intervention.  Finally, by 
distinguishing between statist media power and mediated cultural politics I am seeking to 
identify and differentiate each actor’s weapons, so to speak. Working in tandem, the two 
conceptual lenses, media power and mediated cultural politics help make visible the 
contentious communication between the government and Yasunidos without solely 
relying on a media-centric notion of power. 
 My dissertation also draws from research that examines the symbolic practices of 
movements. Broadly speaking, the fields of social movement scholarship and media 
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studies have not always interacted. Social movement scholarship has not sufficiently 
taken into account the communicative practices of movements, or communicative 
dynamics between movements and governments (Cammaerts et al., 2013). Likewise, 
recent research about Latin American anti-extractivist social movements, where I situate 
my study, rarely touches on mediated power dynamics, with some notable exceptions 
(Vázquez, 2015). Fortunately, there are growing exceptions to what Downing (2008) has 
described as a “divorce” (p. 41) between the fields of media and social movement 
scholarship. A recent body of trans-disciplinary research that study what I call ‘new 
activist cultures’ has made important strides in analyzing media use by 21st century social 
movements (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Costanza-Chock, 2014; Cox et al., 2010; Juris, 
2012; Mattoni & Trere, 2014; Nanabhay & Farmanfarmaian, 2011; Postill 2014).  
Mattoni and Trere (2014) critique the one-medium bias in social movement literature that 
misses the multiple ways in which social actors, and new and old media technologies, 
come together.  
 Social movement scholars, notably those who are part of the current generation of 
scholar-activists, are turning their attention to the intersection of new technologies and 
creative expression that is generated in movement cultures. Many of these studies focus 
on social movement media as embedded in daily practices (Costanza-Chock, 2014; 
Fernandes, 2010; Juris, 2008; Juris & Pleyers, 2009; McNee, 2003), as a conduit toward 
collective identity formation and “mass self-communication” (Castells, 2007, p. 246). 
Cammaerts et al. (2013) employ the concept of mediation to address the shifting 
relationship between media practices of social movements, patterns of media power and 
counter-power, with attention to symbolic power. While this edited volume is a valuable 
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contribution to social movement media studies, they emphasize the media practices and 
environment of activists, though few chapters analyze the contentious communication 
between movements and other actors, such as governments. One exception is the chapter 
by Teune (2013), who analyzes the role that images play in the battle for visibility 
between the German government and social movement actors at the 2007 G8 meeting. 
However, most studies on movement mediation rarely analyze how such practices 
confront state discourse and practices, which is where I hope to make a contribution.  
  The study of movement-based cultural production entails a multi-layered, 
transdisciplinary investigation into the creation and circulation of diverse media and art, 
and the use of public space by movement actors. It involves an analysis of the way that 
photos, videos, graphics, performances and rituals, integrated into protest actions, can 
bear witness to historic injustices and struggles, and provide symbolic currency that is 
shared and borrowed among movements and diverse publics. It is attentive to ways in 
which cultural production mobilizes counter-hegemonic images, discourses and 
perspectives, and the way on-line and off-line interactions shape collective imaginaries. 
For example, Mattoni et al. (2014, p. 4) argue that recent trends in social media practices 
have facilitated a scenario in which widely shared icons, texts, and images become 
“ubiquitous alternative media, linked through different technological sites and 
platforms.” McCaughn (2012) turns his attention to the role of artists in movement-
building, arguing that they help to create visualities and spaces through which citizens 
imagine new forms of meaningful citizenship. Tucker (2010) argues that “aesthetic 
politics” “…informs the understanding and practice of politics, the latter defined not only 
in terms of representatives, but also concerning a ‘broadly politicized’ public life.” (p. 5). 
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While such symbolic and performative manifestations have been widely used in protest 
movements, arguably since the rise of new social movements in the 1970s and 80s 
(Tucker, 2010, p. 43), in Ecuador, movements have typically enacted a more traditional 
format of militant-style marches. Feminist and ecological movement actors introduced 
more performative elements in the 1990s. Of course, all marches are performance to 
some degree, here I refer to the widespread use of images, icons as well as playful, ludic 
protest. In that sense, the way in which Yasunidos has deployed mediated cultural politics 
has been noted by older social movement actors, political analysts and journalists. 
Research presented in Chapter 4 indicates that the powerful images, symbols, and slogans 
regularly displayed by Yasunidos in protest actions, zapateadas, press conferences, 
plazas, and on their bodies was able to reach those citizens not necessarily tuned in to 
political debates or social media conversations. Alvarez et al. (2016, p. 26) remind us that 
political art can make visible “the very notion of alternatives.”   
1.4.4 Post-Development Imaginaries 
 In Chapter 4, I examine how the mediated cultural politics of Yasunidos expresses 
a post-development imaginary. In this conceptualization, I follow Escobar (2014), who 
defines “post-development” as social practices and discourses that displace normative 
conceptions of development, in order to identify alternatives to development.16 This 
concept rejects the hierarchy of knowledge and power established by development 
“experts.” Rather, it valores territorial, indigenous and movement knowledges. He traces 
the advent of the term post-development to 1991, though arguably this concept began to 
emerge in the 1980s in Ecuador and elsewhere. Within the field of post-development, 
                                                          
16 Escobar distinguishes the concept of post-development from alternative development, a concept that 
remains within the development paradigm. 
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Escobar (2014) identifies five key theoretical and methodological tendencies, including 
1) modernity/coloniality/decolonialy studies; 2) alternatives to development; 3) 
transitions to post-extractivism; 4) discourses on the civilizational model, and 5) concepts 
of community, relationality and the pluriverse. I believe that my exploration of post-
development imaginaries makes a theoretical contribution to this field of study by 
analyzing how new, anti-extractivist movements are creating and circulating art and 
embodied practices (in addition to media practices) that signal a generational turn with 
regard to how resource extraction is regarded within a petrol state.  
1.5 Research Methodologies 
1.5.1 Reflexive, engaged, ethnographic, epistemologies of the South frameworks 
 This section discusses my methodological perspectives, what Saukko (2003) 
refers to as the array of “tools, philosophical and political commitments” that accompany 
a particular approach to research, and that bring forth a “partial and political perspective 
on reality” (p. 8). I situate yy hybrid methodological framework as engaged, decolonial, 
feminist, ethnographic research that adopts an epistemology of the South approach. Such 
framework indicates that research is never neutral and is always traversed by power 
relations, inequality, conflict, capitalist modes of production, colonial legacies and 
divergent values and knowledges.  
 With respect to the question of engaged scholarship, I have been involved in 
activism related to media justice, and have participated in both U.S.-based and Latin 
American-based social movements. In fact, I have been an activist far longer than I have 
been inside the academy, and in this research project I have sought to strike a balance 
between the two. While Juris (2013, p. 344) warns that activist-researchers needs to take 
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into account such “dual positionality” (p. 344), Maristella Svampa (2008) critiques the 
expected fissure or false binary between the academic and the activist. She argues that: 
 …we believe it is possible to integrate both models that today are seen as 
opposites, that of the academic and that of the militant [activist], without denying 
the character of either one….we can establish the possibility of combining both into 
one paradigm, that of the intellectual researcher as amphibian, a figure capable of 
inhabiting and travelling through different worlds, and able to develop a better 
comprehension and reflexivity about the different social realities, and about 
oneself….with the possibility of generating multiple ties, solidarities and crossings 
between different realities. (Svampa, 2008, p. 30). 
 
 My interest in anti-extractivist conflicts grew rapidly since arriving in Ecuador in 
August 2012. While I had not been involved in ecological activism, several factors came 
into play in my new geopolitical location that lent itself to this focus: exposure to 
ecologists and indigenous individuals and movements active in resisting extractive 
projects; the fact that Nature is a subject of rights in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution; 
and my relatively close proximity to the Amazon. Even President Correa’s persuasive 
campaign about the value of the Yasuní ITT region, impacted me. They caused me to 
turn my attention to the relationship between political ecology, indigenous cosmovisions, 
and anti-extractive struggles. In August 2013, when Correa officially abandoned the 
Yasuní ITT project, I shared the anguish felt by thousands of Ecuadorian citizens. 
Additionally, my sense was that it was an important coyuntura (historical moment) in 
contemporary Ecuadorian politics. When Yasunidos came into being, not only was I 
present at the marches and witnessed the passion of these young activists, I realized it 
was the first highly-visible, nation-wide, anti-extractivist protest since I arrived a year 
prior. Though it was not the first wave of protests since Correa was President, it seemed 
quite significant, and I decided to track what was happening, though I had no idea how 
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Yasunidos might develop, or even if it would last.  I continued to pursue my research on 
the communication law (my original thesis topic), and perhaps because of these two foci, 
I was acutely aware of how the communicational dynamics in Ecuador were affecting the 
state-social movement conflict.  
Another methodological stance I assume is attention to reflexivity, which involves 
being critically aware of the way in which my commitments shape my research practice. 
While this is not a new concept in ethnography, Saukko (2003) points out that reflexivity 
should be used as a tool to enhance awareness of one’s own situatedness and limited 
nature of one’s worldview, which should hopefully aid the researcher in being more open 
to other perspectives. Such limitations need to be extended to being realistic about the 
impact my research might have, or not have. For example, while Juris (2013) calls 
attention to the “subversive and productive potential” of such research, he also 
acknowledges the constraints that might reduce the scholar’s role to a “supportive 
interlocutor.” (p. 367). In terms of my own process of reflexivity, I have had to face my 
own positionality vis á vis my research: being an outsider, a U.S. citizen who was 
relatively new to Ecuador and without any ties to the ecologist movement; and age, in 
that Yasunidos is largely a youth movement and I am at least a generation older than 
most of them; and perhaps the most critical, the political moment in which protest and 
protesters were being identified, delegitimized, and criminalized by the government. As 
such, at protests I situated myself more so as an observer, rather than an active 
participant. During my field work, many individuals, including foreigners, became part of 
the government’s campaign of mediated delegitimation and criminalization. Researchers 
and activists alike were targeted for their stance as allies to Yasunidos and indigenous 
  
 
 
 
 
36 
groups. In fact, one North American that was associated with the Amazon, Pachamama 
Foundation and Yasunidos, had his visa revoked and was forced to leave the country. 
Taking these events into consideration, I kept a decidedly low profile, representing 
myself more as a researcher than an activist, though I was openly an ally of the 
movement. However, with regard to gaining access to Yasunidos’ weekly assemblies, 
which were private, I was also there as an affiliate of El Churo Comunicación, an 
alternative media collective. On a few occasions I wrote short pieces for their website 
about Yasunidos. Yasunidos was aware that I was doing research, but at the same time I 
was making myself useful in a way that was consistent with my skills, interests and 
affiliations. Arturo Escobar (2015, p. 9) raises pertinent questions with regards to 
committed research:  
With whom, how and from where do we think? With which objectives? What 
does it mean to think with others, with the movement activists that produce their 
own knowledges, with the subaltern, with social groups in resistance, instead of 
only thinking from, and with, the canons of social sciences. 
 
Escobar argues that while we need to recognize that committed research traditions 
emerged in the Américas in the 1960s, there are many new formulations which have 
emerged from “dialogical methodologies” (p. 9) and their intersectionalities, such as 
decoloniality, feminism, indigenous and other epistemologies that reposition the South as 
a key space of production of knowledge. For Boaventura de Souza Santos (2010, p. 43) 
the global South is not a concept limited to geographical location, but rather is a 
“metaphor for human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism on a global scale 
and the resistance to overcome or minimize it.” Such epistemology is based on the idea 
that research must not be limited to a western comprehension of the world, which is just a 
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small part of a vast array of knowledges, values, and ways to conceptually organize 
space, time, relationships, and life itself.    
These methodological perspectives are pertinent to my own scholarly endeavors, 
and are consistent with the movement context within which I have been working.  
1.6 Research design: Methods, questions, and summary 
 This dissertation is a qualitative case study of the mediated conflict between   
Yasunidos and the Ecuadorian government. It focuses on a time one-year time period, 
from August 15, 2013 (the day that Correa announced the suspension of the Yasuní ITT 
campaign to keep the oil in the ground) until August 15, 2014. 
1.6.1 Dates of Field Work 
 I arrived in Ecuador on August 8, 2012, and conducted preliminary research on a 
range of topics while studying for my comprehensive exams and writing my prospectus. I 
was in Ecuador during the one-year time period of the case study, and have subsequently 
remained in Ecuador while writing the dissertation. For two years, I followed a multi-
method research design which included ethnographic observation and participation at 
marches, public forums, artistic events, and university-based symposia. I attended over a 
dozen Yasunidos assemblies (closed strategy meetings which were held weekly) and was 
present at the key moments analyzed in this thesis. I also attended the Yasunidos national 
assembly in Cuenca in late 2014. At these events, I engaged in unstructured, on-site 
conversations with other participants.  
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1.6.2 Field site 
 My main field site was Quito, Ecuador’s capital city. This was both a strength and 
limitation of the study. On the one hand, the Quito-based Yasunidos collective was the 
most visible, due in part to its location in the capital and seat of government, and 
therefore site of national marches and well-known allies of the movement, such as 
Acción Ecológica. This also embued Yasunidos-Quito with a strong political character. 
However, the Yasunidos collectives that emerged in towns and cities across Ecuador had 
distinct characteristics, due to several factors, among them the local political context. For 
example, if the local governments did not support Correa’s movement, they were not 
harassed as badly as Yasunidos-Quito, where the city government was part of Alianza 
Pais (until they lost the mayoral elections in February 2014). While I had several 
opportunities to meet with Yasunidos members from other towns and cities, I was not 
able to focus on groups outside of Quito.  
1.6.3 Methods  
 The case study is a useful methodological approach for studying social 
movements, as it permits the integration of various objects of research or phenomena in a 
spatially delimited time period. Case study research invites multi-perspectival reflection 
and allows for methodological flexibility (Snow & Trom, 2002). Its defining 
characteristics include research and analysis of a “bounded social phenomenon” that can 
generate “a richly detailed and ‘thick’ elaboration of the phenomena studied through the 
use and triangulation of multiple methods….” (Snow & Trom, 2002, p. 147). My case 
study fits neither the category of a “representative” nor “unique” case, but has elements 
of each. Following Ragin (1992), Snow & Trom suggest that the best way to proceed is to 
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first ask what is the object of the case study. Often times such object is “an instance of an 
important theoretical concept or process” (Ragin, 1992, p. 2, as cited in Snow & Trom, 
2002, p. 147). In fact, the object of my case study is not limited to Yasunidos as an anti-
extractivist, ecological youth movement; rather it is a study of a movement that is 
inscribed within a particular social, political and communicational context, that enters 
into direct conflict with the Ecuadorian government. In addition to empirical analysis, it 
seeks to theoretically explore processes of media power and cultural mediation in a 
situation of conflict. As such, this case examines a new way of constructing politics that 
is derived from movement strategies, as well as the use of direct democratic means that 
are inscribed in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution. And, as I will argue later in this study, 
while Yasunidos is not the first nor the only group to contest Correa on mediated terrain, 
the events that occur within the year under study mark a point of inflection, in which 
there is a “before” and “after” Yasunidos.  
 Within the case study, I draw from various methods including ethnographic 
inquiry, semi-structured interviews, institutional analysis and qualitative media analysis. 
Ethnography was my foundational methodology and method. One of the most basic 
definitions of ethnography, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 4) propose: 
In its most characteristic form ethnography involves the researcher participating, 
overtly or covertly, in people's lives for an extended period of time, watching 
what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions—in fact, collecting 
whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the 
research. 
 
 However, I prefer to situate my own “engaged” ethnography (Juris 2013, p. 4) in 
conversation with other movement scholars that seek to practice ethnography in a way 
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that is at once epistemological, methodological and as method. Transcending the view of 
ethnography as just a set of research methods, it involves a specific mode of  
“epistemological encounter” … involving an ethic of openness and flexibility and a 
willingness to allow oneself to become personally transformed through the research 
process.” (Juris, 2013, p. 9). In the best case scenario, it allows the ethnographer to 
“generate new concepts and analyses in the process of ethnographic engagement” that 
might not emerge from other methodologies (Juris 2013, p. 9). Juris points out, and I 
agree, that this is particularly true in the study of new(er) social movements that are 
overtly anti-capitalist and that do not take capitalist modernity as a given. These 
movements do not neatly fit into conventional social movement methods and categories 
such as resource mobilization, framing and political opportunities. I further theorize this 
new wave of social movements in Chapter 2.  
 As part of my ethnography, I attended closed, weekly Yasunidos assemblies; the 
early wave of street protests; the zapateadas (festive protest events with music and 
dancing); key marches held in Quito; university and movement-led conferences about the 
Yasuní; the “infantile ecologist” carnivals; the arrival of the indigenous women’s walk to 
Quito; Yasunidos weekend retreat following the first year of protest; and two ethical 
tribunes abut the Yasuní that were held in Quito. I was able to travel to different 
Amazonian towns, including: Coca, Macas, Puyo, and an indigenous community located 
within the Yasuní. I participated in a “Toxic Tour” with movement actors in the northern, 
most contaminated region of the Amazon (Lago Agrio and surrounding áreas). During 
that weekend we met with and participated in workshops with affected communities, and 
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went on an inspection of a processing plant that received complaints by citizens of 
contamination. 
 A complementary method I used was in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
movement leaders, political analysts and journalists. As part of my research design, I 
waited until after the one-year period of ethnographic observation and participation to 
personally conduct a small, purposive sample of in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with Yasunidos members that I considered to be key leaders. This included a group 
interview with 10 members of Yasunidos that were particularly focused on the 
communicative dimension of the movement. I also conducted in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with journalists, academics, political analysts, and social movement actors that 
were present during that first year. By waiting, the interviewees had, as I did, the benefit 
of hindsight and analysis. The interviews allowed me to co-theorize with movement 
actors. In total, I conducted 30 in-depth interviews ranging from 1.5 to 2 hours.  
 My ethnographic approach also involved conducting qualitative media analysis of 
a few media sources. I call my media analysis “ethnographic” in that I understand the 
flow of media as embedded in people’s daily lives and contexts. Especially in a city like 
Quito, many politically-minded people tend to follow the same media sources. I closely 
followed, collected, and took “ethnographic” notes on television (morning politically-
oriented talk shows), newspaper coverage of national dailies (mainly El Telegrafo, the so-
called “public” newspaper, and El Comercio, a privately owned enterprise) and social 
media conversations on Yasunidos’ Facebook page) during that first year, particularly of 
the key moments (the emergence of Yasunidos; protest marches; the signature collection 
process; and the subsequent tearing down of this direct democratic process by the 
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government). I watched and conducted qualitative analysis of 15 of President Correa’s 
EC shows during that first year, particularly the key moments previously mentioned (I 
also attended one EC). In my study of the Enlaces, I sought to understand the mediated, 
discursive patterns related to the delegitimation and criminalization of Yasunidos and 
allies, as well as the government’s discources about development, Buen Vivir, and the 
Amazon. A limitation of my media analysis is that I did not closely follow radio, which is 
still a widespread, highly popular means of receiving and exchanging information.  
My theoretical and methodological engagement with media power led me to 
undertake an institutional analysis of the journalistic field. In Chapter Three, I map 
changes in media ownership since Correa came to power, in order to develop my idea of 
statist media power, and the media terrain in which the conflict between Correa and 
Yasunidos took place.  
1.6.4 Research Questions  
Building on my research design, I formulated the following questions: 
1) How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of struggle against extractivist 
politics in Ecuador?  
a. How was the mediatization of the conflict a constitutive part of the 
struggle?  
2) How has the Correa government reconfigured media power in Ecuador? 
a. How has it used its media power to delegitimize and criminalize 
Yasunidos and other social actors that oppose oil drilling in the Yasuní? 
3) How has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power? 
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a. How has Yasunidos deployed mediated cultural politics of post-
development, thereby challenging the state’s extractivist discourses and 
practices? 
The following chapters examine these questions in the following manner: 
 Chapter 1: New Waves of Protest in Ecuador’s Citizen Revolution. The 
introductory chapter presents the project summary, relevant background contexts, a 
review of relevant literature, my theoretical and methodological frameworks, research 
design, methods, my research questions and chapter breakdown.  
 Chapter 2: The Emergence of Yasunidos. In this chapter, I address Question #1: 
How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of struggle against extractivist politics 
in the Ecuadorian context? The chapter locates Yasunidos within social movement 
theory, as part of a new wave of social movements contesting extractivist practices of 
Latin American progressive governments. My methodological focus is that of the case 
study ethnography. I analyze the conditions that have given rise to the emergence of this 
movement, and provide a panoramic view of the first year of the movement, its practices, 
and its conflict with the Ecuadorian government. Methods of analysis used in this chapter 
include ethnography, and qualitative analyses of interviews and other documents, such as 
newspaper reports, blogs, and television programs. 
 Chapter 3: The reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador and its impact on 
state-social movement conflicts. In Chapter 3, I focus on addressing Question #2: How 
has the Correa government reconfigured media power in Ecuador? And, 2a: How has it 
used its media power to seek consensus for its extractivist politics, and to criminalize 
social movements that are against such politics? To answer these questions, I use the 
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concept of statist media power, which allows me to examine how the Ecuadorian 
government has reconfigured media symbolically and materially, through media 
ownership and production practices, and legislative-judicial-administrative actions. Once 
I have analyzed how media power has changed under Correa’s administration, I analyze 
how it has used its media power to seek consensus for its extractivist policies and 
practices. My methods include institutional analysis of the growth of government media, 
and qualitative analysis of the EC and pro-extractivist government publicity and 
propaganda.  
 Chapter 4: The mediated cultural politics of post-development. Chapter 4 focuses 
on my third question: How has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power? 
The subquestion is: How has Yasunidos deployed a mediated cultural politics of post-
development, thereby challenging the state’s extractivist discourses and practices? Here I 
present the conceptual framework of mediated cultural politics, and the notion of post-
development imaginaries. To better illustrate the concept, I conduct a qualitative visual 
analysis of instances of creative expression, embodied practices and performative protest 
of Yasunidos, allied artists and indigenous women (including the zapateadas and the 
Indigenous Women’s March on Quito). 
Chapter 5: Democracy in Extinction? Challenges to processes of democratization. 
Chapter 5 provides some concluding thoughts about the case study. It seeks to account 
for the important gains of Yasunidos, while also examining its limitations. It also 
provides a final reflection on the power of statist media, as well as its limits. Finally, I 
outline the contributions of the study, and suggest directions for further research.    
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EMERGENCE OF YASUNIDOS 
2.1 Introduction  
  Before I arrived in Ecuador, I had read much about the power of social 
movements, especially the indigenous movement. I also read and viewed audiovisual 
material about the various uprisings that occurred throughout the 1990s and 2000s. So, a 
few months after moving to Quito, I learned about an upcoming protest called by 
CONAIE, with respect to the auctioning of new oil blocks in the Amazon. I looked 
forward to witnessing this powerful movement in action. However, when I arrived at the 
Marriott Hotel, the site where the protest against the oil auction was to take place, I 
received a surprise. Rather than witnessing thousands of people in the streets like in the 
videos I had seen, I encountered a group of no more than 100 people. When I asked an 
activist friend why there had been so few people, she replied that people did not want to 
go to jail. This was my introduction to the criminalization of protest under the Correa 
government.  
The next time I witnessed a protest was ten months later, when Correa announced 
the end of the Yasuní ITT initiative. It seemed that the spirited protests I had heard so 
much about had returned. I also witnessed the emergence of a new movement.  
A member of Yasunidos theorizes about the new generation that largely conforms 
Yasunidos: 
Yasunidos came into being, in part, because of the government’s putting 
Yasuní ITT in the limelight. [Here is] a new generation with an abstract 
sensibility, a new attitude towards Nature, a new ethical pact with 
Nature…. This is a generation that no longer comes from the traditional, 
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authoritarian family. They have a lot more information, which not only 
comes from the radio, television, and the priest….And it also might be that 
they come more from the middle class than popular classes…. Those who 
participate are not just organic, as those with the most visibility…the 
majority that participate represent new configurations of families, new 
subjectivities in the nation….that have more empathy with feminism. [They 
are] less tolerant of the justification of vertical, aggressive, extractivism that 
is violent with Nature.  (SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015). 
 
This chapter explores the emergence of this new movement, its 
characteristics and its differences with older movements. It examines the research 
question and subquestion: How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of 
struggle against extractivist politics in Ecuador? And, as part of that question, I 
discuss how the mediatization of the Yasunidos-Ecuadorian government conflict 
been a constitutive part of such struggle (though I delve further into this question in 
the following chapter). This chapter first offers a conceptual focus, in conversation 
with scholars that are theorizing the new wave of protests, and the movements that 
are confronting the progressive governments. I propose that Yasunidos is part of a 
new wave of protests across the Americas. Like other movements in Latin 
America, the its emergence makes visible the continuation and intensification of 
resource extraction, also referred to as neo-extractivism when specifically 
discussing extractivism under the so-called progressive governments (Gudynas 
2012). The case study of Yasunidos helps shed light on this new wave of protests, 
particularly how social movements and citizens are resisting such practices. I 
contend that Yasunidos has done so through mediated cultural politics, which I 
define as counterhegemonic cultural expressions enacted by social movements, in 
any form, that are then circulated and shared across multiple media platforms.  
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 This chapter, divided into four sections, seeks to present a panoramic view of the 
case. The first section contains a theoretical discussion about the new wave of social 
movements and protest in 2lst century Latin America. The second section analyzes the 
background context that made possible the emergence of Yasunidos. A key piece of the 
story was the Yasuní ITT initiative, how it emerged, and the roles played by social 
movements, NGOs, civil society and government. With respect to a communicational 
context, I also discuss the government media campaigns that brought the Yasuní ITT 
initiative national and international visibility and acclaim. After presenting these 
antecedents, Section 3 focuses on the emergence of Yasunidos, keeping in mind the 
theoretical arguments made in the first section. In the final section of the chapter, I 
describe and analyze key moments of the case, paying particular attention to the social, 
political and communicational context Yasunidos confronted in 2013-2014.    
2.2 Theorizing new waves of protest and social movement formation in neo-
extractivist Latin America. 
Methodologically speaking, during the year of the study, I carried out 
ethnographic research, including first-hand observation and participation in key events. 
After that year, I sought to identify social movement theories that resonated with the 
Yasunidos case. Not surprisingly, my observations and experiences, and subsequent 
theorization, resonated most with theorists snd activist-scholars that are applying 
decolonial and post-development lenses to the wave of anti-extractivist protests and 
movements that have emerged in the past decade in Latin America. The following 
discussion lays out intersecting perspectives among these theorists, with particular 
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attention to the question of alternative ontologies and epistemologies that are generated 
by anti-extractivist movements.  
The work of Arturo Escobar (1995, 2014) has been central to this discussion. In a 
recent volume, Escobar (2014) argues that the proposals of Latin American social 
movements, particularly indigenous, afrodescendent, environmental, rural and feminist 
movements, are at the “vanguard” (p. 14) of imagining and enacting practices towards a 
post-development scenario. Further, he proposes a related concept of political ontology, 
which “underscores the political dimension of ontology and the ontological dimension of 
politics” (p. 13). This concept allows us to examine “what kind of worlds are enacted 
through which combination of practices, and with what kind of consequences for which 
particular group of humans and non-humans” (p. 13).  This concept seeks to valorize the 
diverse cosmovisions that are generated by movements and territorial-based 
communities, which often provide the philosophical foundation for the enactment of what 
I call post-development imaginaries. This set of concepts resonated with my research 
findings: here was an urban movement whose foundational principles were based on 
indigenous cosmovisions. Their proposals tapped into emerging post-development 
imaginaries that were gaining strength in a new generation of Ecuadorians, of which 
Yasunidos was a part.  
In their consideration of contemporary Latin American social movements, Daza, 
Hoetmer & Vargas (2012) suggest that movements fighting extractivism are confronting 
a reconfigured political landscape in the 21st century, which includes a new adversary, the 
“so-called” progressive governments. Another dimension of this terrain is that these 
governments have incorporated many aspects of the agendas of social movements, if only 
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at the discursive level, yet have not sufficiently changed structural relations of power as 
they had originally pledged to do. Instead, progressive governments have passed new 
laws that seek to repress, control and criminalize acts of dissent. Boaventura de Souza 
Santos (2010), Edgardo Lander (2013), Seone et al. (2013) and others have argued that 
these contradictions have been responsible, in part, for the diminished support these 
governments have faced. These arguments resonate with my case study of Yasunidos. 
They had to engage in a battle with a still-popular government (this would shift over the 
next few years) that had built its platform on social movement proposals, but whose 
practices sought to fragment, delegitimize and criminalize these same organizations.   
Another feature that Daza et al. (2012) emphasize is that these governments, and 
the movements that confront them, have increasingly used the media as platforms of 
dispute.  The mediatization of conflicts between the government and social movements 
has been a key feature in Ecuador. This chapter contributes to the discussion by providing 
evidence of this new scenario of mediated conflict in Ecuador, and how such terrain was 
essential to their activities.  
 Juliana Flores (2010), who situates her work within the Modernity/Coloniality 
Latin American research project, proposes that contemporary Latin American social 
movements expose the limits of capitalist modernity, despite scores of theorists that have 
ignored their contributions, due to a “eurocentric vision of modernity” (Flores, citing 
Escobar, 2003). Flores critiques theorists (among them, Laclau and Mouffe, Giddens, 
Mainwarning and Viola, Melucci, Touraine) for the distinction they make between 
movements in the global North and the “exceptional character of collective action” (p. 
74) in the global South, a framework that reduces collective action to “subjugated 
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alterities” (p. 74). Flores also calls attention to these theorists’ “modern binaristic logic: 
autonomy-dependence, advanced-backward, development-underdevelopment, center-
periphery, etc.” (p. 83): 
…these theories conclude that in the regions where modernity has not completely 
been attained, these movements can do very little to question it. Their actions, if 
anything, are to reach it [modernity]. Therefore, we are faced with peripheral 
struggles, anchored in illustration; struggles that are limited to cover basic 
necessities, gain autonomy from the State, reach economic development, 
consolidate weak democracies, etc. (p. 72).  
 
And while she values the important contributions of diverse theories born in the 
global North (including resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and 
collective identity, etc.) she calls on social movement theorists to “develop a perspective 
of globalization much more multi-form and paradoxical” (p. 78) than has been proposed 
until now.   
Following Flores’ argumentation, I propose that movements such as Yasunidos 
are privileged sites at which to analyze differing notions of modernity that are at play in 
the region.  Daza et al. (2012, p. 47) propose that new social movement formations 
“dispute dominant models of living from specific subjectivities” (2012, p. 50), and rather 
look toward otros saberes (other knowing subjects and forms of knowledge), often 
subaltern and invisibilized. These movements “have generated new cognitive 
maps…[and are] confronting power from other spaces of enunciation, from 
epistemologies that position other forms of relations between humans and the rest of 
life.” (2012, p. 50). As Escobar (2014) has pointed out, Latin American social 
movements are often way ahead of academic theorizing. This is relevant to the Yasunidos 
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case, particularly the ways in which distinct visions of development have been deployed 
by Yasunidos.  
But how have alternative ontologies taken shape, how have they shaped social 
movements, affected the national imaginary, and contributed to the emergence of 
Yasunidos in August 2013?  I propose that alternative ontologies have emerged from 
various sources, events and geographic locations, generating a multilayered, cumulative 
effect on citizens and movements. They have manifested in a widespread ecological 
consciousness, particularly among young people. Such consciousness has confronted the 
dominant paradigm, hegemonic since the 1970s, that oil extraction is necessary for 
Ecuador’s well-being and prosperity, and is the mechanism to “develop” and 
“modernize” Ecuador. On the contrary, the alternative ontologies have been shaped by 
various factors listed here and described in the following paragraphs: 1) the centuries-old 
indigenous resistance to colonization; 2) the experience of contamination from oil-
drilling, which began in the northern Amazon in the 1970s; 3) diverse movements in 
Ecuador (indigenous, ecologist, feminist, peasant, student), and the flows and exchanges 
between peoples and movements due to the Amazon’s proximity; 4) the influence of 
global social movements against climate change; and 5) the 2008 Ecuadorian 
Constitution; and the government’s rhetoric and media campaigns about Buen Vivir and 
the rights of Nature.  
A major contributor to contemporary alternative ontologies has been the ongoing 
indigenous resistance, and in contemporary times, the CONAIE-led uprisings in the 
1990s and early 2000s (Becker, 2012). They have left an indelible imprint on the 
imaginaries of feminist, ecological, eco-feminist, student and peasant struggles and 
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movements (Martinez, 2009). The indigenous cosmovision that understands Nature as an 
instrinsic part of life has been adopted by ecological social movements, which together 
with the CONAIE, influenced the direction of the Constituent Assembly and the 
subsequent insertion of the rights of Nature into the 2008 Constitution. A related concept, 
also inscribed in the Constitution is that of Buen Vivir. Ecuadorians have taken pride in 
their new Constitution, and these groundbreaking articles, which have also been 
celebrated internationally.  
Secondly, another important source of ecological consciousness has come from 
first-hand experience with the unprecedented contamination in the Ecuador’s northern 
Amazon, and the high visibility of the Chevron-Texaco case, which sought damages for 
the massive environmental destruction in that region (Joseph, 2012). Government 
discourse and publicity heavily circulated the message that this would not happen again 
on Ecuadorian soil.  
A third factor, well worth mentioning, is the geographic proximity to the Amazon 
from different cities and towns. Ecuador is a relatively small country, with constant flows 
and exchanges between people from different regions. From Quito, one can reach the 
towns bordering the Amazon by bus in four to eight hours. While many Ecuadorians have 
not visited the Amazon, its territories and peoples are present in the national imaginary 
(even if that imaginary has not always been positive or accurate; as the Amazon region 
has also been the most misunderstood, exploited and forgotten of Ecuador’s regions). 
Geographical proximity has also meant that diverse movements have walked shoulder to 
shoulder in marches, and have shared roundtables in public forums and universities. 
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 Fourth, globalized environmental and indigenous movements have called 
attention to issue of climate change, to indigenous peoples’ role as guardian of the most 
biodiverse places on earth, and their territorial struggles. One of the World Social Forums 
took place in Quito in 2005, which brought global actors to a local stage.  
The fifth factor has been the 2008 Constitution, particularly paradigm-shifting 
articles about the rights of Nature, Buen Vivir and the promise to transform the 
development model. The government’s ecological discourses and media campaigns that 
widely circulated them, have also played an important role in shifting imaginaries. To 
conclude, I propose that the reasons cited here have helped lead to the emergence of 
alternative ontologies that shape conceptions of development and that have engendered 
post-development imaginaries.  
In order to understand how Yasunidos emerged as a key site in the most recent 
conflict, a fundamental antecedent is the Yasuní ITT initiative. This has been the most 
recent and perhaps singularly most important precedent leading up to contemporary 
events, presented in the following section.    
2.3 The Yasuní ITT Initiative  
2.3.1. A groundbreaking proposal   
This section provides important background details, necessary for understanding 
how the Yasuní ITT initiative became so important to the Ecuadorian people and the 
international community. The story of the Yasuní ITT initiative spans over two decades, 
and has had a multifaceted, sinuous path, from indigenous and ecological movement-
based beginnings in the late 1980s, to becoming a capstone government initiative in 
2007, and finally, to its termination on August 15, 2013 by the same government that 
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initially supported it. As such, this project had many complex, contradictory facets, and 
although innovative and groundbreaking in many ways, its management has also been 
widely criticized (Martínez, 2009; Martin, 2011; Acosta, 2016). This section presents a 
brief introduction that paints a picture of its importance to Ecuadorian citizens, social 
movements and the international community.  
The story of the Yasuní ITT initiative is a pivotal element to understanding the 
emergence of Yasunidos. Alberto Acosta (2016), one of its main proponents, has laid out 
the key reasons why it was a groundbreaking proposal. In the first place, it represented a 
rupture with Ecuador’s history of policies and practices around resource extraction. Since 
the first barrel of oil was exported from the Amazon region, in August 17th 1972, all 
governments and many Ecuadorians have considered the primary export model as 
essential to the functioning of the nation. Indeed, even with the promise to keep the oil in 
the ground in the Yasuní ITT initiative, oil extraction and revenue from extractive 
activities have continued, and even increased during Correa’s government (Acosta 2016).  
The Yasuní ITT initiative was a bold step towards changing Ecuador’s 
dependence on oil extraction, and pointed the way toward a model in which Ecuadorian 
citizens and the biodiversity of its territories would be privileged over capitalist 
accumulation. Secondly, with respect to indigenous rights, the Yasuní ITT initiative 
represented a significant measure designed to protect Amazonian groups made vulnerable 
by the rapidly expanding oil frontier. Thirdly, it was a move toward global redistributive 
justice with the global North providing 50% of the estimated 700 million dollars of oil 
revenue to “keep the oil in the soil” (Martin, 2011, p. 2). The vision of Acción Ecológica, 
an ecological social organization founded in 1986 as a women’s collective, and still a key 
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social movement actor nationally and internationally, was key to the Initiative. The idea 
was not just about compensation, rather it focused on receiving contributions from 
countries that have played a greater role in ecological destruction. Martin (2011) argued 
that the Initiative “represents the struggles of all peoples around the globe who seek 
better, cleaner environments not just for themselves, but for their grandchildren” and that 
it represented “the largest global environmental trust fund of its kind.” (p. 3). 
2.3.2. The Yasuní, indigenous territories in need of protection 
The Yasuní is the ancestral home of the Waorani indigenous nationality, and of 
the Taromenare and Tagaeri clans, two nomadic groups related to the Waorani that live in 
voluntary isolation. Other indigenous groups living there include the Kichwa. There are 
also colonos (mestizo settlers) who live there. Given the diverse peoples and cultures, the 
region should be considered first and foremost a territory, not only a park, or a group of 
oil blocks, as it is often framed. As Esperanza Martinez (2009, p. 66) points out, the 
designation of national park, like the creation of Yosemite Park in the 19th century in the 
United States, often serves to erase the histories of these sites as ancestral indigenous 
territories. It also obscures the fact that the Yasuní, unlike the vision of a pristine “park” 
has been an area profoundly marked by rubber barons, illegal wood traffickers, oil 
companies, missionaries, the military, and settlers that came to work in these industries. 
Oil prospection began in the 1930s in territories that were inhabited by nomadic 
indigenous groups. Shell perforated Tiputini 1, part of the Yasuní, in 1948. Two access 
roads were subsequently opened up, and several state and private oil corporations have 
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wanted to exploit the region, even though the estimated reserves of 950,000 barrels is 
heavy crude, which is much more difficult and resource-intensive to extract.17  
 
Figure 2a. Map of the Yasuní National Park by Susana Crespo and Pablo Cabrera. 
Retrieved from http://www.terraecuador.net/revista_83/83_acoso_mapa.html 
 
2.3.3. National and international designations 
The Yasuní has several kinds of designations, and national and international 
protections:  
- In 1979, Ecuador´s Ministry of the Environment (MAE) declared 1,022,736 hectares 
(one hectare is approximately 2.5 miles).as the Yasuní National Park (YNP) (MAE, 
Agreement No. 332).  
- The YNP, the Intangible Zone, and the adjacent Waorani territory span 2.7 million 
hectares.  In 1989, the entirety of the 2.7 million hectares were designated by 
                                                          
17 The history of the Yasuní ITT is well covered in Martinez (2009). 
  
 
 
 
 
57 
UNESCO a World Biosphere Reserve, due to its status as the region with the greatest 
biodiversity on the planet.  
- The “ITT’s” (the Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini oil fields located in oil block 
43, named after rivers that traverse the region) 189,889 hectares are located within 
the Intangible Zone (758,051 hectares), considered as such because of the nomadic 
groups that inhabit this territory.  
- In 2006, 982,000 hectares of the YNP were delimited by the Ecuadorian 
government.18 Moreover, the Inter American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), asked for protective measures in order to safeguard indigenous rights, 
particularly those populations that have been made vulnerable because of their 
exposure to oil activities, illegal wood trafficking, population expansion, and other 
activities related to resource extraction (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
2014).  
The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution underscores the importance of the Initiative, in that 
it forbids oil extraction in areas where uncontacted indigenous groups live (Ecuador 
Const. art. 57). Though the government does not admit it, certainly one of the major 
incentives to exploit the oil in the Yasuní, is to pay toward the massive debt Ecuador has 
amassed to China (Villavicencio, 2013).  
                                                          
18 Executive Decree No. 552, published on February 2, 1999, declared the Intangible Zone should be free of 
all extractive activity. Ecuador, along with Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru, ratified the ILO’s 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, No. 169. See www.ilo.org.  
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Figure 2b. Map of Yasuní National Park, Huaroni territories and Intangible Zone. 
2.3.4 Keep the oil in the soil: indigenous and ecological movement histories in 
Ecuador 
 This brief section sets the groundwork for understanding the current context for 
current anti-extractivist social movements. In 1990, the Indigenous Uprising on Inti 
Raymi, and subsequent mobilizations throughout the 90s, marked a turning point in 
Ecuador’s political history, as the indigenous movement, led by the CONAIE, became a 
central social and political actor (Becker, 2012; Ortiz Lemos, 2013). This powerful 
movement came of age during neoliberal times, and it fought against structural 
adjustments with a multiplicity of organizations and movements, including student, 
feminist, environmental and worker movements. While the CONAIE’s broad agenda 
incorporates many kinds of demands, socio-environmental and territorial conflicts have 
been priorities. During the historical Uprising in 1990, OPIP (Organización de Pueblos 
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Indígenas de Pastaza) proposed legalizing and delimiting ethnic Amazonian territories 
(this claim was rejected by the Borja government) (Varea et al., 1996). In 1998, in one of 
the first resistance struggles, the Cofanes (indigenous group in the northern part of the 
Amazon) were successful in closing an oil well, and in keeping Texaco off their 
territory.19 Further south, the Kichwa People of Sarayaku waged an unprecedented fight 
against unauthorized incursion and oil prospection in their territories.  In 1996, part of 
their territory was concessioned to an oil company, and in 2002, Sarayaku declared a 
state of emergency for six months, and engaged in protests, in order to stop the 
prospection and dynamiting of their lands. They took their claim to the IACHR in 2003, 
and won an historic victory which included monetary reparations. For Alberto Acosta 
(personal communication, April 10, 2015), the Kichwa Sarayaku struggle concretely 
showed how to resist government and corporate incursion into their territory.  
 The success of the indigenous movement´s mobilizations led to the incorporation 
of several of their demands in the 1998 Constitution, which stated that indigenous groups 
must be consulted on matters concerning their territories. The political arm of the 
movement, Pachakutik, was created in 1995. The cooptation that ensued in both 
Pachakutik and the CONAIE resulted in a dramatic dccrease in their legitimacy (Becker, 
2012). By the time Correa became president in 2007, the indigenous movement had 
already lost a great deal of political power.  
 While Ecuador’s Indigenous movement has gained recognition internationally, 
what is less known is the history and impact that ecological social organizations and 
movements have had on the political history of Ecuador. In fact, socio-environmental 
                                                          
19 Accion Ecológica’s website details resistance against extractivism. See http://www.acciónecológica.org 
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movements have been structured around the protagonistic role of the CONAIE, Acción 
Ecológica and the Amazonia Por la Vida (Amazon for Life) campaign, along with 
hundreds of local and regional movements. Writing in 1992, Varea & Ortiz claimed that 
there were over 200 organizations in Ecuador that worked for the protection of the 
environment. A broad, but useful categorization is proposed by Latorre (2009), who 
distinguishes between “technocratic” and “radical” organizations (p. 11). Organizations 
that are technocratic tend to seek solutions to environmental problems through 
technological innovation, and through the market. “Radical” organizations are those that 
seek to change the development model. I would also add that the radical organizations are 
those that have actively confronted the government’s extractivist policies and actions.  
 One of the key organizations of the past decades has been Accion Ecológica (AE). 
AE was founded in 1986 as women´s collective, and has consistently supported popular 
ecological movements, the defense of territories, and communities affected by extractive 
activities. Members of Acción Ecológica have also widely published on these matters, 
and are founders of the international network, Oil Watch. In 1996, at an Oil Watch 
meeting held in Quito, 15 international organizations initiated the Keep the Oil in the Soil 
campaign. Acción Ecológica, and other ecological and indigenous organizations and the 
Amazonia Por la Vida campaign, founded in 1989, have been important predecessors, 
and indeed, incubators, of Yasunidos and the ideas they brought forward in their 
movement. In 2005, Oil Watch presented a position paper that proposed that the Yasuní 
should not be exploited (Martinez, 2009). 
The story of the Yasuní ITT also helps to tell the story of Ecuador’s ecological 
movement, which I would argue has been an organized, innovative force from its very 
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beginnings in the 1980s. In fact, Ecuador and Nigeria were the first nations to propose a 
transition from the extractive model by leaving oil underground. The first explicit, written 
references to a post-petrol transition can be found in Larrea (2000). However, 
environmental and anti-extractivist activism, and a search for alternatives, began much 
earlier. The campaign Amazonia Por la Vida, which grew out of Oil Watch, was 
established in 1989 as a national network that connected human rights organizations, 
indigenous organizations, ecologist initiatives, social movements, affected citizens and 
allies across Ecuador, in their common goal to defend the Ecuadorian Amazon from 
further oil exploitation (Vasquez 2015; Oilwatch, 2005; Fontaine, 2009). Its motto, “El 
Yasuní depende de ti” (the Yasuní depends on you) later used by Yasunidos.20  Amazonia 
Por la Vida went on to become a key movement actor in one of the most visible, 
prolonged and difficult battles, the Chevron-Texaco case. 
In the late 1980s, women, campesinos, and workers in the northern region of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon formed dozens of organizations that began to organize around a 
multitude of issues, including the massive contamination caused by Texaco’s 
(subsequently bought by Chevron) extractive activities. The movement histories of thia 
region have been elocuently documented in Yanza (2014). Luis Angel Saavedra of 
INREDH argues that the Chevron-Texaco story has been told by different actors. The 
Ecuadorian government has told the story through government campaigns that have 
appropriated the discourses of the affected but have not successfully communicated the 
experiences of the affected. The aggressor, Chevron-Texaco, has tried to displace the 
blame and erase the story. Finally, movements and individuals have sought to tell the real 
                                                          
20 Significantly, several members of Yasunidos were active members of this campaign. 
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stories that contain “the magic, the hope, the cruelty, the pain…” as well as the 
contradictions lived in this region (Yanza, 2014, p. 9).  
On November, 3, 1993, more than 30,000 affected citizens filed a lawsuit against 
Texaco (later Chevron-Texaco) in the Federal Court of New York State demanding that 
they pay compensation for the huge costs of reparations for environmental damages 
(Joseph, 2012; Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos, n.d.). Six months 
later, on May 15, 1994, approximately 25 organizations and rural communities, 
indigenous nationalities, and representatives of some public and non-governmental 
entitiies, ratified the constitution of Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia (Defense Front of 
the Amazon) in order to integrate the organized and non-organized social actors. This 
organization went on to facilitate a process that would continue for almost two decades. 
Finally, on February 14, 2011, after 17 years of fighting, the Court ordered Chevron to 
pay more than 18 billion dollars in reparations. This first important victory (the struggle 
to get Chevron to comply with the sentence continues) “was the result not only of the 
strength, unity and resistance of the affected, but also because the fight was taken on as a 
collective struggle with collective goals” by movement actors (Yanza, 2014).   
In a separate but related action, On June 5, 2003, the Pachamama Foundation21, 
Acción Ecológica and CDES presented a proposal to the MAE for a moratorium on the 
expansion of the oil and mining frontier for three years. At that meeting, they presented a 
technical, economic and ecological report that provided evidence that it was not worth 
continuing to extract natural resources at the expense of the destruction those activities 
                                                          
21 The Pachamama Foundation was the first social organization closed by the Ecuadorian government on 
December 5th, 2013. It was able to do this through Decree 16, which gives the state the power to dissolve 
any social organization that it considers dangerous to the internal or external interests of the nation, or that 
affects “public peace.” 
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caused, and harm to those people that inhabited these territories.22 From 2005-2007, there 
were numerous conflicts in the Yasuní between the oil companies and indigenous groups 
(Fontaine, 2009). On January 3, 2007, before leaving office, President Alfredo Palacio 
responded to mounting pressure from civil society, and signed the decree to establish the 
Intangible Zone within the World Biosphere Reserve.  
2.3.5 Government appropriation of the Yasuní ITT initiative.  
On June 5, 2007, the Yasuní ITT initiative was launched. President Correa 
presented a petition signed by over 1,000 persons (crafted by Alberto Acosta, who at the 
time was Minister of Energy), to the international community. The petition demanded a 
moratorium on the exploitation of the ITT. The 2008 Constitution further built 
expectations that it was a viable plan. It was in line with the concept of Buen Vivir, the 
Rights of Nature (Ecuador Const. art. 14, 71, 414), of respecting Indigenous territories 
(Ecuador Const. art.  2, 57, 60, 171, 257), and of working to change the matriz productiva 
(productive model) (Ecuador Const. art. 276). Ecologists decided to support the 
government-led initiative, even though there were well-founded suspicions about the 
government’s commitment to it. There was also criticism that the initiative was limited to 
Blocks 31 and 43, and that it presented an idealized image of the Yasuní. Regarding the 
government’s appropriation of the Initiative from a citizen-led effort, Eduardo 
Pichilingue reflected that “civil society’s error was that it did not totally appropriate the 
initiative. It came about as a result of civil society, but we left it to the government to 
administer.”  (Eduardo Pichilingue, personal communication, Abril 30, 2015). 
                                                          
22 La Hora (2003), see http://lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1000165802/-
1/home/goRegional/Loja#.V2NaN6ODGkp. 
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The Yasuní ITT initiative went on to become the poster child of the Citizen 
Revolution. Ecuador’s government was presented as a leader that was seeking 
alternatives to resource extraction. Suddenly, Ecuadorian social movement actors and 
government ministers became international actors because of this innoviate project. They 
were frequently invited to speak at international symposiums, UN forums and meetings 
of the European Union. Indigenous activists, particularly those from Sarayaku, whose 
territory is located within the Amazon, actively promoted their philosophical concept of 
Sacha Kawsay, or the “living forest”. Ecuador’s efforts were celebrated, as it seemed to 
truly take seriously the rights of Nature inscribed in the 2008 Constitution. Within 
Ecuador, young people, including many who later identified as or supported Yasunidos, 
learned about the Initiative in their schools and through government-led publicity 
campaigns. 
2.3.6 Continuation of extractive activity 
Though the initiative received broad support nationally and internationally, it was 
apparent that the so-called “Plan B,” oil extraction in this mega-diverse territory, was 
never entirely taken off the table. In fact, it became increasingly clear that resource 
extraction was still a priority.23 The government continued to concession oil blocks that 
were within Amazonian indigenous territories. For example, in November 2010, the 
Ecuadorian government renegotiated its contract with AGIP Oil, which included a 
portion of Block 23, even though the Kichwa Sarayaku and other groups living there 
were firmly against oil extraction on their lands. Another clear example is the case of 
                                                          
23 In 2007, when Correa assumed the Presidency, oil concessions in the Amazon region totaled 5 million 
hectares, with 4.3 million of these concessioned to foreign companies. In 2011, 22 additional oil blocks in 
the Central-South region of the Amazon were made available to bidders in the XI Oil Auction (Acosta 
2016, p. ).   
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licensing Armadillo Block, even though there was clear evidence of the presence of 
indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation. After a fatal spear attack by a 
Taromenare of wood merchant Luis Castellanos inside Armadillo Block, there were an 
additional 34 reported events that evidenced the presence of uncontacted indigenous 
groups in that zone (Informe Ejecutivo sobre la situación de los Pueblos Indígenas 
Aislados (PIA) 2009). While such evidence was able to momentarily halt oil exploration, 
the government gave a license to Montex-Gosanti the following year, in June 2011 (El 
Universo, 2013).24   
Just a few months before the Yasuní ITT Initiative was terminated, on March 25, 
2013, the Ecuadorian government finalized its Ronda Sur Oriente del Ecuador (auction 
of oil blocks in the southeast of Ecuador) in Beijing, Bogotá, Houston, Paris, and 
Singapore. This auction potentially affected 2,600,000 hectares, divided into 13 oil 
blocks. Oil exploration and extraction here would impact seven indigenous nations (the 
Kichwa, Waorani, Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Andoas and Sápara). In their report, Acción 
Ecológica states that “the intention to exploit the Southern Amazon should be seen as the 
necesity to take control of territories, where there are also mining concessions and 
various hydroelectric projects.” According to this report, the indigenous communities 
have not been consulted (Acción Ecológica, 2013). 
The above-mentioned examples are just a few instances of the continuation of 
extractive activities. Additionally, there were also threats to disband the Yasuní ITT 
initiative if enough funds weren’t received. Roque Sevilla, who headed the initiative until 
January 2010, told BBC World that, in addition to the economic crisis, potential 
                                                          
24 The Via Maxus oil road, which runs 180km through the Yasuní National Park, was built in 1993.  
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European donors were influenced by the contradictions shown by the government, 
especially having Plan B “up their sleeves.” Correa also insulted governments with whom 
Ecuador was in negotiation. In one infamous, frequently cited instance, Correa told 
German donors that they could “stick their money in their ears” when he was unhappy 
with the terms of an agreement that outlined how international funds would be channeled 
(El Universo, 2010). 
2.3.7 The unraveling of the Yasuní ITT initiative 
Given the messages communicated by the Correa government, funders saw the 
writing on the wall, and international monetary support dwindled. Germany, under 
Angela Merkel, was originally one of the largest contributors to the initiative, but in her 
second administration, Germany decided not to continue to provide financing (La 
República, 2011). This affected the willingness of other countries to contribute. Correa 
did not take a clear enough stand that would have helped donors feel confident that he 
was serious about keeping the oil in the soil. For example, he could have promised that 
while he is President, the Yasuní ITT would not be exploited. Also, clear policies were 
never set. In fact, “the concepts, measures and instruments to make it concrete were not 
sufficiently clarified nor agreed upon.” (Acosta, 2016, p. 11). Of course, there were 
external factors that worked against its success: it is likely that it was just too dangerous a 
precedent for governments of the global North to pay a form of reparations to keep the oil 
in the ground. German Minister Niebel, responsible for denying funds during the second 
Merkel administration, stated “I don’t pay for something that won’t happen. If we take 
part in [the initiative], we will create a precedent of unpredictable consequences.” (La 
  
 
 
 
 
67 
República, 2011). Another important factor to take into account was the financial crisis 
that shifted the global scenario in 2008 and over the next several years.   
On August 15, 2013, when Correa announced that the Yasuní ITT initiative failed 
because of lack of international financial backing, many supporters found this reason 
unacceptable. Many people believed that Ecuador should carry out its pledge even 
without international support. Subsequently, the abandonment of the Yasuní ITT 
initiative became, for many citizens, a point of rupture with the government. With the 
demise of this innovative initiative, the idea of transforming from a primary export model 
to a post-petrol one, seemed that much more out of reach.   
2.3.8 The mediatization of the Yasuní ITT initiative 
To comprehend the reaction to Ecuadorian President Correa’s announcement on 
August 15, 2013 that the government would terminate the Yasuní ITT initiative, it is 
crucial to understand that this flagship initiative was heavily promoted by the government 
and NGOs for six years, both nationally and internationally, though a sophisticated 
advertising campaign. In a search for Yasuní ITT videos uploaded to Youtube in June 
2015, we encountered 45 spots that are or appear to have been created by SECOM. These 
spots mainly target an Ecuadorian audience, and were uploaded between August 2008 
and March 2013, a mere five months before the initiative was abandoned. The videos 
include short animations directed toward young children, spots that feature famous 
Ecuadorian actors and singers, and even a promotional video for a reality TV show in 
which 12 Ecuadorians seek the “Spirit of the Yasuní”.25 
                                                          
25 See Espiritu Yasuní.mov. accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GkEZ-6rvys&t=2s 
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One of the many commercials produced by the Ecuadorian government’s SECOM 
(Secretary of Communication) for the Yasuní ITT initiative (for national television 
audiences) opens in a dense forest setting. A 3D black bubble emerges from the soil and 
floats during the length of the commercial. Amidst lush foliage, a young indigenous man 
dressed in a tee shirt and jeans rises to speak directly to the camera in Spanish: “Yasuní 
ITT is a huge commitment to the planet. Ecuador will contribute 50% of the value that it 
could have obtained by extracting petroleum. The camera cuts to an indigenous woman 
of Kichwa descent (apparent by her clothing) in a similar setting and says to the camera, 
“the world should contribute the other 50%. We will be the example. There is still time.” 
The camera now cuts to a young indigenous girl who tell us “because a country is also 
big by the grandeur of its actions.” Two German tourists emerge from a jungle path and 
say “Support Yasuní ITT because the Yasuní is not only for Ecuador,” and their sentence 
is completed by an indigenous woman of Shuar nationality paddling a canoe in a small 
river, “it is for the whole world”. An Indigenous young man emphatically states in his 
native language, “leave the petroleum underground.” An Indigenous elder, also in native 
dress, and in his language, says, “It is in our hands, you decide.” The black bubble falls 
back into the soil, and the announcer emphasizes, “Get informed, be a part of the 
initiative, and create a new world.” The spot ends with two logos: Yasuní-ITT: Create a 
New World, and Ecuador loves life.26  This spot is just an example of dozens of ads that 
were created and circulated on television, radio, social media, in plazas, and even at 
massive music concerts.  
                                                          
26 Yasuní ITT Spot TV, uploaded to You Tube on August 21, 2011. Accessed at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mljCjLQcak 
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As several of my interviewees pointed out, many youth that went on to identify as 
Yasunidos were adolescents at the time that these spots came out. So it was not surprising 
that the government, in its attempt to convince people of Plan B, had a difficult time 
because of its own successful publicity campaign. A generation of Ecuadorians watched 
the commercials, heard the government discourse, and sat through many presentations of 
the initiative in their schools. I would argue that this is an important antecedent to the 
emergence of a movement to protect the Yasuni from oil exploitation in 2013-2014.  
Next section grounds earlier theorizations about a new wave of Latin American 
social movements that seek to hold progressive governments accountable to their 
promises. I propose that Yasunidos is part of the vanguard that Escobar (2014) refers to 
when discussing a new wave of Latin American movements that call for a post-
development scenario. I mainly relied on ethnographic and interview-based methods to 
describe and analyze the emergence of Yasunidos. I discuss the early protests, and 
demonstrate how Yasunidos, while standing on the shoulders of other contemporary 
ecological movements, presents new identities and practices that locate them in such 
vanguard.  
2.4 Candlelight vigils, protests and mediated maneuvers   
 Even before President Correa declared, on August 15, 2013 that his government 
would terminate the Yasuní ITT initiative, opting instead for “Plan B,” there had been 
rumors that the announcement was imminent. Ecuadorian citizens, many of them young 
people, began gathering in plazas across Ecuador to hold vigils for the Yasuní. While 
many of them were not associated with any social or political organizations, there were 
also many ecologist, feminist, animal rights and human rights collectives present. 
  
 
 
 
 
70 
Amazonia Por la Vida (affiliated with Acción Ecológica and the international group Oil 
Watch) and the La Red de Guardianes del Yasuní (Network of Yasuní Guardians, a 
national network of diverse collectives that defended the proposal to keep the oil in the 
soil) were among the groups that organized the vigils in various cities across Ecuador. 
One of the members of the collective Amazonia Por la Vida described early protests:  
I remember that days before [the announcement] were were already 
anticipating the moment, and we decided to hold zapateadas27 and 
candlelight vigils in front of the Government Palace…we began to 
organize people and chanted slogans in defense of the Yasuní, letting the 
government know that we were vigilant.” (RG, personal communication, 
March 12, 2015). 
 
 The zapateadas became a hallmark of Yasunidos protests and other Yasuní-
related events, which almost always included artistic and performative expressions, 
including singing, dancing, chanting, artistic displays, and performance. The enactment 
of what I call mediated cultural politics became common movement practices. They were 
key vehicles that interrupted hegemonic meanings of development, and communicated 
post-development imaginaries to diverse publics. These mediated cultural politics were at 
once contestatory and propositive acts against the developmentalist paradigm deployed 
through statist media power.  
2.4.1 The televised announcement 
 Correa’s government has reshaped media and communication practices in 
Ecuador. I conceptualize the government’s increasing appropriation of media (both in 
material and symbolic terms) as statist media power, and argue that it is a potent site to 
                                                          
27 A zapateada is an Indigenous collective dance, accompanied by musicians. It is done in a circle , and is 
associated with important days for indigenous peoples, including Inti Raymi. Yasunidos’ zapateadas mixed 
both traditional and more contemporary rhythms.  
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interrogate symbolic conflicts between the government and social movements. The 
Yasunidos case provides an important example of how the government has sought to 
wield its media power to try to convince Ecuadorians that the Yasuni must be opened up 
to exploration and extraction of oil.   
 Correa’s live national broadcast, held before an audience of carefully selected 
ministers and political allies, including a teary-eyed Ivonne Baki, who had led the 
Initiative since 2010 (many say to its downfall) lasted 22 minutes. With Decree No. 74, 
Correa brought an end to the initiative. Surely anticipating the collective indignation by 
the generation that grew up with the Yasuní ITT initiative and the Rights of Nature, 
Correa invoked young people 14 times. Seeking to appeal to this demographic, Correa 
said “beloved young people, you have the security of knowing that no one defends the 
Yasuní, and no-one feels the pain of this decision, more than your own compañero 
President.” He made a special pledge: “My work will always be at the service of young 
people and the Ecuadorian people.” He added: “The worst crime against human rights is 
misery. The greatest error is to subordinate these human rights against the supposed 
rights of Nature.” He appealed to the pockets of the provincial governments by pledging 
$1, 568 million dollars to each, which would be profits derived from oil exploitation. (El 
Comercio, 2013). Correa framed the decision in a way that would become commonplace 
over the next few months: justifying resource extraction as necessary to lift the Amazon 
out of poverty, and promising that the profits would be directed toward Amazonian local 
governments. 
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2.4.2 The Great Vigil for the Yasuní 
That same evening, hundreds of people gathered on the Plaza Grande, just outside 
of Carondelet (the government palace). There were two main factions:  on one side of the 
plaza, protesters denounced the end of the initiative. They called the gathering the Gran 
Velada por el Yasuní (the Great Vigil for the Yasuní). On the other end, those for 
exploitation held a counter-demonstration. Pro-government events like this one have been 
a common response to protest in Correa’s administration. The demonstration included 
members of Alianza Pais (Correa’s movement), employees of the government (often 
ordered to attend), supporters, and a large contingent of the national police that protected 
them. While government supporters were permitted to occupy the plaza, the protesters’ 
access to the same space was blocked by the police.   
The pro-Yasuní protesters held handwritten signs and banners about the Yasuní, 
depicting the animals that lived there. They played music, danced and chanted. These 
became emblematic practices of the movement. That evening, there were a few 
squirmishes between the two groups, with the police trying to separate them, but there 
were no violent confrontations.  
 One of the young people on the Plaza Grande that day would go on to become a 
member of Yasunidos, and a dynamic spokesperson on a national and international level:  
When Correa declared the exploitation, for me it was a very emotional moment 
because of the indignation I felt, but also because of my feminist reflections, like 
who has the right to decide… And this is a president who comes forward with a 
very paternalistic discourse, saying “beloved young people, I have 
decided…”.…But I was also excited about the response, that there was protest, 
because it had been a long time since there was a strong mobilization in this 
country. (RG, personal communication, March 12, 2015). 
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 The indignation felt by this young person was shared by thousands of people 
across Ecuador, many who had never visited the Amazon. This was due, in part, to the 
deep identification that they felt with the Yasuní ITT Initiative, the knowledge that the 
Yasuní is the most bio-diverse region in the world, and because the government made a 
commitment to safeguard it. The indignation expressed by so many evidenced that the 
Rights of Nature and territorial rights for indigenous not only had widespread acceptance, 
it was actually part of the identity of a whole generation of Ecuadorians.   
 In a letter written to the President and members of Alianza Pais on May 1, 2014, a 
member of Yasunidos reflected back to that day: 
A few years ago I heard a President speak of equity, of a change of era, of 
progress for the poorest, and that capital is not above human beings, of the right 
of Nature, of this small piece of land called the Yasuní (until that moment I had 
no idea what it was). Hearing him speak, I fell in love: to maintain the most 
biodiverse place on the planet, territory of other human civilizations from which 
we have so much to learn; showing voracious capitalism and the world that 
human beings could live more lovingly with nature….On August 15, 2013, while 
you, Mr. President gave your discourse about cancelling the Yasuní ITT initiative 
…  I had the hope that you would say that although the funds had not been raised, 
there would be no exploitation. Without a doubt this was one of the most difficult 
moments of my life. I did not understand how my president could turn his back on 
this dream.28 
 
 These emotions and subsequent rupture with the government was shared by many 
young people and others who had believed that it would fulfill its promise to care for the 
Yasuní. Even though there was suspicion all along, especially by those that followed the 
ongoing auction of oil blocks, the final death knell of the initiative brought forth an 
explosion of sadness, frustration and anger.    
                                                          
28 Letter written by Pedro Bermeo, and published on the Yasunidos website. Retrieved from 
http://sitio.Yasunidos.org/images/cartas/Carta-Pedro_Bermeo.jpg 
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2.4.3 Indignation spreads across plazas and multiple media platforms 
 Public outcry erupted across the nation. Radio and TV programs could speak of 
nothing else. Indignation, disillusionment, and also acquiescence, support and 
justification for the decision, were shared and debated across social media, often 
accompanied by photos, videos, and memes. The majority of texts and images against 
exploitation referenced the rights of Nature, the biodiversity of the region and displayed 
photos of animals that live in the Yasuní. Some referred to the indigenous communities 
that would surely be affected by the contamination that would ensue. On August 16, 
independent filmmaker and journalist Carlos Andrés Vera published an entry in his blog, 
Polificción, entitled “Reasons to not exploit the ITT.”29 This blog entry generated heated 
debate, in that within 24 hours there were hundreds of responses. 
 Reading the responses, I noticed few comments about the indigenous groups 
living in voluntary isolation, as this was still not an issue on many people’s radar.30 In 
fact, one of the comments on the blog encapsulates the pro-“development” rationale 
heard on radio and television programs in the following days and weeks: 
My question is the following: for four nomadic tribes that live in the 
Neolithic era, and that, according to you, need 1 million [hectares] to live 
(when in the city of Guayaquil, where 2.5 million persons live … we 
occupy 3.45% of what 4 tribes need), the country should suffer? 
(Commentary by YogaGYE, Polificcion Blog, August 16, 2013).  
 
 The person went on to quoting Rafael Correa’s sentiments enunciated many times 
on the EC, (and before him, the 19th century explorer Humbolt), ¨we cannot continue 
                                                          
29 https://polificcion.wordpress.com/2013/08/16/motivos-para-no-explotar-el-itt/ 
30 Opinion polls showed that the general public responded more to photos or drawings of animals than to 
indigenous peoples.  
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being the fools of the world, sitting on top of gold but poor…¨ On the other hand, CDES, 
a small nonprofit founded in 1997, sought to raise awareness about the indigenous groups 
living in voluntary isolation. On August 17, two days after Correa´s announcement, 
CDES sent out a mass e-mail denouncing the government’s sudden denial that these 
nomadic groups lived in the Yasuní. They pointed out that “paradoxically, this is the 
same government that promoted their existence internationally. Now that the plan is to 
exploit oil reserves, conveniently they no longer exist.” (CDES, 2013). CDES also 
pointed out that the Minister of Justice, mandated to protect the lives of isolated 
indigenous groups, now claimed that these groups were 70 kilometers away (see Map 1 
and Map 2 below). This new narrative did not make sense because semi-nomadic hunters 
and gatherers regularly move about wide swaths of territory.31 Finally, in the e-mail, 
CDES reminded readers that oil exploitation in the area was not only against the 
constitutionally-declared rights of Nature, but that it would affect the lives of human 
beings whose ways of life were already in danger. For many, the indigenous cosmovision 
that has penetrated some of society understands human rights and the rights of Nature as 
inextricably intertwined.  
                                                          
31 On August 23, the Ministry of Justice published a new map in which the uncontacted groups were 
indicated as living and roaming completely outside of the perimeter of Block 31 and the Yasuní ITT. The 
new map contradicted the previous map that was sent to the IACHR in April 2013. See 
http://www.claveverde.org/index.php/noticias/343-ecuador-ministerio-de-justicia-cambia-mapa-de-
poblacion-en-aislamien 
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Figure 2c. Created in 2010 by the Ministry of Environment as part of the negotiations 
with the Equipo de Medidas Cautelares (Team of Preventive Measures). It is consistent 
with the one sent to the IACHR in April 2013. 
 
Figure 2d. Map showing presence of clans of isolated groups in the ancestral territory 
Tagaeri-Taromenare. This map was sent as part of the report from the Minister of to the 
IAHCR in April 2013.  
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Figure 2e. Map of distribution of indigenous groups living in isolation. This map was 
sent by the Minister of Justice to the National Assembly on August 23, 2013. 
 
2.5 Yasunidos emerges in the midst of a national mobilization 
 Collectives began organizing toward a national mobilization set for August 17, 
2013. News of the upcoming event, less than 48 hours after the announcement, circulated 
by word-of-mouth, radio, television, print media and social media. Similar to Occupy 
Wall Street, 15M, and uprisings of the “Arab Spring”, the call to participate, and the 
logistics of the events, spread rapidly across cities and towns through social media.  
During the mobilization, the confrontation was much more intense than it had 
been during previous protests.32 The national police sought to limit the use of public 
space by the protesters, and prevented them from occupying the Plaza Grande. The 
reason given was that a cultural event was in process. The event they were referring to 
                                                          
32 The mobilizations on August 17, 2013 took place in many cities and towns across Ecuador.  .  
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was that of the counter-demonstration, mostly members of Alianza Pais. This group 
insulted the protesters, using Correa’s own phrases such as “tirapiedras” (stone throwers) 
often invokedwhen referring to students that were associated with the Movimiento 
Popular Democrático (MPD).33 The government had also set up huge speakers that 
drowned out the protesters music and chants (see Vázquez, 2015; La Hora, 2013).34 A 
member of Yasunidos later recalled what we were all conscious of at the time: 
It was the first major mobilization against the regime. (SD, personal 
communication, May 9, 2015). 
 
While citizen and social movement protests continued, there is general agreement 
among scholars, activists and political analysts that the repression and criminalization of 
movement leaders had a chilling effect since Correa came to power in 2007.35 
Another member provided more analysis about that particular historical moment 
in Ecuador: 
Yasunidos is somewhat exceptional; it is something that transcends all that 
has transpired in environmental matters. Amazonia por la Vida was a small 
group that served as a base for Yasunidos. There is a moment in which the 
Ecuadorian society rises up against certain forms of governance. There is 
political effervescense with the fall of the presidents, and that is when civil 
society organizations are strengthened. There is a breaking point with 
Gutierrez, who realizes that the indigenous movement had much to do with 
the fall of his predecessors. So he set out to weaken the indigenous 
movement to the point where it almost disappears…Correa is then able to 
                                                          
33 The MPD was a communist party founded in 1978 that had played a key role in some elections. 
However, in the general elections of 2013 the CNE rescinded its legal status as it did not receive popular 
support (another way in which the government has eliminated minority parties). In 2015, the party 
reinvented itself as the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP). 
34 See http://www.lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1101550611/-
1/Po...e_la_Marcha_por_el_Yasun%C3%AD_hacia_Carondelet.html#.UhE-L-AukZY) 
35 Ospina (2013) has pointed out that the number of conflicts increased from 2010-2012. Some  related to 
environmental conflicts, such as the march that CONAIE and the Frente Popular initiated between March 
8-22, 2012, against mining, and against a pro-privatization water law. 
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bring together the Forajidos,36 he seeks to bring in the ecologists, 
indigenous, LGBT…all of these movements supported his candidacy which 
sought great changes. In 2007, this works, but things begin to change with 
the years, to the point where counter-marches began. And just at that 
moment the Yasuní ITT initiative is terminated. Important figures in social 
movements return, and they are consolidated at the societal level. (PE, 
personal communication, Abril 30, 2015).  
 
The pro-Yasuní wave of protests across the nation marked a turning point in 
social movement mobilization, as the issue resonated with a wide range of Ecuadorians. 
The Yasuní conflict would remain in the public eye for over a year; and it would have 
long-lasting political effects beyond that year. 
2.5.1 Yasunidos is founded 
 The following day, August 18, 2013, the Yasunidos collective was founded. This 
section introduces elements of their movement identity, in particular how Yasunidos 
differs from previous Ecuadorian social movements. I include interviews I conducted 
approximately one year after ethnographic field work. I did this so, like me, they would 
have the benefit of reflection. For this reason, I consider the process to be one of co-
theorization with movement activists.    
 According to a core member that was present the evening that Yasunidos was 
founded: 
The collective was born of two primordial energies. The first is 
indignation, and the second is the opposite of that, the desire to create and 
to propose. In other words, indignation because many people, Ecuadorians 
and foreigners, really believed in the sincerity of such a revolutionary 
proposal. Then, to see that hope fall precipitously and be crushed… (BB, 
personal communication, May 7, 2015). 
                                                          
36 The Rebelión de los Forajidos (the Rebellion of the Forajidos) was the mostly urban movement that 
brought down the government of President Gutierrez through democratic protest during April 13-20, 2005. 
The name forajido was the way Gutierrez referred to those who protested against him, and citizens proudly 
reappropriated the name. 
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A dynamic tension between indignation and propositive action, connected to a post-
development imaginary, was one of the characteristics of this new generation of activists.  
 Although there has been ecological activism in Ecuador for decades by the 
indigenous movement and other social organizations, the emergence of Yasunidos as a 
new social actor representing distinct subjectivities differs from other movements in that 
it is heterogenous, youth-led, horizontally structured, and maintains its independence 
from political parties.  Omar Bonilla, a member of the collective, suggests that the 
majority of Yasunidos are young people who simply do not want to accept the world that 
is being offered to them. “What detonates in them is what sociologists call a ‘moral 
economy’¨ (Yasunidos: el nuevo activismo urbano, 2014). Bonilla adds that many 
members were neither for nor against the government, as they had not been previously 
involved in politics. On their website, Yasunidos self-describes as: 
Non-partisan, autonomous and self-organized … we are vegans, cyclists, 
Buddhists, feminists, ecologists, indigenous, housewives, those who fight 
for gender equality and sexual liberation, farmers, workers, artists, 
intellectuals … who have found it necessary to defend life over money… 
We reject extractivism as the only way to produce wealth. We practice 
resistance but are not violent. We are pacifists but not passive. We want a 
different world, but are not naïve. We base our ideals on the reality of 
climate change, the water crisis, the irreversible extinction of biodiversity 
and ethnocide of Indigenous peoples.37  
 
Another member of Yasunidos theorizes its place in movement history.  
I feel part of an historic moment. Obviously, there is a legacy, I would not 
deny all that has been achieved by those whom we have inherited these 
struggles: the compañeras of Acción Ecológica, the indigenous movement, 
and other organizations and movements. But this moment of youth 
mobilization about the Yasuní has a different political tone in its forms of 
                                                          
37 Retrieved from http://sitio.Yasunidos.org. 
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protest, its discourses, and even its ways of expressing itself. (RG, personal 
communication, March 12, 2015). 
 
As demonstrated here, the ecological consciousness in a new generation of Ecuadorians 
has been gestating in for decades, but has its own identity. Its “political tone” prefers 
festive, performative protest actions over more militant forms. Not only is anti-capitalist 
it re-imagines development as a future free of extractivisms.   
 To conclude, I return to the earlier theoretical section of this chapter to affirm that 
indeed, Yasunidos fits into the new wave of social movements in Latin America. As Daza 
et al. (2012) argue, these movements face a reconfigured landscape in that they are 
confronting the broken promises of the progressive governments. In the Ecuadorian case, 
Yasunidos emerged at a moment when many Ecuadorians, after five years of the Correa 
administration, had grown weary of failed promises to transition from resource 
extraction. Some members ceased supporting the policies and actions of the government 
long before the Yasuní ITT announcement; others were still somewhat hopeful but on the 
verge of disillusionment. The abandonment of the Yasuní ITT initiative became a flash 
point for many citizens due to its innovative, progressive mandate that was a source of 
national pride. This was particularly true for a younger generation that had feminist and 
ecologist sensibilities. Like many progressive movements in the 21st century, Yasunidos 
rejects political party affiliation, and rather cultivates democratic assemblies that seek 
consensus. Daza et al. also argue that the new movements are disputing dominant models 
of living from specific subjectivities. In the case of Yasunidos, adherents have grown up 
with the concept of Buen Vivir, and deeply question the paradigm that extractivism brings 
prosperity. The post-development imaginary, emerging from alternative ontologies, is 
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part of the identity of Yasunidos. In the Ecuadorian case, Yasunidos has been shaped by 
groundbreaking initiatives and constitutional mandates (and their promotion across media 
platforms): the Yasuní ITT initative, the constitutionally-sanctioned rights of Nature and 
recognition of cultural and territorial rights of indigenous peoples. As I analyze in the 
next few chapters, the mediatization of the Yasuní ITT initiative by the government 
began with praise and ended with justifying its exploitation. The conflict that ensued 
makes visible the government´s extractivist plans, and major push-back from citizens.    
2.6 Yasunidos coming into play 
 The Yasunidos case also tells the story of tensions involving, on the one 
hand, processes of democratization from below, and on the other, the lack of democractic 
processes in political institutions. This final section focuses on this theme. As discussed 
in Chapter One, I understand democratization not as a path towards a specific type of 
democracy or processes limited to electoral politics, but rather as “spaces of experience 
and experimentation that arise from specific historical, geographical and cultural 
conditions” (Ramirez, 2012, p. 115). The analysis of the distinct forms of power at play, 
whether government media power or mediated cultural politics of Yasunidos, can shed 
light on cultural battles being waged in Ecuador. An examinination of the six month-long 
signature-gathering process brings into focus contradictions at play in governmental 
discourses and practices. Following Ranciere (2011), substantive democracy cannot be 
reduced to a form of government; rather it is an expression of popular power, “the power 
of those who have no special entitlement to exercise power.” (p. 79). The very act of 
calling for a referendum facilitated a process in which Ecuadorian citizens, led by 
Yasunidos, sought to reclaim popular power that had been taken away during the Citizens 
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Revolution. As discussed in Chapter One, during the Correa administration, citizen 
participation has been conceived as a consultative process at best, in which citizens have 
been largely called on to agree with the government.    
 Ramiro Avila Santamaria, a scholar and one of Yasunidos’ attorneys, emphasizes 
three kinds of democracy inscribed in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution: representative 
democracy, direct democracy and communitarian democracy. He proposes that since 
representative democracy had failed Ecuadorians in the case of Yasuní ITT, Yasunidos 
had no other choice but to turn to the other two forms of democracy, communitarian 
democracy, which took place in the streets, and direct democracy, which was waged 
through the referendum process.38  
To analyze Yasunidos´ bid for a referendum on the Yasuní, I have identified three 
key phases around which the story of Yasunidos and processes of democratization can be 
told: 1) the emergence of the movement and first wave of protests, which Avila has 
referred to as communitarian democracy; 2) the signature-gathering process that 
Yasunidos waged during six months, which was the legally-sanctioned period of time 
they had to collect 583,324 signatures of Ecuadorian citizens in order to have the 
constitutional right to call for a popular referendum, a direct democratic process. Part of 
the second phase, I include the joyous victory march in which Yasunidos and key allies 
delivered 55 boxes containing 757,623 signatures to the CNE (an elevated moment in 
which popular power was reclaimed). and 3) the series of events that followed the 
                                                          
38 Avila’s intervention took place on January 12, 2015, during the launching of the Yasunidos report by 
Vázquez (2015). Direct democratic mechanisms are constitutionally sanctioned in the 2008 Constitution, 
articles 103-107. Article 104 stated that Ecuadorian citizens may call for a popular referendum on an issue. 
After this conflict, the government amended the article. 
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delivery of signatures, in which the CNE invalidated 230,000 signatures. Yasunidos has 
coined this moment “democracy in extinction.” 
The referendum process is a privileged site at which to understand the state-social 
movement conflict in a dispute over development and extractivism. It illuminates how 
each side sought to convince Ecuadorian citizens of their perspective. On the one hand, 
the government deployed its media power in order to shape public opinion, mainly 
through the delegitimization and criminalization of the movement; on the other hand, 
Yasunidos, visibilizing new subjectivities and forms of protest in Ecuador, enacted a 
mediated cultural politics that garnered approval and visibility both nationally and 
internationally.  
2.6.1 Consulta Popular! Yasunidos calls for a national referendum   
 The decision to call for a national referendum was made by Yasunidos on August 
22, 2013, just days after the collective was formed. To do so, they needed to gather 
signatures totaling 5% of the electorate, which was 583,324 signatures at that time. The 
question they posed, later legally approved, was: Do you agree that the Ecuadorian 
government should indefinitely leave the crude oil in the ground in the ITT, known as 
block 43?  
 Although there were those who disagreed, a member of Yasunidos justified the 
decision to go this route: 
This decision was another big moment. Even though I am very critical of 
the state and of power I do believe that it is necessary to be strategic, to 
have a vision beyond the moment. For me this was an important action, to 
have proposed the national referendum, because it helped to sustain the 
mobilization for the Yasuní.  We all know that street protests can die out 
quickly, they last for a time and then they end. And that is what occurred, 
although they did last a good amount of time. I remember that we went out 
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to protest almost every day, and we had sit-ins in the streets near Carondelet 
(Presidential palace) … but the call for a consulta sustained mobilization, 
and more people joined. It was an activity that people could feel part of, 
after the protests. It was also very difficult, it required a lot of work….the 
signature-gathering process was super important….What it allowed us was 
to fight for participation. And precisely what we did was to construct ways 
to do things wherein the greatest amount of people could participate. (RG, 
personal communication, March 12, 2015). 
 
Indeed, the signature-gathering process, a direct-democracy mechanism, would 
captivate the nation over the next six months.  
2.6.2 The signature-gathering process as mediated cultural politics 
The right to gather signatures towards a national referendum was eventually 
granted to Yasunidos by the CNE on October 1, 2013. The six-month process of 
signature-gathering, from October 14, 2013 to April 12, 2014, became a potent 
movement building mechanism.  
 In a study about the Egyptian protests of 2011, Nanabhay et al. (2011) argue that 
an “amplified public sphere” is created at the intersection of three interrelated spaces: 
physical, analog and digital. They propose that each space informs the other, leading to a 
context in which real world protests function in tandem with social media and 
mainstream media. However, they clearly assert that change does not occur without the 
occupation of public space. This was indeed the case with the signature-gathering 
process.  
 The signature-gathering process was an act of mediated cultural politics. As 
Alvarez et al. (1996) remind us, culture is not static, rather it is “a process that produces 
meanings that shape and configure social relations (p. 3). By extension, cultural politics 
should be analyzed by “its effects on political culture (what counts as “political” in a 
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given society), how they challenge and unsettle it. A similar meaning is given by Juris 
(2015) who proposes that it is through cultural performance that “alternative meanings, 
values and identities are produced, embodied, and publicly communicated by social 
movements.” (p. 82). He also argues that these performances bridge the mind-body 
divide. In other words, when a movement enacts cultural politics in these ways, their 
appeal can be broader. Hence, in a similar vein, Yasunidos enacted a mediated cultural 
politics that resignified what direct democratic participation and development could look 
like.    
The act of occupying public space, not just with a table and signature forms, but 
with large posters depicting healthy people, forests, and animals (a post-development 
environment free of extractive activities that contaminate and kill), as well as music and 
dance, dynamized and visibilized dissent as perhaps no other action could. In the first 
place, it was not as easy for the government to delegitimize or criminalize this process, 
given it was constitutionally sanctioned and legally approved by CNE. In the second 
place, its effect was amplified in other mediated platforms. Everyone I interviewed 
believed that the signature gathering process was one of the most successful components 
of Yasunidos’ campaign. It mobilized members of Yasunidos and volunteers across the 
country, including citizens who had not yet been involved. As real, substantive citizen 
participation dwindled during the Citizens Revolution, here was a constitutionally 
consecrated way to take action on an issue that was important to so many: 
I believe that the moment in which we were on the offensive was the best 
moment for Yasunidos. Networks grew on a national level. When we 
visited the various provinces where there were Yasunidos, about 18 to 20 
provinces, and we missed a few, it was extraordinary because groups grew 
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even where we hadn’t facilitated them. (SD, personal communication, May 
9, 2015). 
 
 This member of Yasunidos further describes the scenarios that took place across 
Ecuador, and proposes why this phenomenon attracted attention: 
I witnessed young people of 23 years of age work 16, 17 hours a day in the 
collection of signatures. They were absolutely obsessed with the task. A 
whole generation of young people went out to the streets with an impressive 
amount of joy…The fact that young people, unaligned, dove into the task 
with passion and heart…with other groups it might have been impossible to 
achieve. It was at once the great virtue and great limitation of Yasunidos. 
(SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015). 
 
 At the same time, the process of occupying public spaces such as plazas, outside 
schools, churches, shopping malls and other places crowds gather, was an excellent way 
to meet and dialogue with people across race, class, gender, age, and neighborhoods. 
Unlike Correa’s unilateral decision, this process fostered a citizen-led, national debate on 
the Yasuní, extractivism, and democracy (regarding who has the right to make a decision 
about the Yasuní). During this process, the public had a first-hand opportunity to get to 
know Yasunidos and debate the issues with them (rather than a soley mediated 
experience).  
 As one member of Yasunidos described, she sometimes felt that she was winning 
people over one person at a time. She even ran after a few people when they simply 
walked away to ask “why?” These personal encounters led to some of the richest 
exchanges. Yasunidos was committed not just to gathering signatures, but to engaging in 
dialogue and debate with fellow citizens. The process allowed Yasunidos to reach broad 
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sectors of society, and further, to appeal to their imaginaries about the kind of Ecuador 
they want, and to take action towards that future:      
We made a tremendous effort to reach all sectors of society, above all 
perhaps those that had never been connected to social struggles. We 
appealed to people’s artistic sensibilities as well. And Yasunidos was able 
to amplify its discourse in light of a theme that was super concrete: You 
disagree with what is happening? Well, here is a concrete tool, sign 
here…(SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015). 
 
 The process also brought Yasunidos into direct contact with the obstacles, such as 
people’s fears of signing the petition. Signature collectors, who would share their stories 
at the Yasunidos weekly assemblies, recounted that many individuals confessed that they 
were afraid to sign the form because they didn’t want to lose their government job. They 
would often bring family members or friends to sign on their behalf, admitting those 
feelings, but proudly having their children or parents provide a signature.  
 Other difficulties and tensions with other social movements and with political 
figures arose during the process of signature collection. These frictions were due, in part, 
to Yasunidos’ rejection of the help (or protagonism, one might say) of parties. They were 
also due, in part, to reactions to urban youth taking a lead in themes that had been the 
domain of others. For example, CONAIE, led during this process by Humberto 
Cholango, did not participate, although ECUARUNARI, the highlands chapter of 
CONAIE, led by Carlos Perez Guambartel, played a key role. Alberto Acosta commented 
on this:  
First, no flags; second, no old figures that lead political movements, which 
is very interesting, and many of them understand this and put themselves on 
the margin (like myself). Other political figures feel marginalized and did 
not commit as they should have. CONAIE did not commit, ECUARUNARI 
did as they have other leaders. There was also a kind of jealousy, not just 
from the indigenous movement, but also from others. There was uneasiness 
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on the part of certain political figures who wanted to help but felt mistreated 
by the youth. Yasunidos rejected all of them without distinction. (Alberto 
Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015). 
 
A member of Yasunidos shared his perspective on this issue: 
I think what occurred was about protagonisms and personalisms….it is very 
difficult to accept that a young woman that is 19 or 20 years old relegates a 
political leader like Humberto Cholango (then president of the CONAIE) to 
the sidelines. I think that these were the kinds of agendas that 
predominated. At some moment some of them came to see Yasunidos as 
their enemy, which is absolutely unreal. For example, there was a moment 
when some leaders asked who financed Yasunidos, adding “is it true you 
received money from Chevron? (an allegation of the government). Pretexts 
as absurd as these… they had their own interests, their own resentments and 
their own agendas. (BB, personal communication, May 7, 2015). 
 
As these interview segments reveal, one could say that there was a cost to the way 
that Yasunidos did politics. Yet, I propose that the benefits outweighed the downside, as 
their position brought them a great deal of legitimacy in the eyes of many Ecuadorians. It 
also made it harder for the government to accuse them (as it tried to do) of being a 
movement made up of “los mismos tirapiedras de siempre,” a common lema of Rafael 
Correa when talking about political or social movement actors.  
 The possibility of a popular referendum brought international attention, including 
several globally-organized petition drives. International allies also posted on social media 
their photos with signs indicating their support of Yasunidos and the preservation of the 
Yasuní.  This must have been very hard for the government to stomach, as it had mostly 
enjoyed being known as an ecologically-friendly nation. With the international spotlight 
on Yasunidos, this image began to be replaced by another, that of a government who 
would abandon the project of keeping the oil in the soil in the Yasuní. 
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2.6.3 Signature-gathering process as a site of conflict: government strategies 
 The signature-gathering process was marked by multiple efforts on the part of the 
government and its allies to confuse people and dissuade them from signing (Vazquez, 
2015). The use of media platforms amplified that effort. The first irregularity was that, 
according to law, the Constitutional Court needed to approve the question. It never 
responded as to the validity of the question. This fostered mistrust, because at any point 
in the process the Court could simply decide the question was invalid. Extensive 
interviews with Yasunidos (Vázquez, 2015) revealed that Yasunidos members were 
regularly followed and harassed, their phones tapped, and their bank accounts 
investigated. Signature-gathering efforts were also impeded by the police and private 
guards. In one case in Quito, private guards destroyed and removed a tent that protected 
signature gatherers from the rain. There were also cases of infiltration, in which suspect 
individuals showed up at Yasunidos headquarters to allegedly volunteer to collect 
signatures. Another intimidating tactic used frequently was that police and other 
individuals (civil servants or allies of the government) took photos of the signature-
gatherers and signers. Adding to the atmosphere of harassment and intimidation, on 
November 5th, 2013, a police intelligence report was leaked and circulated on social 
networks. It provided a detailed map with photographs of the members and allies of 
Yasunidos. A member of Yasunidos discusses some of the ways in which they dealt with 
these tactics:    
One of the reasons that I am not afraid, or rather the way in which I have 
worked with my fear, is my belief in the collective process, and I think that  
working collectively one is more protected. We have also learned that it is 
better not to hide, rather, when they attack you, you need to become even 
more visible. That way you have more people that recognize you, that 
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identify you, and that will defend you…We Yasunidos have also learned 
that if they attack someone, it should be that person who is a spokesperson, 
who shows their face….For example, when the police put out the pólice 
report, framing us as if we were drug dealers, those people profiled became 
the spokespeople …. (RG, personal communication, March 12, 2015). 
 
 Mediated strategies used by the government in the Enlaces during the early wave 
of protests and the signature gathering process included misframing of the protests and 
specific protesters as violent; insults and threats to sympathetic political and social actors, 
academics, members of political parties, and journalists; verbal attacks on social media, 
likely coming from government-hired “trolls” (people paid to intervene in social media). 
The mediated response to Yasunidos is dealt with in more detail in Chapter Three. Here I 
provide a few key examples as part of the overall context (the mediated response cannot 
be excised from the context given its constant presence and weight).  
 On EC No. 336 on August 23, 2013, Correa characterized Yasunidos as 
manipulated by politicians, “childish ecologists,” “the same stone-throwers as always,” or 
as middle-class urbanites with ¨full bellies¨ that had never been to the Amazon, nor knew 
what it meant to live without basic services. He sought to depict Yasunidos as out of 
touch with people in the Amazon. In a move that was highly intimidating, in this EC, and 
what became a common occurrence over the next few months, he showed photographs of 
the marches, often pointing out and discussing specific individuals at length.  
 On EC No. 331, on August 31, 2013, after the request to initiate a national 
referendum process, Correa stepped up the attacks. He dared Yasunidos “not to be lazy” 
(“no sean vagos”), and to collect signatures to prove they had support. Scenes from the 
protests were also shown. This segment sought to, on the one hand, minimize the 
numbers of protesters, and on the other, accuse them of acts of violence. Showing a video 
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of people writing on a wall, accompanied by ominous-sounding background music, he 
accused protesters of trying to “destabilize the government and create chaos.”  This 
particular EC framed the riot police as victims of aggression. Correa also made it clear 
that his supporters were following Yasunidos’ social media communications. In addition 
to intimidation, accusations and criminalization of Yasunidos, Correa made fun of 
proposed alternatives to oil extraction, even displaying a chart with a table divided in 
two-halves, the “government’s” proposals and “irresponsible” proposals. In these ways, 
the government sought to interrupt the image of Yasunidos as nonviolent and also 
delegitimized their post-extractivist proposals.  
2.6.4 Sowing confusion during signature-gathering 
The incidents that created the most confusion were when two different groups also 
began referendum processes on the same theme. One of the groups, Amazonia Vive 
(Amazon Lives), initiated by the 30 mayors that were aligned with Alianza Pais, 
supported extractive activities in the Amazon. They used the slogan Yasuní Sí. Their 
leading question was:  
Do you support the President’s proposal to exploit petroleum in an area no more 
than 1 per 1,000 in the Yasuní National Park, and that the oil that is extracted from 
blocks 43, in the ITT camp, is directed toward the fight against poverty, the 
financing of life plans of ancestral communities, and the provision of basic 
services? 
 
There were several reports from citizens that some of the signature gatherers of 
these competing referendum processes sought to convince people that they were 
members of Yasunidos. In one of the most shocking acts that transpired during the six-
month process, the forms designed by Yasunidos and disseminated in the daily 
newspaper, El Comercio, were plagiarized by the other two groups leading referendum 
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processes and disseminated the following week in El Comercio and other newspapers, the 
only notable difference being the questions (Vázquez, 2015). Many people became so 
confused by all the different forms and questions, they simply did not sign anything. 
There were also government actions that targeted other environmental groups. One 
of the most disturbing was the sudden government-closure of the Pachamama 
Foundation. Pachamama was an ally of Yasunidos, and provided funds to Ecuadorian 
groups, such as Acción Ecológica, to underscore how the ECs were intertwined with 
government actions. Just days before the closure, on November 30, 2014, on EC No. 350, 
Correa presented a video that attacked Yasunidos, Acción Ecológica, Pachamama 
Foundation, and indigenous leaders. Following the closure of Pachamama, on EC No. 
351, Correa framed NGOs as being against the progressive governments, and bankrolled 
by “foreign interests.” While this has occurred historically in certain cases, this particular 
claim, denied by Yasunidos and without evidence, was likely meant to damage their 
reputation. These and many other incidents, detailed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, led to 
a climate of fear, paranoia, distress about the way the government was using its statist 
power and statist media power to attack critical actors.  
2.6.5 Yasunidos victory march to deliver the signatures 
 Despite the mediated, physical, and psychological obstacles placed in their path, 
Yasunidos exceed their own and everyone’s expectations, and gathered 757,623 
signatures, which was 173,300 more than the 584,323 signatures required. On April 12, 
2014, 55 boxes containing 107,088 signature pages were delivered to the CNE at the 
culmination of the most joyous march most people could recall. Indigenous youth and 
women travelled from the Amazon, Yasunidos collectives arrived from across the 
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country, Afro-Ecuadorians from the coast, Indigenous groups from the highlands, and 
thousands who had a stake in the process of the past few months took part in the march. 
A member of Yasunidos describes the emotional tone of the March:  
The night before the delivery of the signatures…we camped out in El 
Arbolito (The Little Tree, a park in which many protest activities have take 
place), and the next day that great march moved me so much. It was so 
beautiful, diverse, and showed much of the expressions that had meant the 
defense of the Yasuní, and it was a momento of poder del pueblo (power of 
the people), saying, here are our signatures, they represent us, here they are, 
we deliver them, and then that collective joy when we reach the CNE….  
(RG, personal communication, March 12, 2015). 
 
As the boxes were delivered one by one, to the sound of unending applause, the 
march acted as a collective voice of citizens, making visible dissent, and breaking 
through silence and fear. The march was perhaps the most important and vibrant 
manifestation of Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics of post-development. 
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Figure 2f. Yasunidos delivers the signatures to CNE.  Photos: Diana Coryat 
2.6.6 Democracy in Extinction 
 Once the boxes were delivered by Yasunidos to CNE, another series of 
irregularities took place. Three days after the signatures were delivered, on April 15, 
2014, CNE released a video, aired nationally, that described reasons that could lead to the 
elimination of signatures. Sensing a fraud foretold, members of Yasunidos made a 
surprise visit to the CNE. When they demanded to see their boxes, they observed that the 
security belts were broken on several of them. Upon revision, they found that many of the 
copies of identification cards of signature gatherers were missing, which would lead to 
the disqualification of thousands of signatures. Two days later, the CNE accused 
Yasunidos of trying to deceive them, and the boxes were hauled away by the military to 
one of their installments. The signature verification process ultimately took place without 
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the consent or supervision of Yasunidos, as was originally stipulated. Moreover, these 
events occurred during Easter week, when many people leave Quito to spend time with 
their families. So there were far less protesters than there might have been during another 
time period.  
 Vázquez et al. (2015) carefully documented the process, noting fraudulent and 
suspicious activites that included: the breaking of the protective seals of the boxes; public 
media campaigns against Yasunidos, including false allegations against the signature 
gatherers; CNE press releases citing the reasons for the elimination of signatures; and the 
very serious accusation that Yasunidos had falsified signatures. In short, there were 
multiple irregularies leading up to CNE’s announcement that it had eliminated over 60% 
of the signatures. On April 29, 2014, President Correa declared that there would be no 
referendum, even before the signature verification process took place. It was very clear 
that the government was adamant about not allowing a referendum to go forward. 
This was indeed the most difficult moment the movement had faced. Yasunidos 
initiated a campaign urging citizens to demand that their signatures be validated. 
However, this campaign, “Democracy in Extinction” did not gain traction. A member of 
Yasunidos discusses the impact that this series of events had on the movement:    
We did not have a strategy prepared for the moment of fraud. I think we 
were somewhat naive in believing that with that number of signatures, the 
referendum would go forward. Psychologically we were more prepared to 
win, than for a mediated situation of fraud. I don’t think there was planning 
in the event of fraud…we decided on the theme of “democracy in 
extinction” as a way to attract more sectors. But I feel that the message 
wasn’t so clear, nor was it as emotionally appealing as in the previous 
phase….It caught us completely off guard politically as well as 
mediatically….Also, the type of activists and bodies that were very efficient 
for the phase of signature collection, and to convince the people that they 
had to sign, and vote in favor of the Yasuní, were not the same kinds of 
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activists needed for that next moment…like those with more political 
experience, in order to confront that situation. Precisely because we are 
young, we had not had experience with autoritarian regimes. We didn’t 
have experience in civil disobedience, or in actions of resistance nor direct 
action… (BM, personal communication, April 28, 2015). 
 
On May 6, 2014, the CNE announced that they would only validate 359,761 
signatures, which fell short of the amount they needed to call for a national referendum. 
Reasons given ranged from valid ones such as repeat signatures, to those that were 
unreasonable, including small stains or wrinkles on a form or undecipherable letters. No 
matter where Ecuadorians stood on the issue of drilling for oil in the Yasuní, the 
government’s frontal attack on the signature-gathering process, its effort to depict 
Yasunidos as dishonest, and the manner in which the CNE dealt with the process, was an 
affront to many people’s sense of democracy and justice. It appeared that every effort 
was made so that the referendum would fail.  
 A team of academics from several universities carried out an independent 
statistical analysis of the signatures presented by Yasunidos to the CNE to try to estimate 
the number of valid signatures (Vázquez, 2015). According to their report, Yasunidos 
delivered between 667,334 and 680,339 valid signatures. They concluded that the chance 
that the number of valid signatures presented by CNE was accurate was statistically less 
than “one millionth.” They also concluded that chances that the number of valid 
signatures were less than the minimum required by law was almost equal to zero. This 
report called into question the objectivity of the CNE, and recommended a formal, 
independent audit and access to CNE’s database. The report stated that an audit “is 
indispensable, as conditions for democratic institutionality, transparency, independence 
and credibility of the resolutions of electoral power.” (Tegantai, 2014, p. 2) 
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 I would argue that the elimination of signatures and other irregularities provoked 
a sense of frustration and despair in many citizens, which lead to paralysis rather than 
mobilization. It was also an emotionally difficult moment for many members of 
Yasunidos, especially those who did not have political experience.  Several were so 
frustrated and angry they simply stopped their protest activities. Others persevered, but 
without the forward momentum provided by the concrete goal of gathering signatures. 
Yasunidos has since struggled to gain that kind of massive public support.  It seemed that 
the moment of hope and people-powered direct democracy was over, at least at this 
juncture. 
Although a devastating moment in the life of the movement, and one that had far 
reaching implications for democracy in Ecuador, Yasunidos does not assume what 
occurred as a total loss. As one member argues: 
The Yasunidos collective became a new poltiical actor in the public sphere, 
and it was a fresh voice whose intervention was needed. When Yasunidos 
breaks into this sphere, I think the other political actors did not have an 
adequate response to what we were proposing, from the most traditional of 
the Right, to the center Left… and perhaps even social movements. And 
after the signature collection process, I don’t believe the state will permit 
another exercise of signature collection as Yasunidos did.  (BB, personal 
communication, May 7, 2015).   
 
A political actor I interviewed also discussed the outcome: 
They (Yasunidos) aren’t necessarily a threat to the government. The 
possibility that people organize is a threat to the government, and that they 
claim the rights established in the Constitution, and that is why they wanted 
to eliminate them. And since then, there are many international meetings, 
not just academic meetings but political ones, and this case is always 
present. Members of Yasunidos have also travelled and presented at these 
and other meetings. (Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 
2015). 
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Many analysts agree that the government’s decision to drill for oil in the Yasuní, 
and its treatment of Yasunidos, hurt Correa politically. For instance, when Correa’s 
movement, Alianza Pais, lost Ecuador’s three major cities (Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca) 
and most of the Amazon in the mayoral races of February 2014, many considered it a 
vote against all that had happened in 2013 (Ospina, 2014). In Chapter 5, I discuss the 
longer-term political implications of this mediated battle, in particular for processes of 
democracy in Ecuador.    
On October 28, 2014, Yasunidos presented a demand to the IACHR against the 
Ecuadorian government for violation of political rights of the citizens who signed the 
petitions for a popular referendum. Julio César Trujillo, one of Yasunidos’ lawyers, 
stated that they had little hope that the referendum would be approved, as governmental 
organizations “obeyed one will, that of the President of the Republic…and because of 
this we needed to appeal to international organisms.” (Cazorla, 2014, p. 4). 
 Ironically, on May 22, 2014, the International Day of Biodiversity, the Ministry of 
the Environment granted Petroamazonas (the state oil company), the license to exploit the 
Yasuní blocks 31 and 43. The complete coordination of supposed independent branches 
and institutions of government, and alignment of public media, was further proof that 
democratization processes had been eroded.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter, divided into four sections, has sought to present a largely interview 
and ethnographically-based, panoramic view of the case study of Yasunidos.  The first 
section grounded the chapter in a theoretical discussion about the new wave of social 
movements in Latin America. Here I analyzed how Yasunidos fits patterns associated 
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with a new generation of movement actors that are contesting power in the progressive 
governments. The second section focused on the story of the Yasuní ITT, including its 
mediated treatment by the government, thereby contextualizing the emergence of 
Yasunidos. Section Three focused on Yasunidos identity and movement practices. In the 
final section of the chapter, I analyzed four key moments of the case, paying particular 
attention to the social, political and communicational context they confronted in that first 
year. I sought to tell the story of the year in a succint manner. In what was a very 
complicated year on many levels in Ecuador, I emphasized the tension between 
movement-based processes of democratization, and government attempts to abort those 
processes. I analyzed how the direct democratic process of collecting signatures across 
the country was able to partially interrupt the government’s media power. As I discussed 
in Chapter 1, media power has been theorized by several scholars, but the limits and 
excesses of media power has rarely been analyzed. This chapter, particularly Section 4, 
provides insight into howYasunidos confronted the government’s media power with 
direct democratic actions. These actions formed part of their practices of mediated 
cultural politics. And, as I have proposed, a focus on mediated cultural politics sheds 
light on processes that a sole focus on media power can overlook.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE RECONFIGURATION OF MEDIA POWER IN ECUADOR AND ITS 
IMPACT ON STATE-SOCIAL MOVEMENT CONFLICTS 
3.1 Introduction   
  When I first travelled to Ecuador in August 2012, Julian Assange, the founder of 
Wikileaks, had recently been given safe harbor in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London.39 
Internationally, President Correa was celebrated as a champion of freedom of expression 
given his support of this whistleblower. So, when I read Ecuadorian newspapers in the 
days following my arrival, I was puzzled to read numerous editorials and opinion 
columns that questioned the “intolerant government that seeks to wash its image using 
Assange” and pointed to the “contradictions” this act displayed with domestic 
communication, such as forbidding government functionaries to give interviews to the 
press and other such actions.40 I would later find that this disjuncture between 
international and national opinion about the Ecuadorian government was just one of 
many examples of communicative criticism.  Others would be related to the 
government’s attitudes towards the media, social movements and the indigenous 
communities seeking to protect their territories from extractivism.   
 In this chapter, I address one of my main research questions: how has the Correa 
government reconfigured media power in Ecuador? A related sub-questions that I analyze 
                                                          
39 Julian Assange applied for political asylum in Ecuador due to continuous legal battles in Sweden over 
allegedly unresolved rape charges. Assange and many others believe that his extradition would lead to 
persecution by the U.S. due to his whistleblowing Wikileads project. See Julian Assange seeking asylum in 
Ecuadorean embassy in London, June 19, 2012, The Guardian.  Accessed at 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/19/julian-assange-wikileaks-asylum-ecuador 
 
40 See Assange, Ecuador on Stage, August 20, 2012, El Comercio, and La Agenda Del Poder, June 29, 
2012, El Comercio, for two examples of then-current opinion about the action.  
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in Part II of this chapter is: how has the Correa government used its media power, 
particularly the EC television program, to delegitimize and criminalize Yasunidos and 
other social actors that oppose oil drilling in the Yasuní.   
 In the following section, I return to the theorization of media power that I 
introduced in Chapter One. I then discuss Ecuador’s media field prior to, and after 2007, 
when Correa assumed office. I analyze different components of media power, including 
the symbolic, legislative, and production practices of the government, particularly in 
relation to journalists and private media companies. While most of the dissertation 
focuses on mediated government-social movement relations, in analyzing the 
reconfiguration of media power it is necessary to focus on the journalistic field, where 
such configurations have mostly played out. Part II of this chapter focuses on how the 
government has deployed its media power in its dealing with Yasunidos and other social 
movements, particular through the EC. I also analyze Yasunidos’ media practices: how 
they strategically used the governmental attacks to their advantage; how they leveraged 
private media; and how they characterized their own social media practices. An analytic 
thread that runs through the whole chapter is the limitations of statist media power, a 
theme that is underdeveloped in most accounts of media power.  
 The methodologies used in this chapter are diverse, and have included 
ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews with members of Yasunidos, journalists, 
political analysts, and social movement actors who have expertise in communication 
practices. I use institutional analysis to examine laws and decrees that were passed during 
the year covered in this case study. In Part II, I use a critical discourse analysis 
framework to analyze presidential discourses in the EC, related to Yasunidos and other 
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anti-extractivist resistance. One of the aspirations of this chapter, both theoretically and 
empirically, is to widen our understanding about the reconfiguration of statist media 
power by examining the symbolic actions, legislative-judicial framework, and media 
ownership and production practices of the government. In this way, we can better grasp 
its implications for journalists, media organizations and social movements, as well as 
appreciate its limitations, and the ways social movements resist and fight back.    
3.2 Theorizing statist media power in Ecuador 
 A conceptual framework of statist media power has evaded most theories of 
media power that focus on liberal democratic regimes, in which power and protagonism 
are assumed to be the domain of private media (albeit in alignment with government). 
This is not the case in Ecuador, nor in other states where governments have attained some 
measure of direct control over media’s symbolic and material resources. Therefore, I seek 
to further develop a concept of statist media power, theoretically, methodologically and 
empirically.  
 In Chapter One, I argued that it is essential to apply a communicational lens to the 
Yasunidos case, as it can illuminate contemporary state-social movement conflicts about 
extractivism in ways that are often overlooked (either media is left out of the analysis or 
there is a focus on government-media relations). I introduced a framework of statist 
media power that expands on Couldry’s (2003) notion of media power as symbolic and 
material resources that, taken together, have definitional power to shape the whole of 
social space. Couldry extends Bourdieu’s notion of the meta-capital of the state, which 
refers to the state’s power over other fields, and he applies it to the meta-capital that the 
media potently generate over other fields. In doing so, Couldry proposes that only media 
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meta-capital can compete with statist meta-capital, as each has the cross-cutting power to 
deeply impact other fields of power. In the context in which Couldry is theorizing media 
power, these two meta-capitals (of the state and of the media) are generated by distinct 
actors. Whereas I propose that in the Ecuadorian context, the meta-capital of the media 
(media power) has become, under Correa, a constituent, even dominant aspect of the 
state’s meta-capital.  
 Therefore, when I refer to statist media power, I understand it as the power to 
construct a version of reality using symbolic and material resources at the state’s 
disposal. Given the scope of resources available to the state, such power also affects the 
capacity of the state to circulate other kinds of state capital (political, economic, 
legislative, judicial, and communicational). As such, it is a multilevel, multi-modal, 
dynamic process that involves the mediation of symbols, images, rituals, and discursive 
constructions of state and non-state actors. Paired with material resources, such statist 
media power has enormous potential to benefit government agendas. Because statist 
media power is part of a “package” of various kinds of statist capital, and also able to 
leverage those other forms of capital, it can have strong implications, not just for media 
democratization, but for overall processes of democratization (in this case, the erosion of 
democratization).  
 One of the key arguments in this chapter, arrived at though careful analysis of the 
Ecuadorian government’s media practices and media holdings, is that it has amassed an 
unprecedented amount of media power, although that power is always partial, and 
permanently subject to contestation and resistance. I categorize the various forms of 
media power in three conceptually discrete but overlapping categories (in that all have 
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symbolic and material dimensions and implications): symbolic actions, legal-judicial-
administrative factors, and state media ownership and production practices. The first, 
symbolic actions, include threats, delegitimization and criminalization of government 
adversaries. The second, legal-judicial-administrative factors, include the passing of laws 
and decrees that provide the government with legal means to penalize social movements 
and the media. These factors have restricted freedom of expression and self-censorship. It 
also includes taking over and closing private media; and establishing a new 
communication infrastructure that oversees and sanctions media. The third factor is state 
media ownership and production practices, which are the main vehicles for transmitting 
the symbolic dimensions of the state. This includes the production of content that is 
circulated widely across media platforms.  
 By making explicit the various dimensions of statist media power, it is my intent 
to emphasize both its symbolic and structural, materialist aspects, and ways in which they 
relate and overlap. The Enlace Ciudadano, for example, integrates all three categories, in 
that it is a television and radio program produced by the government; it is aired on many 
channels owned by and/or that have been taken over by the government, it is archived 
online in government websites, and the content - its discourses, visuals and rituals -  have 
symbolic power. 
 There is another aspect to media power that has been underexplored in scholarly 
literature: the limitations of media power. Couldry (2003) argues that some 
concentrations of symbolic power are so great that they “dominate the whole landscape” 
and amount to the power of constructing reality (p. 4). While I agree with Couldry that 
such concentration, given the uneven distribution of symbolic power, can dominate and 
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therefore distort representations of reality, such media hegemony always encounters 
counter-hegemonic challenges that seek to interrupt its discourses and representations. 
Des Freedman (2014) has explored the limitations of media power through empirical 
cases (both Couldry and Freedman conceptualize mainstream media as the holder of 
media power, a key difference with my study). While Freedman concurs with Couldry as 
to the troubling effects of the unequal allocation of symbolic and material media 
resources, his research findings have lead him to conclude that “[m]edia institutions do 
not exert an exorable power over society…They are open to challenge, particularly when 
their frames don’t match experiences or aspirations, especially in times of social 
struggles…when existing narratives are under stress (2014, p. 119-120)41. As such, media 
power is not as “predictable, solid, or immoveable” as advocates of the propaganda 
model argue (p. 117). However, when it comes to interrogating how media power can be 
challenged, his proposals lack specificity; for example, he proposes that it is important to 
take advantage of the contradictions inherent in capitalism, without providing further 
detail. 
Freedman’s assertions are key to understanding the limitations of media power in 
the Yasunidos case, particularly his argument that challenges to media power can arise 
when frames (in this case, the government’s) don’t match “the experiences or 
aspirations” (2014, p. 119) of citizens. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, such 
mismatch between Correa’s assertions that oil-drilling brings wealth to the Amazon 
region did not match Ecuador’s decades-long experience as a petrol state, in which the 
financial resources did not benefit the Amazon region. Even more dissonant, the 
                                                          
41 One of Freedman’s (2014) studies focused on how readers question editorial frames of the Iraq pro-war 
media. 
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government’s vision of development did not match its own stated vision, just months 
before it abandoned the project to keep the oil in the soil. Additionally, young people’s 
post-development imaginaries did not match the traditional, petrol state logic, in which 
extractivism is believed to bring development, modernity and much-needed cash for the 
economy. Post-develoment imaginaries are further examined in Chapter 4.  
I propose, too, that challenges to media power also arise when social movements 
powerfully deploy alternative conceptualizations that resonate with citizens. Yasunidos 
was able to trouble the government’s depiction of their movement as violent, as 
manipulated youth backed by “los mismos de siempre” (a common Correa statement, 
referring to the same political actors as always,). They were also able to interpellate 
statist media power by strategically leveraging it for their own benefit, as analyzed in Part 
II of this chapter. 
3.3 The journalistic field in Ecuador prior to 2007 
 In Ecuador, as in most of the world, the journalistic field has been characterized 
by the dominance and concentration of private media, which has grown 
disproportionately compared to other kinds of media, historically holding approximately 
95% of radio and television licenses.  In 2006, four national business groups (that are also 
families) owned more than 70% of national dailies (Ramos, 2010). The Commision for 
the Audit of the Concession of Frequencies of Radio and Television (hereafter referred to 
as the Audit) found that at least four concessionaries controlled VHF stations in 
practically the whole of Ecuador. (Ramos, 2010, p. 27). A social movement actor 
involved in the drafting of the communication rights agenda in the 2008 Constituent 
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Assembly discussed the Audit that was conducted about the situation of media 
ownership:     
We presented the Audit to Rafael Correa on May 18, 2009. In this audit, 
we discovered all of the dealings of frequencies that we suspected. The 
study covered from 1995 to 2008. But beforehand, the Controlaria also 
conducted an audit. We came to the same conclusion that frequencies 
had been purchased. (Jose Ignacio López Vigil, personal communication, 
January 22, 2016). 
 
 Even though episodic ruptures in government-media relations have arisen from 
time to time, historically these media actors have enjoyed a close alliance with dominant 
political and economic actors (the state, elites and business sectors). The private media in 
Ecuador, owned to this day mainly by families rather than by transnational corporations, 
have benefitted from these ties. Their close relationship with the state has meant that 
laws, regulations and state practices have enabled private media to occupy a privileged 
position in relation to other kinds of media. Cerbino et al. (2014) have spelled out the 
multiple ways in which a succession of Ecuadorian governments have subsidized private 
media. For example, until recently, the state did not set limits on the number of 
frequencies that could be associated with one owner. It also permitted, with little or no 
oversight, the rent, sale, and transference of radio and television channels. Regarding the 
provision of news and information of public interest, tt was merely left up to the 
discretion of private media to do so. Since the 1960s, private media companies received 
tax exemptions, and other economic incentives. Taxes were waived on the importation of 
equipment, and they did not have to pay taxes on investments. Additionally, the military 
regime that was in power from 1963-1966 passed two decrees that waived private radio 
and television companies from taxation on their sales and earned profits. In the 1970s, 
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they were granted steep reductions in postage rates. However, none of these kinds of 
incentives were available to community media. In fact, community media were forbidden 
from selling advertising during the dictatorship (Cerbino et al., 2014).  By 2007, 19 
families controlled 287 of the 348 television licenses. In radio, 45 families controlled 
60% of the concessions. Until 2008, the Ecuadorian state only had one official media: 
The National Radio of Ecuador, an AM station that transmitted from Quito for four 
decades. The growth of public media began in 2008, under Correa. 
 On the other hand, in interviews that I conducted with journalists42 that work for 
the two leading dailies, El Comercio and El Universo, they have argued that within this 
schema, there was more pluralism and debate in these media, and generally in society, 
than since Correa came to power in 2007, given the threats and suits against journalists 
and media companies. These actions, spearheaded by Correa himself, ushered in an era of 
self-censorship in the journalistic field, unlike in any other era in Ecuador. However, 
while it might be true that there was more diversity of opinion in Ecuador’s dailies and 
journals in terms of reporting and opinion, I would argue that the scenario was far from 
one of media democracy, as very few social actors had access to the media, and generally 
speaking, private ownership by families meant that elite actors, mainly aligned with the 
state, held media power.  
 There is another important context that needs to be considered, which was the 
record-low popularity of Ecuadorian media at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 
21st century. Prior to Correa taking the political stage in 2007, the journalistic field had 
reached a crisis of credibility with Ecuadorian citizens. Such crisis coincided with 
                                                          
42 These journalists are left-leaning; I mention this to break with the idea that all those that work in private 
media are necessarily aligned with commercial or right-wing interests. 
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citizens’ rejection of party politics, politicians and neoliberal practices in general. This 
was due, in part, to the complicity between the journalistic and political fields. Just prior 
to Correa’s election, three presidents had been overthrown by popular protest (rather than 
military coups) in a period of eight years, evidence of the growing discontent with 
neoliberal politics and the politicians that promoted them. An analysis of the events 
surrounding the fall of president Lucio Gutierrez, on April 20, 2005, help bring into focus 
the interconnected political and journalistic crisis of credibility. Abad (2011) recounts a 
dramatic example of such collusion: citizen uprisings in April 2005, which would soon 
push Gutierrez out of power, were “timidly” (p. 17) covered by Ecuador’s mass media, 
even as protests increased dramatically. While there were over 100,000 people protesting 
in the streets of Quito on April 19, 2005, (a day in which a Chilean journalist died due to 
asphyxiation by tear gas that was used by the police to repress protesters), El Universo’s 
cover page on the following day featured a half-page photo of Pope Benedict XVI, and 
only provided a few lines about the protests in official discourse (p. 18-19). This brought 
on not just a political rebellion but also an “audience rebellion” by outraged citizens.  
Aligned with a discourse of stability and social order promoted by 
power, the impossibility of understanding other forms of political 
expression outside of proselytism and the rhetoric of political parties, 
these media turned their back on the protesters, and, not seeing 
themselves represented, [citizens] stopped believing them.…. (Abad, 
2011, p. 17) 
 
 In the face of the media’s refusal to cover what was happening, news of protests 
circulated by word-of-mouth, cell phones, e-mail and Radio La Luna, a small private 
radio station that provided citizens with live tribunas ciudadanas (citizen tribunals) in 
order to share information, events and opinion (Navas, 2012, p. 233). There were many 
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dissonant moments in the tumultuous neoliberal era, this being merely a “point of 
reference” (p. 19), which involved the delegitimation of both political power and media 
power. In fact, this particular context was instrumental to Correa winning the presidency 
on an anti-neoliberal platform, and to his ability to wage a guerra mediatica against 
journalists and media companies.  
3.4 Changes in Ecuador’s journalistic field since 2007  
3.4.1 Overview of changes 
 The government is a recent, powerful entrant in the journalistic field, and 
therefore, a defining actor in both the political and journalistic fields. As the most 
powerful actor in the political field, the state has the power to redefine other fields 
through legislation and other means (Bourdieu, 1999). In Ecuador, the typical Latin 
American configuration of media power, in which the state and private media are allies, 
has been transformed under Correa. As I previously pointed out, much has been written 
about the reconfiguration of media power with a focus on government-media relations. 
However, this chapter, while taking into account the effect such changes have had on 
journalists and private media, privileges an analysis of how social movements have been 
affected.  
 Waisbord (2011) has characterized media practices of the progressive Latin 
American governments as populist media. Although I do not use, nor enter into the long, 
complex debate about populism, I concur with Waisbord’s analysis of media practices in 
that they represent trends that are distinct from liberal democratic media systems.43 They 
                                                          
43 Although many scholars use the concept of populism or neo-populism in their discussions of the 21st 
century wave of Latin American leftist governments, it is not useful in my study, given that it focuses on 
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include the mediated polarization of those who are “for” or “against” the government; the 
strengthening of state control over the media; and the disciplining of media outlets and 
journalists by the Executive through rewards for acquiescence and punishment for 
criticism. All of these characteristics fit government actions since 2007. 
I propose a broad categorization that characterizes distinct but overlapping ways 
in which the reconfiguration of media power has been utilized by the government against 
journalists, private media and social movements:  
1) Symbolic actions: These include threats, campaigns of delegitimization and 
criminalization of government adversaries (journalists, social movements, 
academics, and anyone who publicly confronts the government). Strategies of 
delegitimation also include questioning the veracity of opponents’ claims and 
invalidation of demands, suggesting that they have other interests.  
2) These symbolic actions are enacted and widely circulated through a variety of 
media; the media platform par excellence is the Enlace Ciudadano (EC).  
3) Legal-judicial-administrative actions: The passage of laws and decrees that 
provide the government with legal means to sanction journalists, media 
companies and social movements, which curtail freedom of expression and 
encourage self-censorship (and therefore the erosion of media democracy). This 
category includes the confiscation and closing of private media. It also includes 
the new communication law which stipulated the construction of a new 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the imbricated relationship between the leader and el pueblo. Rather, this study focuses on the conflictive 
relationship between the government and social movements.  
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administrative communication infrastructure that oversees and sanctions 
journalists and media outlets.  
4) Statist media ownership and media production practices: This category 
encompasses several factors: how the government has increased its role as a 
media owner; how it manages the media under its control; the production of radio, 
television and internet-based content; and the creation and circulation of 
government publicity in public and private media. Such content production and 
circulation on a multiplicity of platforms is one of the main vehicles for 
transmitting the symbolic dimensions of the state.  
The following sections briefly introduce each category.   
3.4.2 Symbolic actions 
 Soon after he was elected President in 2007, fully taking advantage of the 
credibility crisis of the media, Correa began to disrupt the historic state-private media 
alliance (Cerbino et al., 2014; Ramos, 2010). While the private media was originally 
supportive of Correa, in a matter of a few months, relations quickly turned sour when the 
media began to criticize the government. The private media anticipated the guerra 
mediatica even during Correa’s presidential campaign, when on November 11, 2006, 
Correa announced that the media would have the freedom to exercise its profession, but 
that he would promote laws and sanctions in case of deliberate disinformation. But even 
before the government could exercise sanctions through the new Communication Law 
that was passed in 2013, Correa applied symbolic tactics, often through threats, 
delegitimation, name calling and making fun of journalists and media outlets.  
  
 
 
 
 
114 
 Correa also increasingly demonstrated intolerance for journalists that asked him 
questions he did not want to answer. For example, on January 11, 2007, he ordered the 
removal of several journalists during a press conference.  (El Universo, 2007, March 12). 
One of the events that has remained engraved in the memories of Ecuadorians, is when, 
on June 27, 2007, during a press conference, Sandra Ochoa, a journalist with El Universo 
asked Correa about his petrol politics, even though he had warned he did not want to talk 
about this issue until he had made concrete decisions. When she insisted, he became 
exasperated and exclaimed, “Esta gordita horrorosa!” (“This horrible fatso.”). Over the 
next few days, journalists and citizens publicly expressed their disapproval of this action. 
This kind of insult came to be representative of the way that Correa would treat 
journalists, and also women (especially feminists, who have been called malcriadas, 
badly-raised or misbehaved), and social movements. These actions would continue and 
increase over the next several years.  
 This and other egregious actions spearheaded by Correa sent shockwaves through 
media institutions, and continue to affect what they publish or say till the present time. 
Journalists and media outlets have had good reason to fear reprisals for publishing 
investigative journalism that targets government officials. Since 2007, the Correa 
government and the private media have had a highly conflictive relationship. In fact, 
Correa has portrayed private media as a political opponent in its own right, with more 
power than fragmented political parties (Cerbino et al., 2014). Correa has systematically 
and publicly criticized journalists and private media as corrupt and dishonest, especially 
when they have been critical of the government’s actions. Some of the names he uses to 
insult them include: la prensa corrupta (the corrupt media); asesinos de tinta (ink assasins, 
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etc.). In fact, he dedicates up to half-hour of his Saturday show to insult the media and 
journalists. There are special segments of the EC, such as La Libertad de Expresión es 
para Todos (Freedom of Expression is for Everyone,) and the Caretuca de la Semana 
(Mugshot of the Week).  These regular segments are dedicated to refuting news articles 
by journalists (and politicians), insulting them for their biases and errors in reporting, and 
mocking them. Initially, such criticism was embraced by many citizens, or at the very 
least seemed funny, given their direct experiences with the media’s alignment with power 
during citizen uprisings against several presidents. But eventually, the public’s 
heightened awareness of media half-truths and lies (pointed out by Correa in special 
segments of the EC) were applied to government media. Hence, the years-long avalanche 
of criticism of the media has also greatly affected how government communication is 
viewed. By making the public more aware of how the media distorts facts, has only 
called more attention to government media does the same. Again, this brings to the fore 
the limitations of media power, in that the public has become as untrusting, if not more 
so, of government media.  
 The table below provides a small sample of symbolic actions enacted by the 
government against journalists and media companies. While many of these actions can 
also can be situated within the legal-administrative category, they are indeed symbolic 
acts in terms of the disruption of the government-media alliance, and because of the long-
lasting impacts they had on the journalistic field, in terms of the self-censorship and fear 
it provoked.  
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Table 3a. A representative sample of symbolic actions. 
Date Category Event 
2007 
Attacks Emilio Palacios is thrown out of President’s Palace for 
asking a question that Correa did not like (May 20th).  
During a press conference, Sandra Ochoa, insisted about 
Correa’s petrol politics, he became exasperated and 
exclaimed, “Esta gordita horrorosa!” (“This horrible fatso.”) 
(June 27). 
Punishment Governmental organizations are ordered by Correa to either 
reduce or eliminate media buying in the most important 
private dailies (El Universo and El Comercio). This practice 
continues until 2012. 
Punishment Government prohibits its ministries from giving interviews 
to private media. These sources were the most utilized 
sources prior to the prohibition. This prohibition was in 
effect until 2013.  
2009 
Resignations and 
closures 
Carlos Vera’s TV program, which criticized and questioned 
the government, was closed due to the government’s 
complaints about its breach of law (Vera refused to give 
airtime to one of the government’s bureaucrats).  
2010 
Resignations 
On March 30, 26 columnists quit ‘El Telegrafo’ (state 
newspaper) because it was censoring their opinion columns 
about the internal situation of the newspaper. 
Resignations and 
attacks 
Jorge Ortiz, who strongly criticized the government, had to 
resign fromTeleamazonas stating that he was leaving 
because of the constant and insistent attacks from the 
government to the channel and himself. 
2012 
Resignations and 
attacks 
Janet Hinostroza left her interview and opinion television 
program. She stated that she had suffered "threats to her 
integrity", so she chose to withdraw temporarily from the 
program.  
Threats, attacks, 
dismissals 
Gonzalo Rosero, director of Radio Democracia, complaint 
about threats and attacks: Rosero: " Please stop bothering 
and chasing me". He implored President Correa to guarantee 
his free exercise of journalism. 
 
Martin Pallares, an investigative journalist who worked at El 
Comercio for 13 years, was fired for critical comments he 
made about the government on his personal twitter account. 
Rejection of 
international 
norms 
The Ecuadorian government rejects the report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights on Freedom of 
Expression and calls for change in the Special Rapporteur. 
2013 
Punishment and 
closures 
Closing of the opposition magazine “Vanguardia” (July 
17th). The government explains that the closing of the 
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business was due to economic mismanagement. 
2014 
Punishment and 
closures 
On August 26, the Superintendence of Communications 
liquidated the critical Diario Hoy (newspaper) arguing that it 
had losses of 50% or more of the capital for two continuous 
years. 
 
 Another way in which media corporations are encouraged not to criticize the 
government is by the implicit or explicit threat to withhold advertising (and the funds 
they bring in). Since approximately 70% of advertising are still derived from the 
government, this age-old practice remains a powerful mechanism of silencing criticism.  
 The symbolic actions mentioned in this section and in the above table are only 
some of the most representative. The scale of journalist and media delegitimization is 
immense, as many of these actions take place on a weekly, if not daily basis.      
3.4.3 Legal-judicial-administrative factors.  
 Conaghan (2015) argues that policies directed toward civil society organizations 
and the media have expanded the scope of societal regulation, and with it, the powers of 
the Executive, referred to as “politicized legalism”44. She further argues that “new 
government bureaucracies have been endowed with substantial powers” and “constitute a 
sweeping new regimen of executive-directed social control….” (p. 9). She also argues 
that “no enemy loomed as large in the dark societal landscape envisioned by Correa than 
the mainstream media” (Conaghan, 2015, p. 11). This section discusses the institutions 
charged with regulating media and society under the Correa government, and some of 
more contentious new regulations. The objective here is to provide an overall picture of 
                                                          
44 Conaghan’s assessment is derived from Daniel Brinks’ (2012) notion of analyzing the ‘state-as-law’.  
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ways in which the government is reconfiguring media power in its favor through legal-
administrative means.   
 Correa’s refoundational discourse and anti-neoliberal platform included, at least 
initially, a communication rights framework that was conceived during the Constituent 
Assembly with strong participation of community media advocates. As such, the 2008 
Constitution advances a broad and progressive vision of communication rights, 
guaranteeing citizens not only access to information and communication technologies, 
but also to the broadcast spectrum.45 This constitutional mandate potentially creates an 
opening for the democratization of the media, understood as “the necessity to maximize 
democracy with citizen participation in decision making, and … to maximize diversity 
and pluralism in the mediated world.” (Leon, 2013). It also implies confronting the 
concentration of media and privileging the interests of elite economic groups. Returning 
to the concept of media power, Article 18 guarantees the right to freedom of expression: 
the right of all peoples to “seek out, receive, exchange, produce and circulate 
information.” Hence, it has potential implications for the power of representation of 
minority voices and the exclusions of “voice” (Couldry, 2010). Initially, there was 
excitement among progressive communication activists about possible impacts of this 
framework for the democratization of the media. However, the symbolic actions of the 
government sent powerful messages that a rights-based approach would not be the focus 
of this administration. Rather, the application would be punitive and would privilege the 
government’s right to communication above others.   
                                                          
45 Several of the progressive Latin American governments including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and 
Uruguay. have enacted media reforms that seek to democratize the broadcast spectrum, as discussed in 
Chapter One. Each case is different in terms of the actual reforms, and execution of them. 
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 On multiple occasions, Correa’s response to the media’s critique of, or opposition 
to his policies, has been to take legal actions against journalists and media outlets. One of 
the most renowned cases involving the judicialization of the media, among many, is 
simply referred to as Caso El Universo. Emilio Palacio, a journalist who was already 
under fire for his heated exchanges with Correa, published an opinion column (“No to 
lies”, 201146) with respect to the events surrounding the national drama that was 
unleashed with a police revolt on September 30, 2011 (referred to as “30-S”). Palacios 
stated that the government opened fire inside a hospital full of innocent citizens. In 
response, President Correa sued Palacio and his newspaper, El Universo, for US$ 80 
million and also sought prison sentences for the journalist and directors of the national 
daily. The sentence was ratified by the Ecuadorian courts (which have been subordinated 
to the Executive). One of the judges in the case, Monica Encalada, went into exile in 
Colombia after revealing alleged corruption in the case, as she feared for her life. After 
receiving the most severe international criticism from the international community, 
Correa issued an official pardon to the journalist and newspaper. Such pardon led to the 
CPJ’s (Committee for the Protection of Journalists) staff member, Carlos Lauria, to 
comment that “to listen to the president, it as if I were listening to someone who acts as a 
King rather than an elected President.” (Human Rights Ecuador, 2011). He also pointed 
out that the use of criminal procedures to punish comments about public officials is a 
violation of Article 13 of the Human Rights convention that guarantees freedom of 
expression. But the damage had already been done; media outlets and journalists would 
now think twice before publishing a critical piece. Self-censorship became widespread, as 
                                                          
46 Retrieved from http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/02/06/1/1363/mentiras.html February 6th, 2011 
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reported by Reporters without Borders and other media watchdog organizations. For 
example, Martin Pallares, an investigative journalist who worked at El Comercio for 13 
years, was fired for critical comments he made about the government on his personal 
twitter account. In this interview, he addresses the context for media outlets and 
journalists: 
I believe there is an awful atmosphere of self-censorship, I believe that neither 
journalists nor the media escape that terror, my dismissal occurred within that 
context. 
Before going into the details of my departure, I believe it is necessary to 
understand that it happened in the context of a terribly hostile environment for the 
press, with a Communications Law that forces the media and journalists to live in 
a state of permanent distress. The fear of being prosecuted either by the 
Communications Superintendency on the side of law or by any judge in this 
country. I believe there is an awful atmosphere of self-censorship, I believe that 
neither journalists nor the media escape that terror; my dismissal occurred within 
that context.47  
 
Given the situation described above, on March 12, 2013, a group of journalists 
and media organizations of different political orientations testified before members of the 
Comisión Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos (CIDH, The Interamerican 
Commission of Human Rights) and the Relatoria Especial para la Libertad de Expresión 
(Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) about the frequent 
violation of rights. They cited: the judicialization of opinion; the closing of media; the 
increase in stigmatizing discourses against the media; and the use of national cadenas 
(government broadcasts that all stations are required to air) to attack journalists. They 
even cited a suspicious assassination of a journalist. In 2012 alone, there were 172 
reported threats and aggressions against journalists and media. Journalist Christian Zurita 
                                                          
47 Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorreview.com/in-depth-ecuador/interviews/martin-pallares-i-believe-
there-is-an-awful-atmosphere-of-self-censorship/ August 31, 2015.  
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reported that three different media had to retract their comments on several occasions 
because of official pressures. Moreover, he mentioned that 1,365 obligatory cadenas, 
totaling 11,793 minutes, had been ordered by the government between 2007-2012 (El 
Universo, March 13, 2013). By 2011, four prominent journalists that had television 
interview programs had resigned. Janeth Hinostroza of Teleamazonas, the fourth to 
resign, stated that she did so because she had suffered repeated threats.  
3.4.3.1 Creation of a communication law and institutions that sanction and regulate  
 The communication rights platform inscribed in the Constitution was to be 
implemented through the passage of the Ley Organica de Comunicacion (LOC), which 
was signed into law on June 14, 2013. Like the 2008 Constitution, the LOC is a 
progressive document that includes provisions for communication rights, intercultural 
communication by pueblos and nacionalidades (Indigenous and Afro communities), 
workers’ rights, affirmative action, freedom of expression, and articles that foment 
national and regional production and diffusion. Yet, I agree with the communication 
rights scholars, activists and watchdog organizations that I have interviewed, spoken 
with, and read, that the LOC has not promoted the democratization of the media. In fact, 
contrary to the rhetoric, it has actually contributed to the erosion of media democracy and 
processes of democratization in Ecuador.  
 One of the more significant aspects of this legislation has been its pledge to 
redistribute the broadcast spectrum in thirds: 33% to private media; 33% to public media; 
and 34% to community media.48 To date, however, while public media has grown to 
                                                          
48 The proposal to divide the spectrum in thirds originally came from AMARC, according to José Ignacio 
López Vigil, a long-time communication rights advocate and key actor in Ecuador’s Constituent Assembly.  
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occupy over 17% of the airwaves, community media has barely grown (Acosta, 2016). 
Aside from the 14 radio frequencies that were temporarily granted to indigenous and afro 
communities, there have been few changes with regard to license reversions (that would 
free up airwaves for community media), and not one community radio or television 
frequency has been granted.  
 With respect to private media, the same eight families continue to hold most of 
the frequencies. Even though an audit was conducted about media ownership, none of 
those media have been reverted. And while Ecuador was the first Latin American nation 
to establish that shareholders of financial institutions cannot hold stocks in media outlets 
(Article 312 in the 2008 Constitution), the Eljuri family (Banco de Austro), an ally of the 
Correa government, owns the television station Telerama. In the case of the Ecuadorian 
media holdings of Angel González, the Mexican media mogul and friend of the Correa 
government, owns 16 media companies in Ecuador, 10 of which are national: three 
television stations, 11 radio stations and two newspapers, including El Comercio, a 
national daily).49  Such holdings are prohibited through two articles. Firstly, Article 6, 
stipulates that national media cannot be owned by foreign interests, and secondly, Article 
113, prohibits a person or organization from owning more than 2 radio or television 
channels. González controls 10 of 61 national media, a figure that is only superseded by 
the government, which owns 12 national media. According to one communication rights 
activist: 
We are living in a time in which it does not depend on the strength of a law or the 
impact of a law, or of the organizations that have demanded it, but simply the 
discretional application by the Executive….I do not believe that this government 
governs with the law in hand. (JLV) 
                                                          
49 A US Magnate controls 10 national media. (El Universo, 22 febrero 2015). 
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 While private media has taken a blow, more so do to judicial threats and 
sanctions, and community media is stagnant, public media has become a powerful 
communication apparatus of the government. But rather than adopting a pluralistic 
model, it is directly under state control and ownership.  
 In 2009, SECOM (the National Secretary of Communication) was created by 
presidential decree. This organization institutionalizes government discourse and the 
production of information, establishing the scripts, editorial lines, rules, and procedures. 
A long-time media activist spoke of the kind of power held by SECOM: 
It holds symbolic power but it is also very material. There are the public media 
stations that broadcast the sabatinas, the cadenas, {Correa’s Enlace Ciudadano) 
etc. But there are also private media that, if they don’t broadcast the sabatina, 
SECOM calls them. They call them and say “remember that the frequencies are 
owned by the state.” For example, Radio Latacunga, a community radio station 
that is technically private, receives these calls. Private and community radio 
stations are bribed through publicity funds, or a call from SECOM. Correa has 
generated an espionage aparatus, including SENAIN50  and SECOM, which even 
controls social media. (Jose Ignacio López Vigil, personal communication, 
January 22, 2016).  
 
Another media activist argues: 
SECOM has played a fundamental role in the government – the government 
would be nothing without SECOM. The communication strategy of the 
government has been a strategy of publicists of propaganda. It isn’t a secretary of 
communication; rather it is a secretary of propaganda. In other words, there are 
official media that have a direct connection to propaganda.  
 
 The Superintendencia de la Información y Comunicación (SUPERCOM, 
Superintendent of Information and Communication) is an institution that was created 
through the LOC. It is charged with ensuring compliance with the LOC. It has the ability 
                                                          
50 La Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia (SENAIN, the National Secretary of Intelligence) was created by 
presidential decree No. 1768 on June 8, 2009.  
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to demand steep fines of media institutions that have transgressed the LOC. Its decisions 
are binding and do not include an appeal process. It is a very polemic institution, 
especially given that its director is selected from a short list of three candidates hand-
picked by the President of the Republic. SUPERCOM has broad powers to interpret the 
LOC, which in many parts have vague language and are therefore open to broad. In the 
first year of its operation, it reviewed and processed 93 cases.  
 SUPERCOM has pursued journalists, politicians and media organizations through 
one of the more controversial articles of the LOC, Article 26, linchiamiento mediático 
(media lynching). Media lynching is broadly defined in this article as the diffusion of 
information, reproduced publicly and repeatedly, which seeks to diminish the public 
credibility or prestige of a natural or juridical person. Offenses are punishable by fines, as 
well as an order to provide a public apology. This article has yielded multiple sanctions 
or threats of sanctions in cases where the Correa government has been criticized. 
However, when citizens and organizations have sought to use the media lynching article 
when Correa has defamed them, they have been denied a hearing. In one case, a pollster 
requested the right to reply to insults directed at him by Correa. SUPERCOM replied that 
Correa is not subject to such provision because his broadcasts are part of his presidential 
duties. Cite.    
 Additionally, as part of a package of constitutional amendments passed on 
December 3, 2015, the media in Ecuador legally became a public service, which signifies 
that it is owned by the state, not the people.51 One of the consequences of this is that if a 
                                                          
51 Fundamedios 2015, retrieved from http://www.fundamedios.org/alertas/asamblea-aprueba-cambio-la-
constitucion-para-que-la-comunicacion-sea-considerada-como-servicio-publico/ 
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media fails to inform the public about themes and events of public interest, such media 
can be fined by SUPERCOM. According to one communication activist I interviewed: 
That communication is considered a public good is terrible, because it means that 
the state retains the ownership. I have a right to be informed and to inform, and I 
have the right to own media. It is my right, not because the state allows it. So, if it 
is considered a public service that is dangerous because for me to be able to 
access this right, I need state authorization. Moreover, the Constitution states that 
public services need to be uniform – imagine if communication were uniform – 
one line of thought only! (Jose Ignacio López Vigil, personal communication, 
January 22, 2016).  
 
 Another institution created through the LOC is Consejo de Regulación y 
Desarrollo de la Información y Comunicación (CORDICOM, the Board of Regulation 
and Development of Information and Communication). Among many responsibilities, 
one of its roles is to regulate media content and time slots. On the one hand, the agency is 
vigilant about cases of racial and gender discrimination in the media. On the other hand, 
It is important to note here that many of these articles and institutions were not part of 
what was fought for by media activists. Rather, several of these articles were inserted the 
night before the LOC was passed in the Assembly, before anyone, even most members of 
the Assembly, had time to review or comment on them.  
 Hence, as potentially transformative as the LOC might have been, it has been 
widely criticized as a measure of control, especially by sectors that are already at odds 
with the government, namely social movements and journalists. Private media was 
always against the LOC and waged coordinated campaigns against its passing (Ramos, 
2012). But social movements (except for communication rights advocates who fought for 
the law, though have since been disappointed) never got behind the LOC. Their lack of 
enthusiasm was clearly due to the government’s campaigns of delegitimization and 
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criminalization of social movements, which began early on in Correa’s presidency. As 
such, there was little hope that the LOC would benefit social movements that were at 
odds with the government’s policies.   
Table 3b. Legislative-Judicial-Administrative Actions 
Date Category Event 
2008 Confiscation Confiscation of more than 15 mass media: TC Televisión, 
GamaTV, CN3 y Cablevisión, Compañía y Televisión del 
Pacifico, Editorial Uminasa, Radiodifusora del Pacífico, 
Radio Bolívar, Radio Súper K, Radio Carrusel, Organización 
Radial, América Visión, Radio La Prensa, Editores e 
Impresores Edimpres y Movidad C.A. que imprime las 
revistas La Otra, La Onda, La Onda Infantil, Más, El Agro 
and Samborondón  
2009 
Creation of 
regulatory 
institution 
SECOM (the National Secretary of Communication) was 
created by presidential decree in December 2009. 
2011 Judicial 
President Rafael Correa sued for US $ 10 million to 
journalists Juan Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita for 
moral damage to publish the book “El Gran Hermano” (The 
Big Brother). 
2012 Judicial 
 “El Universo” case: The National Court of Justice confirmed 
the sentence for a fine of 40 million dollars and three years in 
prison for each of the damned: Emilio Palacio and Carlos, 
Cesar and Nicolas Perez brothers. 
 
2013 
Legislative Ley Organica de Comunicacion (LOC) was signed into law 
on June 14, 2013. 
Regulatory 
institutions 
created by the 
LOC 
CORDICOM (The Consejo de Regulación de la 
Comunicación y Desarrollo de la Información) was created 
in November. It regulates media content, time slots, and 
charges of discrimination.  
 
SUPERCOM, the Superintendency of Information and 
Communication, was created through the LOC. It has the 
ability to fine journalists and media institutions that have 
transgressed the LOC 
2015 
Regulatory 
institutions 
The Agencia de Regulación y Control de las 
Telecomunicaciones (ARCOTEL, Agency of Regulation and 
Control of Telecommunications), was created and charged 
with the administration, regulation and control of 
telecommunications and the broadcast spectrum 
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3.4.3.3 Confiscation of media outlets 
 Another way in which the Correa government has increased its media holdings 
has been through the confiscation of private media. According to Kitzberger (2015) these 
actions have been “part of a broader transformation of the social power matrix in a 
process of realignment of institutional, political, and communication resources that 
allowed for the wholesale reconfiguration of power relationships” (p. 10). In 2007, the 
government embargoed El Telegrafo, a national daily. In 2008, it was refounded as public 
media. In 2008, 12 media (radio, television and newspapers) were confiscated (see table 
below for details). One of the television stations, Gama TV, was then utilized as the main 
broadcast station to transmit the EC.  In 2011, the number of confiscated holdings 
abruptly grew to over 20 media properties. In 2012, another 16 private media were shut 
down. According to Supertel (the Superintendent of Telecomm unications) these media 
transgressed the Radio and Television Law. It was also true that most of these media held 
critical stances toward the government.  In 2014, Diario Hoy, a national newspaper 
critical of the government, was shut down. 
3.4.3.4 Non-communication legislation that impacts social movements.   
 It is important to take into account legislation that is not directly related to 
communication, when it affects the free expression and practices of citizens and social 
movements. One law and one decree, created in 2013, have been viewed by critical 
scholars, social movements, social organizations and journalists as negatively affecting 
public expression of civil society organizations. These include Decreto 16 and the Penal 
Code. Together with the LOC, the three new pieces of legislation that passed in 2013 and 
early 2014 have been referred to as a trilogy of state control mechanisms.  
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 Published in the Official Register on June 16, 2013, Decreto 16 gives the state the 
power to dissolve any social organization that it considers dangerous to the internal or 
external interests of the nation, or that affects “public peace.” Moreover, social 
organizations (which include several kinds of organizations, including collectives, social 
movements, and NGOs) have been forbidden from engaging in political activities, which 
are supposed to be reserved for parties and political movements that are registered with 
the CNE. This Decree has been a cause of concern for many organizations that are 
autonomous, especially those that are critical of the government, and has precipitated 
self-censorship on the part of social organizations.  
 According to Decreto 16’s wide parameters, indigenous social movement 
organizations such as the CONAIE could be shut down by the government. In fact, the 
Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), 
along with several other organizations, has challenged its constitutionality, on the 
grounds that prohibition of political activity could limit their freedom of expression. 
ECUARUNARI also claims that Decreto 16 contradicts Article 57 of the 2008 
Constitution, which endows indigenous peoples and their organizations with legal status. 
Social organizations need to be share their information with a government registry that 
details the name of their members, funding sources and activities. Such registry has 
caused consternation among many social organizations.52 The first casualty of Decree 16 
was the Pachamama Foundation, an Ecuadorian non-governmental organization founded 
in 1997. The Pachamama Foundation had historically played an active role in ecological 
matters, and had an anti-extractivist posture. It had provided some support for Yasunidos.  
                                                          
52 Yasunidos decided to remain a non-legalized collective due to many reasons, with Decreto 16 being one 
of the considerations.  
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 The Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP, Organic Integral Penal Code), which 
became law on August 10, 2014, has without doubt, legally expanded the punitive power 
of the state. It contains 29 articles that refer to crimes against “public security” (an 
increase from 13 articles that characterized certain conduct as sabatoge and terrorism. 
One of the new crimes is called “rebellion”. Some legal experts have noted that many of 
these articles are vaguely worded, which is worrisome, as the government has already 
widely interpreted articles from the previous penal code in order to process social 
movement actors, including 200+ indigenous leaders that had been arrested while 
protesting (Pásara, 2014). Legal expert Pásara has been especially worried about Articles 
345 and 346, as they can be used to repress social protest. For example, Article 345 
deems many activities historically related to social protest as “sabotage.” Article 346 
prescribes 1 to 3 years of prison for those that “paralyze a public service”.  In sum, the 
new penal code and Decreto 16 have contributed to the creation of a context in which 
protest is discouraged, questioned, and criminalized.  
 These sections, and the table above, underscore some of the ways in which the 
communication rights framework has been given short shrift, while the government 
pursues critical media outlets and journalists through a combination of symbolic actions 
and legislative-judicial-administrative means. The following section examines how the 
government’s media ownership and production practices add yet another layer to the 
reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador.  
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3.4.4 State media ownership and production practices 
3.4.4.1 Media ownership 
  As part of the reconfiguration of media power, in 2008, the government 
established the country’s first public media (radio, television, print media and internet),  
 mainly through the creation of public media, and confiscation of private media channels 
owned by economic groups that owed taxes. Though referred to as public media, it does 
not adhere to international norms of public media, which are characterized by 
independence from the government, pluralism, and mechanisms for participation and 
autonomously created content. Whereas “state media” would refer to those media under 
the control of the Executive, “which act as communicational appendages” of the state 
(Waisbord, 2014, p. 86). In Ecuador, there is no real editorial or administrative 
independence of these media, rather they are directly under SECOM (Secretary of 
Communication), and largely represent government perspectives, rarely criticizing its 
officials or policies.  
 Prior to 2007, the government only had one official media, Radio Nacional de 
Ecuador (Ecuador National Radio), an AM radio station. By 2012, the public media 
system consisted of 22 different media. Newly created government media have included 
Ecuador TV (2007), and Radio Pública on FM Radio, administered by SECOM. In 2009, 
the internet-based ANDES (Agencia Publica de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramerica) was 
created by SECOM, and has been administered by Ecuador TV. In 2010, the government 
launched the newspaper PP: El Verdadero. In 2011, a multimedia platform consisting of 
television, radio, printed press, and a website, El Ciudadano, is created. In 2012, Habla 
Ecuador (Ecuador Speaks) was launched as part of El Ciudadano. With 231 radio 
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stations, it became the most important radio network, with the greatest national coverage 
in Ecuador. Synopses of many of its programs are translated into several indigenous 
languages.   
 Public media has grown to occupy 17% of radio and television diffusion from 
under 1%. (Acosta, 2016). And even though public media is still dwarfed by private 
media in terms of percentage owned, it has come to occupy a dominant position in the 
journalistic field, given the collusion of the meta capital of the state, and meta capital of 
media, as discussed previously. Additionally, the Correa government has utilized its 
statist power like no prior government, to produce media content for its obligatory 
cadenas (that all media must air). Journalist Christian Zurita reported that 1,365 
obligatory cadenas, totaling 11,793 minutes, had been ordered by the government 
between 2007-2012 (El Universo, March 13, 2013). Most recently, in 2016, by way of 
Executive Decree 1158, the government has created a new organization that brings all of 
its various media (TV, radio, print media and internet) under one umbrella company, 
Empresa Pública Medios Públicos de Comunicación del Ecuador (Medios Públicos EP).   
Table 3c. State media ownership and production practices.  
Date Category Event 
2007 Producer 
“The President talks with the people” (January): first steps 
towards the creation of “El Enlace Cuidadano”. Radio program 
broadcasted by more than 150 radio stations around the country 
and aired every Saturday morning for two hours 
2008 
Creator 
EDITOGRAN, a private company, passed into public domain 
because the government equipped the printing press in March.  
Creator In March 17th El Telegrafo is reborn as a state newspaper. 
Creator 
Ecuador TV: new TV channel created in November for the 
transmission of the Constituent Assembly. 
Confiscation  
GamaTV, a private TV channel, was confiscated in July and 
used as headquarters for the transmission of the “Sabatina”.  
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Confiscation   TC Televisión, a private TV channel, was confiscated in July. 
Confiscation  
Confiscation of other media: CN3 y Cablevisión, Compañía y 
Televisión del Pacifico, Editorial Uminasa, Radiodifusora del 
Pacífico, Radio Bolívar, Radio Súper K, Radio Carrusel, 
Organización Radial, América Visión, Radio La Prensa, 
Editores e Impresores Edimpres y Movidad C.A. que imprime 
las revistas La Otra, La Onda, La Onda Infantil, Más, El Agro y 
Samborondón 
Creator 
Radio Pública (Public Radio) in august was made part of the 
Estado a cargo de la Secretaría Nacional de Comunicación. 
2009 Creator 
Agencia Pública de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramérica 
(ANDES) is born in December and circulates online.  
2010 Producer 
In September, the newspaper ‘PP El Verdadero’ (Pepe the 
truthful) began circulating with El Telegrafo. 
2011 Creator 
Ciudadano Multimedia (multimedia citizen) is the official 
channel for the government of the Revolución Ciudadana. It 
includes TV, radio, written press and webpage.  
2012 Producer 
Habla Ecuador (Speak Ecuador) is a network of 231 radio 
stations that covers the whole national territory. 
2013 Creator 
National Assembly TV was created in March to transmit the 
meetings live.  
2014 Producer 
Correa informed that the 92% of the media were still private and 
that the citizens are receiving untruthful information.  
 
3.4.4.2 State media production practices 
As a media producer of print, TV, radio, and Internet; as well as through the 
production of non-broadcast content that publicizes public works and government 
initiatives (not just commercials, but media created for the various government 
ministries, television series, documentaries, etc.), the government has appropriated a 
public good, the media, and has used it to construct social reality according to its 
perspective. Correa has used public media as a platform upon which to wage a 
“permanent campaign” (Conaghan and De La Torre, 2008) about the successful 
administration of the government.  
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 The government increasingly receives criticism for the amount of public funds 
spent on media production. Visión 360, an investigative reporting television program, 
aired an episode entitled Luces, cameras, derroche? (Lights, Cameras, Waste?53.).  This 
episode questions the exorbitant use of funds spent, by many different government 
ministries, on high-cost productions, many of which have never been broadcast or 
distributed. While no total budget figure has been made available, one can piece together 
public works contracts to arrive at general estimates. Additionally, there are indicators of 
the scale of national production activity it produces. For example, a media production 
company executive interviewed for Vision 360 estimated that in the past five years 
approximately 80% of all production company jobs have originated from the government. 
Much of the production costs go to the filming of public works (for dissemination on the 
EC, and in institutional videos uploaded to YouTube), by dozens of government 
ministries and agencies. These include promotion of the extractive industries. For 
example, a single search on YouTube for Refineria del Pacífico (the Pacific Refinery, 
which is a refinery under construction since 2008 with a projected capacity of processing 
300,000 barrels of oil a day) yields dozens of videos created by diverse government 
agencies. The Refinería del Pacífico channel displays 49 different videos. Additionally, 
hundreds of videos about public works have been uploaded to other government agencies 
channels on YouTube, including Archivo Ciudadano, El Ciudadano, Agencia Andes, 
Ecuador Estratégico, Presidencia de la República de Ecuador, TeleCiudadana, and Vice 
Ecuador, among them. Ecuador Estratégico, a government agency that “constructs 
                                                          
53 Luces, cameras, derroche? (Program 16, Bloque 1, Season 3) Parts I and II were retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykAzFrjmIDE and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvMsaEk-cqk.   
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happiness” and “generates Buen Vivir and integral development in communities that are 
close to strategic projects” (oil drilling, mining, etc.) has 195 videos uploaded to its 
channel. They include pedagogical animations54 and videos in indigenous languages.  
Yet, interestingly, the question of media power is brought to the foreground, as 
part of the main argument of the Visión 360 program. It maintains that, despite the 
exorbitant expenditures of public funds on media production, many government-
produced programs never make it to broadcast, and those that are aired do not have large 
audiences, many out of the radar of most citizens, despite placement in multiple media 
platforms.  For example, in 2011, the government produced a 12-episode Reality TV 
series called Espiritú del Yasuní (Spirit of the Yasuní). SECOM said it never aired 
because of policy changes (referring to Correa’s Plan B). However, the show was 
produced in 2011, and Correa did not announce the end of the Yasuní ITT initiative until 
2013. Yet, it never aired. Another mini-series, Ciudad Quinde (City of Hummingbirds) 
cost $700,000 but had a small number of viewers. Tierra de Serpientes (Land of 
Serpents) a fictionalized mini-series produced by the Ministry of Interior, and that 
emphasizes the work of the national police, made full use of public goods such as 
helicopters, police facilities, etc. The cost of production was $678,000. Martin Pallares, a 
renowned Ecuadorian independent journalist (fired by El Comercio because of his 
resolute, critical stance of the government) argues in this show that this use of public 
funds is unjustified. Visión 360 focused mainly on the promotion of public works, 
government initiatives and tourism projects. It didn’t even mention the enormous amount 
of the time government uses to criticize its opponents and detractors. In the following 
                                                          
54 See Ecuador Estratégico: Que hacemos? Recursos que construyen felicidad (Strategic Ecuador: What do 
we do? Resources that build happiness.” (accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smyrKdpFmsI).) 
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section, we can see how the government used publicity dollars to mount a campaign to 
justify the termination of the Yasuní ITT initiative.  
3.4.4.3. Other media campaigns justifying the termination of the Yasuní ITT 
initiative.  
 The delegitimation and criminalization of Yasunidos was intertwined with other 
kinds of media campaigns. This brief section presents how the government used publicity 
to “sell” Plan B. Once Correa announced the end of the Yasuní ITT initiative, the 
governmental communication strategy included a large-scale, mediated justification. It 
produced and circulated a multiple-platform campaign that would seek to convince 
citizens of the need to extract the oil in the Yasuní. The publicity was shown on the EC 
but also aired as commercials during other television programs. The campaign also went 
beyond the media to physical spaces in cities and towns.  
 The basic arguments advanced by the media campaign were that 1) the money is 
needed to eradicate poverty; 2) A large percentage of the funds would be directed to the 
Amazon, and 3) oil drilling would only affect 1% of the Yasuní given use of ‘cutting-
edge’ technology (these themes were also some of the main topics in the EC). 
Investigative reporters and scholars have disputed such claims, based on recent extractive 
activities in the Yasuní (Finer et al., 2014; Los Taladros Petroleros, 2013). This campaign 
included physical as well as mediated interventions. Large banners that were placed in 
the Plaza Grande announced that “99% of the Yasuní is intact.” In fact, the Plaza Grande, 
historically an important stage upon which protests and counterprotests are held was a 
key site for the government’s pro-drilling campaign. In addition to the presence of 
banners, and government-supported pro-drilling protester presence, one particular EC, 
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held on the Plaza Grande, featured Amazonian mayors and indigenous groups that 
support drilling. In this way, the government symbolically and physically reappropriated 
the Plaza Grande.   
With regard to televised campaigns, the Corporación Participación Ciudadana 
(Corporation for Citizen Participation) reported that from August 15, 2013 through the 
end of September, there were 126 government announcements on 9 national television 
stations. Media monitoring in September resulted in documenting the airing of pro-
drilling commercials 555 times, 530 minutes of air time (Project Yasuní). Another series 
of spots entitled “Speaking about the Yasuní,” bearing the Secretary of Communication 
logo, were aired 140 times, for a total of 140 minutes. The “Yasuní Lives” campaign was 
aired 80 times, for a total of 104 minutes. “The President Said” campaign was aired 38 
times for a total of 37 minutes of airtime (Vasquéz, 2015).55   
Along with the pro-drilling Yasuní spots, the government also launched another 
high-profile campaign, “The Dirty Hands of Chevron”, which denounced the damage that 
Texaco-Chevron had caused in Ecuador (although the state oil company Petroamazonas 
also harms the environment). The public relations firm, McSquared, located in Brooklyn, 
NY, purportedly paid Hollywood actors large sums of money (Mia Farrow, $188,000 and 
Danny Glover, $330,000) to visit Ecuador and put a gloved hand into contaminated oil 
pools. The amount of public funds used for these campaigns has not been disclosed. 
However, McSquared received $6.4 million dollars from the Ecuadorean government for 
international public relations. Owned by Ecuadorians, it reported expenses of 
                                                          
55 Some of these spots can be seen on the blog Otra Educación  Retrieved from http://otra-
educacion.blogspot.com/2014/03/el-cuento-del-99-del-Yasuní-o-el-Yasuní.html. 
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$1,943,140.42 to the U.S. Department of Justice, per a legal mandate to report funds 
received from foreign governments (Los Pagos de McSquared, 2014).  
This brief section has served to illustrate that the Enlace is not the only media strategy of 
the government; rather, it is part of a concerted effort that takes many forms, both 
material and symbolic. 
In sum, the amount of media production activity, as well as the number of media 
outlets that serve as government platforms, has increased the ability of the Ecuadorian 
government to promote and justify its extractivist agenda. As evidenced in this section, 
the government has directed hundreds of thousands of dollars to a diverse array of media 
content to serve this purpose. Yet, as Visión 360 investigative reporting has revealed, the 
number of programs produced does not necessarily translate into a critical mass of 
viewers. While my study does not specifically focus on circulation and audience 
reception, this is an important area of future research on government media power. The 
picture painted here is one of a government who has allocated huge budgets for 
producing media content that promotes its works, in order to maintain legitimacy and 
diminish questions about its extractivist policies. Many agree with journalist Martin 
Pallares, who has commented that the government is “administered by publicists” (in an 
interview with Visión 360).   
 To conclude Part I of this chapter, I have argued that the Ecuadorian government 
was able to reconfigure the journalistic field, and build a media empire within five years 
(2007-2012). This has translated into statist media power, both symbolically and 
materially. In order to understand the media context in 2013, when Correa announced the 
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end of the Yasuní ITT initiative, I set out to reconstruct just how statist media power has 
grown to dominate the landscape.  
 The following section provides a detailed analysis of how media ownership, 
media production practices, and legislation have come together in the Yasunidos case 
study. I analyze how the Enlace Ciudadano became the cornerstone of the government 
campaign to promote a pro-extractivist agenda, extole the virtues of development in the 
Amazon, and attack Yasunidos.  
3.5. The Enlace Ciudadano: the mediated delegitimization and criminalization of 
Yasunidos   
 This second part of this chapter focuses on the Enlace Ciudadano (EC), and how 
the Ecuadorian government has used it as a premier media platform upon which to attack, 
delegitimize and criminalize anti-extractivist, social movement protest. In particular, I 
analyze how Correa has sought to use the EC to turn public opinion against Yasunidos. 
This section corresponds to my research question: How has the Correa government used 
its media power to seek consensus for its extractivist politics and to criminalize social 
movements that are against such politics?   
3.5.1.  An overview of the Enlace Ciudadano: statist meta-capital meets media meta-
capital.      
 The Enlace is the most important mediated platform for the government and for 
President Correa, who hosts the show, to disseminate its position on all themes. It is an 
exceptional space in which we can appreciate the concept of media power as symbolic 
and material resources that have definitional power to shape social space. As Couldry 
(2003) proposes, both media meta-capital and statist meta-capital can generate impact in 
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and across all fields of power. In my own conception of media power, I understand statist 
media power in Ecuador as a constituent, dominant aspect of the state’s meta-capital. 
Without a doubt, the EC is a privileged site where these two forms of capital potently 
merge. Running approximately 3.5 to 4 hours, the EC is a weekly program that has aired 
nearly every Saturday since 2007. Broadcast from a different town or city in Ecuador 
each week, it is aired nationally on national and regional television stations, and on over 
400 radio stations. Even when President Correa is traveling, the EC is led by the Vice 
President of the Republic. There have also been ECs broadcast from New York City and 
Genoa, Italy, as part of Correa’s visits to those cities.  
 Since its inception, the EC has been widely viewed, heard, and commented on 
weekly by supporters and detractors alike (Cerbino et al., 2014; Conaghan and de la 
Torre, 2008; de la Torre, 2013). It is the mediated space in which the political and 
journalistic fields converge, in which the government not only disseminates its 
perspectives with compelling arguments, images and testimonials in the presence of a 
supportive audience, but also where it carries out a mediated battle against its perceived 
enemies. Prior to 2007, the private media had the power to shape the national agenda and 
public opinion. But with the introduction of the EC, Correa has appropriated the 
technologies, production values, and aesthetics of private media, in order to confront 
them on their own terms in a “hegemonic dispute.” (Cerbino et al., 2016, p. 9). Cerbino et 
al. (2016) argue that “Correa transcends and at the same time transgresses some aspects 
of the media logics” (Cerbino et al., 2016, p. 6). The EC, they argue, is the “most 
effective communicational tool utilized by President Correa to sustain his political 
discourse” (2016, p. 11). This is due to various factors, including: the wide ranging 
  
 
 
 
 
140 
themes of national interest that it tackles; and the timely announcements made by the 
President himself, which endows the program with an immediacy that makes journalists, 
ministers and social actors ever attentive. Its ritualized nature; its celebration of national 
popular culture, the diverse regions it features each week, its entertainment value, and the 
accompanying itinerant ministries, offers Ecuadorian citizens direct contact with 
government officials, with a chance to appear on television, in regions where most 
governments had never gone before.56 Much more critical of the EC, De la Torre (2013, 
p. 32) offers an analysis of the ritualistic, pedagogical performance that has taken place 
nearly 365 weeks a year since 2007: 
The president sits in a high podium from which the professor of the nation gives a 
class to all Ecuadorians. He utilizes Powerpoint presentations to illustrate, with 
sources and technical data, his government’s policies. The master classes are 
interrupted by applause of the audience, or by Correa’s questions directed toward 
the audience, which are answered with either yes or no.” In this way, power is 
revealed: the president-professor of the nation is above a public that affirms him, 
but that has no possibility to enter into a critical dialogue with him…. These 
interventions demonstrate that he is the State and serves the nation with real faith 
and dedication. 
  
 Another aspect of the EC, certainly much less inspirational than the popular 
national music, poetic images of the nation, and shots of adoring constituents waving 
lime green flags (the color of Alianza Pais), is Correa’s lengthy attacks on his political 
opponents. Conaghan and de la Torre (2008, p. 278) propose that for Correa: 
political opponents are not simply wrong-headed, misguided, or misinformed; 
they are corrupt and immoral representatives of the privileged, the oligarchy….In 
stark contrast to those on the dark side stand the forces allied with el pueblo (the 
people), the morally superior common folk.  
 
                                                          
56 These itinerant cabinets consist of government officials that travel with the show to meet with local 
authorities, deepening the political impact of the visits to towns and cities.  
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 Private media is always presented in the Enlaces as the enemy not only of Correa, 
but of el pueblo ecuatoriano (the Ecuadorian people). The ‘us vs. them,’ and ‘friend or 
enemy’ construction is ever-present in the EC. There are several segments of the program 
that are reserved especially for this purpose. Whether scolding them, uncovering their 
half-truths, insulting them or making fun, private media has received the most virulent 
attacks in Ecuadorian history. Correa has referred to the media as “ink assassins,”, “the 
corrupt press”, “liars,” “criminals,” etc. In this way, the private media has received a kind 
of scrutiny it has never faced before.  
 On the other hand, this kind of “media literacy” provided by Correa during the 
EC, along with the years-long debates about communication rights, freedom of 
expression and the communication law, have also facilitated a heightened awareness 
among the public about the media and its effects. As such, Ecuadorians can easily 
identify news sources, media actors and the political agendas they represent. The 
consequences of this is not insignificant; it means that government media is also critically 
read by the public. In other words, just because the EC commands attention, it by no 
means translates into acceptation by the public. In fact, as the years pass, what was once 
seen by some citizens as an unprecedented act of government transparency, is now 
viewed as a despised program whose grandiosity and accompanying high budgets, have 
been questioned by citizens, journalists and social movements (In Chapter 4, I analyze 
how Yasunidos has been able to leverage such negative sentiments to their advantage).  
3.5.2 The mediated construction of political legitimacy and illegitimacy 
 Private media is not the only oppositional force according to the government: 
others include political parties, critical scholars, and social movements. As pointed out in 
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Cerbino et al. (2014), Correa discursively constructs democratic legitimacy as solely 
emanating from the electoral process. Hence, given that Correa had won a majority of 
votes during three presidential elections (2006, 2008, 2013), he proposes frequently that 
his government is the most legitimate actor. In the following quote, we see how he 
equates approval for the exploitation of the Yasuní with his approval rating:  
The clamor of the people to leave the oil in the ground? As they (Diario Hoy) 
want that, they come up with impressive numbers. What is the reality? 56% of the 
country support, more than just exploiting the Yasuní, they support the decision of 
their President. (President Correa, Enlace 336, August 24, 2013).  
 
 When social movements or other social actors speak out against government 
polices, Correa often says (and has repeated frequently in the EC) that such actors should 
have no say, given that they were not duly elected. He further proposes that if they want 
to have a voice, they should run for office and win, as he did. Such argument disregards 
the idea that minority parties or those outside of party politics, like social movements, 
should be able to express dissent. Applying such logic, if winning at the polls is the 
democratic measure of who has the right to speak and who should remain silent, social 
movement actors lose to politicians. Correa also frames social movements (and other 
organized groups such as labor unions) as organizations that represent special interest 
groups, instead of the pueblo ecuatoriano as he does. Hence, discursively he is pitting 
movements and citizens against each other. He has reserved a special disdain for 
CONAIE’s indigenous leaders, and has sought to divide the social movement throughout 
the years (see Becker, 2012 and de la Torre, 2014 for discussions about processes of 
fragmentation and cooptation of movements).  
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 The crucial point here, in terms of statist media power, is that President Correa, 
the political actor who hosts the EC, is constructed in that space as the most legitimate 
actor in Ecuadorian politics. Moreover, the EC is broadcast in a context of hyper-
presidentialism, in which the legislative, judicial and statist media rarely if ever exhibit 
independence from the Executive. Consistent with Couldry’s (2003) and my theorization 
of statist media power, van Dijk (2001, p. 174) proposes that:  
Mediated discourse, and especially, journalistic, whether by print media, radio, 
television or internet, has a relevant influence in the way in which we represent 
the world around us. While it is true that perhaps we don’t believe all that we read 
in the newspaper, nor do we necessarily feel influenced by the transmission of a 
discourse of our President, but, in spite of that, news will influence what we think 
(although critically), regarding what we think is important or irrelevant, in which 
people we consider important or irrelevant, and in which people are considered 
prominent or marginal, and which events are or are not interesting.57 
 
 This argument by van Dijk is important to keep in mind in the following pages, 
that describe and analyze not just how but also by whom Yasunidos has been depicted. It 
is not just the depiction; rather the enunciation emanated from the Ecuadorian President, 
frequently, over an extended period of time (approximately 7 months). In fact, in the 
LOC, this activity is referred to as media lynching. However, when individuals have 
sought to accuse Correa of such, Cordicom has rebuffed such charges on the grounds that 
Correa is not “media.” One could argue otherwise, by taking into account the 
implications of possessing statist media power.  
 This situation was a double-edged sword for Yasunidos. The highly mediated 
nature of the case provided excellent opportunities for national visibility, at the same time 
that it presented formidable challenges. This new movement of young people, most of 
                                                          
57 I have translated this from a Spanish text.  
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whom had little to no political or media experience, had to quickly learn how to respond 
to the ever-expanding level of delegitimization and criminalization they faced. This 
treatment of Yasunidos is explored in the next section. 
3.5.3 The Construction of Yasunidos in the Enlace Ciudadano 
  In addition to a theoretical framework of media power that is transversal 
throughout this study, in this section I am also guided by a critical discourse studies 
(CDS) framework (van Dijk 2001, 2015). Critical discourse studies is neither a theory nor 
method, rather it is a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding how specific 
discourses are deployed in the reproduction of power and domination; the social and 
political representations of social actors, and the consequences of such discourses (van 
Dijk, 2015, p. 474). CDS categories useful for my analysis include: the communicative 
event (the EC), the themes (interpretation of social movement actions and notions of 
development deployed by the government), local coherence (how Correa explains social 
and political events to the audience), and social actor description (how Yasunidos and its 
allies are described by Correa on the Enlace).  
 My methodological framework used to study the EC has included ethnographic 
participant observation and media analysis with respect to the ways in which Yasunidos 
was depicted. During the span of time covered by this case study, I viewed 20 live 
broadcasts of the EC (approximately 60 hours of airtime) on television. I observed and 
took notes about the ways in which Yasunidos was framed and depicted. I then went back 
to the recorded programs and selected eight (two to three episodes for each phase of 
conflict between the government and Yasunidos) between August 24 and May 3, 2014, 
for a more in-depth analysis. The phases, as laid out in Chapter Two, are: 1) the 
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emergence of Yasunidos; 2) the signature collection phase (including the culminating 
march in which the signatures were delivered to the Elections Board); and 3) the 
“Democracy in Extinction” phase, when the Elections Board disrupted the process, and 
the Enlace was used as a key podium from which to damage Yasunidos’ positive 
reputation.    
 For the analysis of the EC, three broad questions were posed: 1) What were the 
strategies the government used to delegitimize and criminalize Yasunidos; 2) How were 
other oppositional actors depicted (private media, indigenous movements, ecologists, 
foreigners); and 3) How did the government frame development in the Amazon.   
 Additionally, I analyzed the events surrounding each EC, as Correa is always 
reacting to specific events that occur just before during the EC. The mediated 
delegitimization and criminalization of Yasunidos was not disconnected from the face-to-
face, physical aspects that were also employed by the government. As such, I bring into 
the analysis the diverse ways in which statist power was used in conjunction with statist 
media power. A detailed study was conducted that enumerated the various mechanisms 
of “psychosocial” repression that were used on Yasunidos, their allies, and the general 
public (Vázquez, 2015). While the report does list mediated forms, it foregrounds other 
aspects of repression: control of public space; counter-marches; utilization of police to 
limit social participation; physical force (policy, army); generating a context of 
uncertainty among the public; following and obtaining information about Yasunidos; 
closure of Pachamama, an allied organization; forcefully removing signature-gatherers 
from public spaces; harassment and intimidation of activists; illegal detention of 
signature-gatherers; physical and verbal aggression against members of Yasunidos; 
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infiltration into Yasunidos’ headquarters; and finally, electoral fraud (Vázquez, 2015). 
Taken together, such use of statist power, amplified by the mediatization of events from 
the government’s perspective, generated a social and political context that truly shook 
Ecuadorians to the core. Given the highly visible nature of the signature-collection 
process, an element of continuous drama was added to actions – by the government and 
Yasunidos - that occurred on a weekly basis.  
 The following table details each phase, the dates, the number of ECs analyzed, 
and important events that took place within each phase.     
Table 3d. Analysis of Enlace Ciudadano programs during case study  
Phase and Dates # of Enlaces 
analyzed 
Summary of key events within this phase 
Emergence phase 
 
August 15-October 14, 2013 
3 Correa announces the end of Yasuní ITT 
initative, declaring interest in its exploitation; 
government media blitz; candlelight vigils; 
Yasunidos collective is formed; first wave of 
protests; zapateadas and other performative acts 
by Yasunidos; Yasunidos formally solicits the 
Constitutional Court for permission to collect 
signatures toward a national referendum on the 
Yasuní. 
The signature collection phase 
 
October 15 – April 12, 2013 
 
 
3 From start of national signature collection to 
delivery of signatures; the National Assembly 
votes in favor of exploitation; two other groups 
begin signature-collection processes; Yasundos 
members are harassed, illegally detained, and 
surveilled. 
“Democracy in Extinction” 
phase 
April 13 – August 15, 2013 
2 CNE annulation of signatures; criminalization 
of Yasunidos; drilling license awarded to 
Petroecuador; Yasunidos appeals to 
international courts; Ethical Tribunal on Yasuní. 
The following sections highlight the ways in which Yasunidos and its allies were 
delegitimized and criminalized, and how the concept of development was deployed. For 
each phase of the conflict between the government and Yasunidos, as played out on the 
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EC, Table 3e contains many more details about each phase, including quotes (my 
translation from the Spanish) and the events just prior to the EC. 
3.5.3.1 Phase One: The emergence of Yasunidos (August 15-October 14, 2013) 
 The first phase of the conflict between the government and Yasunidos was 
marked by widespread vigils and protests, which quickly spread across Ecuadorian towns 
and cities. The mediated strategy on the EC was first and foremost to delegitimize 
dissenters. Correa used that opportunity to place blame on his opponents (rather than 
young people, who were initially framed as manipulated), the press, other political 
parties, and legendary contestatory social actors. A typical strategy used on the EC is to 
call attention to and insult specific individuals. This was meant to convince young people 
and the general public that the protests had reduced numbers, and were led by the “los 
mismos de siempre” (the same folks as always, a common refrain used by Correa.). For 
example, on EC 336, Correa said  
About 26 people get together at events against the exploitation of the Yasuní. And 
who are they? Youth? It is a strategy, to pit the youth against us. And there is the 
“youth” Julio César Trujillo (an activist-lawyer in his 70s). Don’t be deceived, 
these are the same stone-throwers from the MPD (left-party made up of many 
students). Young people, don’t be manipulated by these broken politiqueros! (EC 
336, August 24, 2013).  
 
 While protesters are depicted as violent, there is a direct warning to citizens that if 
they get involved there will be repercussions: 
What they are looking for is for someone to be killed or injured, that the police 
lose their patience or calm. For four hours they attacked the police. … Parents, 
watch out. Kids that go out (to protest) will lose their spot (at school). Be very 
careful as those irresponsible ones from the MPD are hoping for a youth death, 
generating violence. And as no one pays them any attention, they protest for any 
reason. (EC 337, August 31, 2013).  
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 In this EC, Correa’s also mocks Diario Hoy:  
The opinion polls put us in a good mood; they are so ridiculous they make us 
laugh.. Diario Hoy is an insult to statistics, to ethics. They have a preselected 
sample….they only call groups who are against the government….they are 
politicizing the theme…Everyone is an ecologist. 
 
 Correa also sought to demonstrate that he had support from the Amazon. During 
EC 337, a video was shown in which Amazonian mayors declare their support for the 
exploitation of the Yasuní (these mayors would go on to lose electoral races six months 
later). The video also insists on the low impact that exploitation will have on the Yasuní, 
and attacks the urban middle class for not understanding the importance of resource 
extraction for the Amazon. This statement, made by President Correa on EC 341, on 
September 28, while discussing the benefits of a hydroelectric project, is representative of 
the way in which Yasunidos and other ecologists were depicted: 
If we condemn everyone to live like Tarzan, we wouldn’t have roads, universities 
with grants in the exterior, hospitals. In other words, the real buen vivir (good 
living) increases options, but they would condemn us to slavery. Ask these 
neoecologists how many of them took cold showers this morning. When they 
want to condemn us to poverty they take our freedom. On the contrary, when one 
can live with basic services, those that want to, like these people, can live in the 
jungle. You shouldn’t pay any attention to these people. This is the real 
ecologism.  
 
Repeatedly, Correa equates resource extraction to the concept of Buen Vivir, 
which is usually meant to denote harmony between humans, other beings, and 
ecosystems. Simultaneously, he depicts Yasunidos and their allies as being out of touch 
with the needs of Amazon dwellers. This both of these frames were wholeheartedly 
rejected when Amazonian women and their children marched from the Amazon to Quito 
to express their opposition to extractivism, and their agreement with Yasunidos.  
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 Participant observation at protests, public forums and other related events, and 
social media monitoring from August 25, 2013 through September 30, 2013, indicates 
that there were at least three kinds of effects of the government’s media campaign: first, 
the government was successful in fostering fear in potential Yasunidos supporters. In 
Quito, the number of protesters visibly diminished (this could also be attributed to protest 
fatigue or the increasing perception that Yasunidos events were just for young people, but 
many people I spoke with expressed reluctance). Social media monitoring of Yasunidos 
evidenced a reduction in the number of conversations, shares and “likes” on their 
Facebook page. Many individuals admitted that they were hesitant to go to the marches 
for fear that they or their families would lose their jobs. Secondly, government 
communications about ‘cutting-edge technology’ that would lessen environmental 
damage in the Yasuní, and the financial benefits that would be directed to the Amazon 
region seemed to gain credibility. People began to repeat lines from the ECs, such as ‘we 
need the money’ and ‘the damages won’t be so bad.’ Sentiments on this issue would shift 
again, as Yasunidos continued to organize (See Table 3e at the end of the chapter).  
3.5.3.2 Phase Two: The signature-collection process (October 15, 2013 – April 12, 
2014) 
 The second phase is delimited by the six-month period in which Yasunidos had 
the challenge to collect signatures equaling 5% of the electorate. And while protests had 
diminished by this stage, many artistic and cultural events were held. The Caravan for the 
Yasuní also began to travel through Ecuador. While the group faced constant harassment, 
surveillance, and physical aggression at signature-collection points, the EC depicted 
Yasunidos as hypocrites, and as against the good of the nation. Correa also sought to 
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prove that resource extraction was an absolute necessity if Ecuador were to advance its 
goals, among many other topics (the typical EC broaches dozens of themes each week). 
For example, in the following quote, there are many different ideas that Correa is 
expressing:    
 There is a radical change in the manner of development in the Amazon. Don’t be 
deceived, gringos with full bellies come here saying that ‘nothing should be 
touched, no cutting of trees, don’t exploit, die of hunger but I will have where to 
go as a tourist. You have always been poor, its part of your environment.’ Let 
them live in conditions that our Amazonian peoples face. What racism. They 
come to defend using the name of Amazonian peoples. Don’t be deceived, we 
have the right to live well. They are hypocrites. They come to complain because I 
had to make the difficult decision to exploit the Yasuní. How many people are 
here [at the EC], 800-1000? Exploiting the Yasuní is like affecting one person 
here. That is the compromise….These hypocrites come and say ‘don’t touch the 
Yasuní’ these gringos! And I ask, how much jungle do they have in the U.S.? 
How many uncontacted tribes do they have?….No government has done more for 
the uncontacted indigenous groups! (EC 357, January 18, 2014). 
 
 In the signature-collection phase, Correa increased attacks on foreigners – 
international media, NGOs such as Pachamama Foundation (which was subsequently 
shut down by the government on December 4, 2013), and scholars and activists that had 
originally been with the government, but had since changed their positions due to 
extractive and other policies. Criticisms of Pachamama Foundation were launched on the 
EC prior to and just after they were shut down. In EC 351 on December 9, 2013, a video 
shown alleged that members of the Pachamama Foundation (who denied that people in 
this video were part of their organization) being acted aggressively to foreign miners. The 
video characterizes the foundation as inciting violence and financing protest, and argues 
that anti-extractivist groups do not have support in areas where there is planned 
extraction. It calls foundations like Human Rights Watch, Pachamama, Acción Ecológica 
liars. It also mentions that Yasunidos is part of these foundations. Correa argued: 
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All is planned, they have manuals for these things, lets see the manual made by a 
foreigner living in Intag (a region threatened by mining. The “foreigner” is a 
Cuban American who has lived in Intag for 30 years). (EC 351, December 9, 
2013). 
 
And in reference to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, he stoked 
anti-imperialist sentiments: 
When I took the sovereign decision to exploit the Yasuní.… the Inter American 
Commision on Human Rights sends a letter asking for an explanation as to why 
we have made this decision. Hahaha. Check yourself! First let them tell me how 
many countries they ask that, and then they put a deadline. … Mind your own 
business, not that of a sovereign country like Ecuador.  
 
 As time advanced, and Yasunidos collected more signatures, the attacks became 
more vicious. 191 television and radio spots were released by SECOM in March, and 
several actions by other social actors provoked a great deal of confusion. Two other 
groups that were also engaged in signature collection for different referendums 
plagiarized the Yasunidos form, which served to confuse many citizens, who became 
reluctant to sign anything.  Additionally, there were many reports from Yasunidos 
signature collectors that the other groups would try to convince citizens that they were 
part of Yasunidos, to secure their signatures.  
 Despite all of these formidable challenges, Yasunidos held a vibrant march to 
deliver 757,623 signatures to the CNE on April 12, 2014. (See Table 3f at the end of the 
chapter). 
3.5.3.3 Phase Three: “Democracy in Extinction.” (April 13 – August 15, 2014) 
 During this third phase, in which the CNE would reject thousands of signatures, 
and President Correa would announce that a national referendum on the Yasuní would 
not be put to citizen vote, the EC featured many videos, produced by SECOM that 
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depicted Yasunidos as a violent group that has committed fraudulent activities. The EC 
and other media content released by CNE, SECOM and other government entities 
worked together to try to destroy Yasunidos’ reputation, and bring an end to the hope that 
the Yasuní could be saved through popular vote. The attacks were so virulent, Yasunidos 
denominated this as “democracy in extinction.” 
 Three days after the April 12 delivery of signatures, CNE released a video that 
explained just how signatures might be eliminated. Sensing a death foretold, members of 
Yasunidos showed up unannounced at the CNE, and found that their boxes of signatures 
had been tampered with. In fact, the identity cards of the individuals who had collected 
most signatures, were missing (thereby eliminating those forms). On April 26, in EC 371, 
Correa sought to delegitimize Yasunidos and the process:  
They have lied to us, but not only that. If it is a collective with 100 members, 
maybe there are 10 are authentically concerned about the Yasuní. Moreover, they 
go in their 4x4 cars, or take hot water showers. They are not coherent.  But if 
those 10 without coherence are authentic, that’s a lot. 90 of them are the same 
stone-throwers as always. The MPD is there trying to damage the government, 
Carlos Pérez Guambatel (President of ECUARUNARI), Patchakutik, they are 
against everything. Don’t be deceived. There is nothing about this that is a youth 
collective, it’s the same pack as always. These are the ones that lose all of the 
elections…. 
 
On May 3, during EC 372, Correa continued the campaign of delegitimation: 
What do mines and oil have to do with salaries, but certain ecologists just don’t 
get it. Because I also consider myself an ecologist. The Yasunidos Collective is 
creating a scandal about fraud, international observers…. Because they know that 
they didn’t collect enough signatures and want to start a political scandal… The 
most ecological thing Yasunidos has done is to have recycled the MPD.  
 
At the same time, Correa continued to insist that there would be very little 
damage done in the Yasuní, and that resource extraction was necessary and positive: 
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(speaking of schools) there is so much to do and that is why we need billions of 
dollars. That is why we should take advantage of our natural resources… I would 
never let the Yasuní be destroyed…it is in exchange for millions of dollars for 
Millennial schools for our children, hospitals for our families, for roads, for our 
communities, for services that are urgently needed. (EC 371, April 26, 2014).  
 
 This phase constituted a long and painful period for Yasunidos and for hundreds 
of thousands of citizens. Yasunidos attempted various campaigns such as “Democracy in 
Extinction” and “What happened to my signature.”  Unfortunately, many agree that the 
attacks and campaigns of delegitimation were partially successful. However, many others 
were critical of these campaigns, but nonetheless were discouraged by the overwhelming 
forces against a popular vote on the Yasuní. I argue that, at that moment, statist power 
and statist media power, were able to interrupt democratic processes from below.  
 However, this is also a story that contained many successful mediated practices 
that Ysunidos enacted that served them well for most of the process, actually until CNE 
would not let the practice continue on its democratic path. The rest of the chapter is 
dedicated to exploring how Yasunidos was able to visibilize their movement through a 
range of communicational strategies. (See Table 3G at the end of the chapter). 
3.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I focused on the reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador since 
Correa came to power in 2007. I extended Couldry’s (2003) and Freedman’s (2014) 
theoretical constructs to consider a scenario in which media power is a constituent aspect 
of statist power, and therefore a dominant part of the journalistic field. I found this 
necessary, given that media power is largely theorized from contexts of western liberal 
democracies, with a focus on corporate media power. My conceptualization of statist 
media power emerges from another context, one in which Ecuador, a Latin American 
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progressive government has broken the century-old alliance between the government and 
private media. While originally lauded as a measure of transparency never offered by 
previous governments, Conaghan and de la Torre (2008, p. 281) realized early on that the 
media practices of the Correa government created an “uneven play field” for those who 
oppose government policies and actions. By virtue of their high office and their 
newsworthiness, incumbent presidents or prime ministers always enjoy an inherent 
advantage in getting their messages out to the public. But that advantage can turn highly 
disproportionate when incumbents use the resources at the disposal of their government 
to saturate the public with marketing campaigns. 
In a context of hyperpresidentialism, and concentration of powers in the 
Executive branch, unprecedented funds for media budgets, and a Secretary of 
Communication that views communication as propaganda, the Ecuadorian government 
has extended the depth and breadth of its reach enormously.  
 As access to media is a powerful resource, I also sought to analyze statist media 
power empirically, and gain an understanding the properties of the government’s 
discourse about Yasunidos and about development in the Amazon. I examined the 
various mechanisms through which it is deployed: symbolic, legislative, media ownership 
and media production practices. Each dimension was analyzed separately, with concrete 
examples. Another way in which I sought to understand media power was to move 
beyond the analysis of the relationship between the government and private media, which 
dominates the scholarship on media reforms in Latin America, to look at the implications 
that media power has had in the case of Yasunidos. To carry out the analysis, I worked 
with the EC, which is Correa’s main discursive platform. I contextualized the mediated 
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discourse with an analyis of the events surrounding each EC analyzed, and the various 
other ways in which statist power was deployed off-line.  
 Through such empirical study, we have learned of the unprecedented nature in 
which media power has been reconfigured, and concrete ways in which it is used to push 
an extractivist agenda. We have also seen how statist media power has been used in an 
undemocratic fashion, when it has sought to stifle protest, criminalize individuals and 
equate democracy with elections.  
For a thorough analysis of state-social movement relations, and its mediated 
dimensions, it is necessary to understand the nature of the government’s 
communicational arsenal. Such understanding also facilitates an understanding of its 
limitations, particularly the innovative ways in which Yasunidos interrupted that power 
and deployed their own conceptions of democracy from below. As such, I also examined 
how Yasunidos has confronted the government’s media power.  
Table 3e: Phase One: The emergence of Yasunidos (August 15-October 14, 2013) 
 
Phase 
One 
Events prior to the EC 
 
Government 
Strategies 
What Correa says on the EC 
August 
24, 2013 
EC 336 
 
 
8/15 - Declaration of plans to 
exploit the Yasuní, and 
candelight vigil by protesters 
 
8/17 – Nationwide protests 
begin 
 
8/18 – Yasunidos Collective is 
born 
 
8/22 – Yasunidos solicits the 
Constitutional Court to gather 
signatures of the electorate 
Delegitimization 
of leading 
ecologist group, 
connected to 
Yasunidos. 
2:03:31. I have not lied … but Action 
pathological (a play on Acción 
Ecológica) says there is no 
technology that would reduce the 
impact…they are saying such foolish 
things…they don’t know what they 
are talking about…they are 
irresponsible… 
Delegitimization  
of national 
newspaper Diario 
Hoy.  
2:11:55. The opinion polls (stating 
that people don’t want to exploit the 
Yasuní) put us in a good mood; they 
are so ridiculous they make us laugh.. 
Diario Hoy is an insult to statistics..to 
ethics. They have a preselected 
sample….they only call groups who 
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towards a national referendum. 
 
 
 
are against the government….they are 
politicizing the theme…Everyone is 
an ecologist.  
Dismisses the 
notion that youth 
are protesting, 
points to other 
social and 
political actors, 
appeals to young 
people to not be 
manipulated.  
 
 
 
Insults 
2:17:38 About 26 people get together 
at events against the exploitation of 
the Yasuní. And who are they? 
Youth? It is a strategy, to pit the 
youth against us. And there is the 
“youth” Julio César Trujillo (an 
activist-lawyer in his 70s). Don’t be 
deceived, these are the same stone-
throwers from the MPD (left-party 
made up of many students). Young 
people, don’t be manipulated by these 
broken politiqueros! 
 
2:19:10. [names various student 
leaders]. Stone throwers who don’t 
know how to open a book, but they 
know how to speak stones…these are 
the ones … in the Yasuní. Don’t 
permit them to politicize  something 
so sensitive that has hurt all of us.   
August 
31, 2013. 
EC 337. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
8/27 – Gran Manifestación 
(Large protest) for the Yasuní. 
Police force used (Paint ball and 
tear gas) to prevent protesters 
access to the Plaza Grande. 
Government publicity in favor 
of exploitation cover the Plaza 
Grande.  
 
8/28 – SECOM broadcasts anti-
protest videos on national 
television and radio.  
 
Regulations on social media are 
announced.  
 
Ministry of Interior threatens 
private media 
Delegitimization 
of private media 
(who mostly 
cover Yasunidos 
positively). 
Again, 
constructing the 
media as both a 
political actor, 
and delegitimate 
actor.  
00:28:30. Prohibido olvidar (It is 
prohibited to forget, another common 
refrain), so you can see their double-
moral, the lack of ethics …these same 
champions of democracy now want a 
popular referendum on the Yasuní. 
Don’t be lazy, go out and collect 
signatures . Lets go, stop throwing 
stones and go collect signatures, and 
we will see you at the polls.  
Criminalization, 
framing protesters 
as menacing, 
violent, with bad 
intentions.  
2:34:36. What they are looking for is 
for someone to be killed or injured, 
that the police lose their patience or 
calm. For four hours they attacked the 
police.  
Framing actors as 
illegitimate, 
because they lose 
elections. 
2:34:36. Young people of the nation, 
do not be deceived, these are violent 
people, sick people, people that lose 
elections.  
Threats to citizens 
 
2:56:26. Parents, watch out. Kids that 
go out (to protest), they will lose their 
spot (at school). Be very careful as 
those irresponsible ones from the 
MPD are hoping for a youth death, 
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generating violence. And as no one 
pays them any attention, they protest 
for any reason.  
Showing support 
from the Amazon 
2:56:27. A video is shown, in which 
Amazonian mayors declare their 
support for the exploitation of the 
Yasuní (these mayors would lose 
electoral races six months later). The 
video also insists on the low impact 
that exploitation will have on the 
Yasuní, and attacks the urban middle 
class for not understanding. 
Sept. 28, 
2013. EC 
341 
Protest actions continue. Sept. 
27 Yasunízarte event. 
 
Reporters now have restricted 
access to the Yasuní.  
 
The pro-drilling Amazonian 
mayors begin their own 
referendem process called 
Amazonia Vive. Another group 
begins a counter-referendum 
that would ban all extractive 
activities (Frente de Defensa 
Total de la Amazonia).  
All of the above 
strategies are 
used. In addition, 
there is a marked 
increase in  
discourses that 
celebrate 
development by 
resource 
extraction 
1:39:50. Extols the virtues of a 
hydroelectric project, followed by the 
comment, “If we condemn everyone 
to live like Tarzan, we wouldn’t have 
roads, universities with grants in the 
exterior, hospitals. In other words, the 
real Buen Vivir (good living) 
increases options, but they 
(opposition to extractivism) would 
condemn us to slavery. Ask these 
neoecologists how many of them took 
cold showers this morning. When 
they want to condemn us to poverty 
they take our freedom. On the 
contrary, when one can live with 
basic services, those that want to, like 
these people, can live in the jungle. 
You shouldn’t pay any attention to 
these people. This is the real 
ecologism. 
 
Table 3f: Phase Two: Signature collection phase. (October 15 – April 12, 2013) 
 
Phase Two Events prior to the EC Government 
Strategies 
What Correa says on the EC 
December 9, 
2013 
 
EC 351 
 
 
12/4 – The Ministry of the 
Environment shuts down 
Pachamama Foundation via 
Decree 16.  
 
Yasunidos has received 
referéndum signature forms 
on 10/1 and have begun 
collecting signatures 
Position foreign 
NGOs and non-
Ecuadorian 
nationals as 
threats to the 
nation.   
 2:53:10. A video is shown that alleges 
that members of the Pachamama 
Foundation (who denied that people in 
this video were part of their organization) 
being acted aggressively to foreign 
miners. The video characterizes the 
Foundation as inciting violence and 
financing protest. It calls foundations like 
Human Rights Watch, Pachamama, 
Acción Ecológica liars. Correa proposes 
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The National Assembly 
votes in favor of” national 
interest” to exploit Yasuní 
 
An intelligence report on the 
Yasunidos is leaked in 
social media (11/5) 
 
 
“All is planned, they have manuals for 
these things, let’s see the manual made 
by a foreigner living in Intag (a region 
threatened by mining. The “foreigner” is 
a Cuban American who has lived in Intag 
for 30 years). It argues that the 
opposition does not have support in areas 
where there is planned extractive 
activities. Correa mentions that 
Yasunidos is part of these foundations. 
“Broken political parties in the polls go 
to the foundations.” 
January 4, 
2014. EC 
355 
Yasunidos collection site in 
a public park is forcefully 
removed by the police. 
 
The definition of ethnicide 
is modified in the Penal 
Code by the National 
Assembly 
(12/14) 
 
The Caravan for the Yasuní 
begins its route through 
coastal Ecuador (12/27) 
Defending the 
government’s 
notion of 
development. 
1:43:00. Please lets not waste our time in 
stupid discussions [about natural gas] and 
those that don’t want things to change. 
Those that are doing well while others 
live in misery, lets not pay attention. Our 
country needs those natural resources to 
get out of poverty….our country needs 
the natural resources, those that say 
otherwise are lying.  
January 18, 
2014 
EC 357   
Broadcast 
from Morona 
Santiago 
(Amazonian 
province) 
President Correa criticizes 
the international media 
Defending the 
government’s 
notion of 
development 
and its actions.  
 
Oil drilling 
brings 
prosperity 
11:40 – Correa discusses how the 
Amazon has changed, that the 
government has brought (government-
run) millenium schools to the region, 
how the cities are being organized.  
 
1:51:10 – (In saying that children need a 
decent place to study) certain people 
oppose this….let people die of hunger, 
but we are environmentalists. They need 
to understand that the most important of 
the Pachamama are human beings, are 
children, that people live in a dignified 
way to overcome poverty so that our 
children have more opportunities than we 
did.  
 
1:54:20 – I believe the Waorani will be 
the first [indigenous group] to overcome 
poverty because they live in the Yasuní.  
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1:56:20 – (showing a thatched roof hut) 
was Panacocha before. Now thanks that 
it is part of a strategic oil project, oil is 
no longer a curse; these natural resources 
are a blessing. (now the image is 
switched to that of cement homes).  
 
1:57:10 – If we have to cut down a tree 
so that people have better lives, we have 
to do it. Let’s be clear, compatriots, we 
will do it with environmental care, but 
with social responsibility. People have 
the right to live well. We should all be 
ecologists.  
 
1:58:20 – My dream is that the first 
region to conquer poverty is the Amazon, 
because that is where the natural 
resources are.  
 
2:48:54 – Only a demented person could 
say how great it is that oil reserves will 
run out, while the more oil we have, that 
is good news. Thank God we have 
discovered new sources, that is why it is 
important to explore the Southeast 
(region area of the Amazon).  
 Delegitimizing 
anti-extractivist 
activists and 
foreign support 
1:39:40 Correa discusses the 
inauguration of a (government-run) 
millennium community in Sucumbios. 
“There is a radical change in the manner 
of development in the Amazon. Don’t be 
deceived, gringos with full bellies come 
here saying that ‘nothing should be 
touched, no cutting of trees, don’t 
exploit, die of hunger but I will have 
where to go as a tourist. You have always 
been poor, it is part of your 
environment.’ Let them live in conditions 
that our Amazonian peoples face. What 
racism. They come to defend using the 
name of Amazonian peoples. Don’t be 
deceived, we have the right to live well. 
They are hypocrites. They come to 
complain because I had to make the 
difficult decision to exploit the Yasuní. 
How many people are here [at the EC], 
800-1000? Exploiting the Yasuní is like 
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affecting one person here. That is the 
compromise….These hypocrites come 
and say ‘don’t touch the Yasuní’ these 
gringos! And I ask, how much jungle do 
they have in the U.S.? How many 
uncontacted tribes do they have?….No 
government has done more for the 
uncontacted indigenous groups! 
 
2:23:00 – (Speaking of bad roads in the 
Amazon) This is what the stone throwers 
want to conserve. That we live in the 
past. 
  Appealing to 
anti-imperial 
sentiments.   
When I took the sovereign decision to 
exploit the Yasuní.… the Inter American 
Commision on Human Rights sends a 
letter asking for an explanation as to why 
we have made this decision. Hahaha. 
Check yourself! First let them tell me 
how many countries they ask that, and 
then they put a deadline. … Mind your 
own business, not that of a sovereign 
country like Ecuador.  
 
Table 3g. Phase Three: “Democracy in Extinction.” (April 13 – August 15, 2014) 
Phase 
Three 
Events prior to the EC  Government 
Strategies 
What Correa says on the EC 
Democracy 
in 
Extinction 
 
April 13 – 
August 15, 
2014 
 
EC 371, 
372 
 .  
 
 
Delegitimization, 
Criminalization 
of Yasunidos.     
 
Development  
ideals of the 
government 
Overview: In the third phase, Correa 
sought to justify the terrible treatment the 
government gave Yasunidos. The 
delegitimization and criminalization 
increased.    
April 26, 
2014 (from 
Italy). EC 
371  
Points of signature collection 
are openly surveilled 
 
Other groups begin to collect 
signatures near Yasunidos 
sites, creating widespread 
Delegitimization, 
Criminalization 
of Yasunidos 
2:47:40 – Lets go to another video, there 
is that youth collective gathering 
signatures for the Yasuní. They are trying 
to make us believe that it is oil or the 
Yasuní. That’s a lie. 
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confusión. Yasunidos forms 
are plagarized by these 
groups, so they look almost 
identical to Yasunidos forms.  
 
Yasunidos members receive 
threats.  
 
Month of March – 191 spots 
in favor of exploitation of the 
Yasuní are broadcast by 
SECOM. 
 
4/12 – National march to 
delivery 757,623 signatures.  
 
4/15 – A national cadena  
is broadcast that explains 
how signatures might be 
eliminated. Yasunidos 
detects un muerte anunciado 
(a death foretold), arrives at 
CNE and finds the security 
bands on some of the boxes 
have been broken.  
 
 
 
4/15 – Identity cards of 
individuals that have 
collected the most signatures 
are mysteriously missing 
from the boxes (thereby 
anulling the signatures they 
have collected). 
 
  
 
They have lied to us, but not only that. If 
it is a collective with 100 members, 
maybe there are 10 who are authentically 
concerned about the Yasuní. Moreover 
they go in their 4x4 cars, or take hot water 
showers. They are not coherent.  But if 
those 10 without coherence are authentic, 
that’s a lot. 90 of them are the same 
stone-throwers as always. The MPD is 
there trying to damage the government, 
Carlos Pérez Guambatel, Patchakutik, 
they are against everything. Don’t be 
deceived. There is nothing about this that 
is a youth collective, it’s the same pack as 
always. These are the ones that lose all of 
the elections…. 
 
[This is followed by a video that depicts 
Yasunidos as violent].  
 
2:56:01 - They wait until the police come, 
that there are deaths so they can become 
victims at the international level. Did you 
see the shot where pregnant women are 
creating the disturbances? They want to 
be victims. They can’t win at the polls, so 
want to do it with blood, with violence. 
But they won’t topple us, this revolution 
won’t be stopped by nothing or nobody. 
(2:56:09). 
Benefits of 
Development 
43:50 – (speaking of schools) there is so 
much to do and that is why we need 
billions of dollars. That is why we should 
take advantage of our natural 
resources….I would never let the Yasuní 
be destroyed…its in exchange for 
millions of dollars for Millennial schools 
for our children, hospitals for our 
families, for roads, for our communities, 
for services that are urgently needed.  
May 3, 
2014 
EC 372 
Criminalization 
 
 
 
 
 
2:23:05 – What do mines and oil have to 
do with salaries, but certain ecologists 
just don’t get it. Because I also consider 
myself an ecologist. The Yasunidos 
Collective is creating a scandal about 
fraud, international observers….Because 
they know that they didn’t collect enough 
signatures and want to start a political 
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Development 
scandal….The most ecological thing 
Yasunidos has done is to have recycled 
the MPD.  
 
2:23:05 – This is the great opportunity 
that Latin America has to achieve 
development without exploiting our labor 
force, our natural resources….But 
because we can raise salaries, because 
thanks to our natural resources we have 
cheap energy, we have roads, we have 
ports, airports ….That is what they don’t 
understand, that if we wouldn’t have had 
natural resources, the capacity to generate 
cheap energy, we wouldn’t have the 
highest salaries in the region. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MEDIATED CULTURAL POLITICS OF POST DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction  
 In Chapter Two, I presented a panoramic view of the first year of Yasunidos, as 
well as the historical context of ecological activism; the Yasuní ITT conflict; and the 
movement’s emergence, identity and practices. This present chapter goes into more depth 
on Yasunidos’ visual, embodied and mediated practices, and the post-development 
imaginaries their creative expression evoked. It investigates my research questions: How 
has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power, and the subquestion: how has 
Yasunidos deployed mediated cultural politics of post-development, thereby challenging 
the state’s extractivist discourses and practices? To address these questions, I revisit my 
theoretical framework of mediated cultural politics, and deepen it by analyzing how 
Yasunidos’ movement practices express post-development imaginaries. To do so, I 
visually analyze the kind of art that Yasunidos has chosen to represent these imaginaries. 
I also contrast these imaginaries, and the values they represent, with the government’s 
extractivist discourses and values. In the second part of the chapter, I examine 
Yasunidos’ media practices, both in terms of how they leveraged the attention they 
received from private media, and also how they strategically made use of the enormous 
visibility they got on the EC. Methodologically speaking, this chapter mainly relies on in-
depth interviews with Yasunidos and allies, and ethnographic participation in the 
marches, performances, zapateadas, artistic events, and press conferences. I argue here 
that the role of performance, ritual, art making, and the use of other visuals such as 
posters, have been a key element in movement-building, by making visible the cultural 
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battle being waged between the government’s extractivist agenda and Yasunidos’ 
invitation to consider a post-extractivist future. Their movement practices have also 
served to communicate a set of values and imaginaries that envision another way 
forward.  
 Mattoni and Teune (2014) contend that social movements are nothing less than 
visual phenomena, and that transdisciplinary attention to the visual (and I would add, 
embodied practices) is an important, evolving field of research. They also argue that such 
expressions must be seen as situated within a web of social practices. Following their cue, 
in the following sections I articulate the context and content of the art that Yasunidos has 
chosen to utilize in its campaigns.     
4.2 Yasunidos, mediated cultural politics and post-development imaginaries   
 In Chapter One, I introduced the concept of mediated cultural politics, a 
theoretical rendering that brings together Alvarez et al.’s (1998) cultural politics 
framework and Jesus Martin-Barbero’s (1987) notion of mediation. Mediated cultural 
politics refers to movement practices that interrupt dominant meanings, values and 
discourses, which are then amplified by circulation across multiple media platforms. I 
propose that this concept can elucidate how Yasunidos, with no substantive media power 
of its own, was able to interrupt hegemonic meanings of development that were 
powerfully deployed through statist media. I contend that Yasunidos’ mediated cultural 
politics has been able to resignify not just development, but also democracy and citizen 
participation. They have done so, in part, through creative, performative expressions and 
visual arts, what I have come to conceptualize as post-development imaginaries. Such 
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concept brings together Escobar’s concept of post-development, with Gaonkar’s (2002) 
and Taylor’s (2002) re-elaboration of the concept ‘the social imaginary.’ 
 With respect to the term “post-development,” this is a concept that Arturo 
Escobar coined in 1991.58 In a recent text, Escobar (2014) explains that from the outset 
the concept has sought to displace “development” from its centrality, both discursively 
and in practice.59 Along with a critique of capitalist models of development and related 
ideas of growth, progress and modernity, the concept suggests that “it is possible to 
imagine the end of development” (Escobar, 2014, p. 31). Such discourses and practices, 
according to Escobar, emerge from ontologies and epistemologies generated by social 
movements and ancestral communities. I agree with this proposal and in Chapter Two, I 
established that Yasunidos is a new social movement actor that is part of the “vanguard” 
(Escobar, 2014, p. 14) of imagining and enacting practices that point toward a post-
development scenario.  
In tandem with the concept of post-development, for the concept ‘imaginary’, I 
draw from Gaonkar (2002) and Taylor (2002), who have conceptually reworked 
Castoriadis’ (1987) theorization of the social imaginary. Though these authors are 
analyzing shifting social imaginaries of Western modernity, their conceptualization is 
relevant to my work on post-development imaginaries. For these scholars, social 
imaginaries “refer broadly to the way a given people imagine their collective social life” 
(Gaonkar, 2002, p. 10). They are “the means by which individuals understand their 
identities and their place in the world” (p. 4). They are manifested in images and 
                                                          
58 Escobar acknowledges the claim that the concept emerged at around the same time at an international 
gathering in Geneva in 1991.   
59 Many scholars and ecologists also use the concept of alternatives to development or post-extractivism 
(Acosta, Gudynas, Martinez). Like Escobar, I see these as complementary concepts.  
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symbols, and are spread by mass media. Importantly, transitions from one social 
imaginary to another necessarily take place over long periods of time. For Taylor (2002, 
p. 106): 
[It] is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a 
widely shared sense of legitimacy. In addition, we should note that what start off 
as theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary….    
 
Using these authors’ characterizations as a point of departure, I propose that the 
concept of post development imaginary involves a diverse range of cosmovisions, 
discourses, practices and resistances enacted by social movements and ordinary citizens, 
that visibly manifest the world they seek to actively create, one in which relations 
between human beings and other living beings are more harmonious and respectful, and 
one in which human beings are guardians, not owners, of other life forms. As such, I 
propose that Yasunidos’ movement practices embody a post-development imaginary.  
I further argue that such imaginary has recently taken root in Ecuador, particularly 
in young people. This relatively new imaginary has come about, in part, because of 
indigenous, ecological and feminist social movements’ strong critique of hegemonic 
notions and practices of development, as well as their ability to bring forward ontologies 
and epistemologies that generate alternatives. This shift is taking place transnationally, 
but I suggest that Ecuadorian social movements are at the forefront of this imaginary, 
given the contexts I described earlier (Chapter Two). Key to the shift has been the 
institutionalization of these movement’s proposals in the 2008 Constitution (and rights 
that it purports to safeguard: the Rights of Nature, the right to previous consultation on 
issues of extraction in one’s territory, cultural rights, territorial rights, etc.). The Yasuní 
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ITT initiative, and the government’s earlier promotion of it, has also played a part in this 
shift in social imaginary.  
 Eduardo Gudynas, in a recent conference about the Rights of Nature (July 12, 
2016, FLACSO-Ecuador) suggested that there is perhaps no other country in which so 
much has been learned from indigenous communities, although he still considers the 
rights of Nature to be a minority ethos. He argued that in terms of rights and protections 
of Nature, no other Constitution is so advanced, and Ecuador is often invoked as an 
important reference. The problem, he added, is in the application of the Constitution.  
 I also do not propose that a complete shift in the social imaginary has taken place. 
Rather, the post-development imaginary is in conflict with, and still dominated by the 
more entrenched, extractivist imaginary. Gudynas (2012, p. 256) speaks to such 
entrenchemnt across the whole region: 
In South American social imaginaries, the idea that it is necessary to exploit 
Nature is strongly rooted…. From this point of view, the problem is not to avoid 
extractivism, rather it is to see how to strengthen it, to make it more efficient and 
obtain more profits. It is also common that this position is strengthened by 
invoking supposed scientific-technological advances and the promise of economic 
growth.  
 
In the cultural battle being waged between Correa and Yasunidos, these are 
precisely the two imaginaries that are in dispute The following section examines the 
differences between them.  
4.3 Dominant and alternative conceptions of development 
 Since June 26, 1972, when oil began to flow out of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
through a 312-mile pipeline, the rentist state embraced the promise of economic 
development, financial prosperity and capitalist western modernity. While, indeed, many 
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Ecuadorians and transnational corporations have profited from oil, extractive activities 
have left the majority of affected areas in the Amazon with massive contamination that 
has negatively impacted the lives and health of indigenous communities, animals, flora, 
fauna, and all living beings (Acosta et al., 2013). Many areas in the northern part of the 
Amazon, the first to be exploited, are company towns commonly identified as oil blocks, 
with pipelines running along side most roads, and the prosperity of the inhabitants is 
nowhere to be seen.60 There have been virtually no Ecuadorian governments that have 
been opposed to oil drilling, including the Correa government. Once celebrated as an 
exception to such extractivist perspective of the region, its practices have increasingly 
contradicted its own 2008 Constitution and Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir 2009-2013 
(National Good Living Plan), in which it pledged to change the extractive model to one 
of alternative development models.   
The focus of Buen Vivir rejects the developmentalist conception that has ruled for 
the past 60 years, and that was based on an extractivist vision of natural resources, 
the expansion of agricultural soils, and the massive, intensive exploitation of 
mining and fishing resources. The new constitutional mandate, prevention and 
precaution are institutionalized, and the way of seeing the natural patrimony 
beyond the so-called resources to exploit. (Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir 2009-
2013, p. 217).  
 
The underlying values and ideals that are behind the extractive model and its 
accompanying discourses are rooted in various sources. They represent a combination of 
ideals of western capitalist modernity; economic theories of growth and modernization; 
advances in science and technology, and the continuation of colonial practices that were 
set in place in the Amazon in the 19th century (Espinoza Mora Bowen, 2010; Gudynas, 
2013). Extractivist discourses and practices also emerge from post-neoliberal discourses 
                                                          
60 As part of my ethnographic fieldwork, I visited the northern Amazon and affected communities.  
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of governments that identify as 21st century socialist projects, in which an emphasis is 
placed on the ‘return of the state’, and with it, state-led development that allegedly brings 
profits to citizens rather than transnational corporations. Another source of these values 
comes from dominant conceptions of sustainable development in which there is an 
assumption that new technologies can lessen the harmful impacts of development.  
As analyzed in Chapter Three, many of the extractivist perspectives are regularly 
voiced on the EC by President Correa and his ministers. They include: an anthropocentric 
approach to Buen Vivir in which people supposedly come first, even if detrimental to 
other living beings and ecosystems. This discourse contradicts how Buen Vivir, or Sumak 
Kawsay, is understood by indigenous cosmovisions, in which it refers to harmonious co-
existence between humans and other beings. A related discourse about drilling in the 
Yasuní is that the profits will benefit Amazonian communities. One of Correa’s main 
arguments relates to the hegemonic notion of sustainable development, that “cutting edge 
technology” will lessen the impact on the Yasuní. Moreover, officialist discourse 
proposes that natural resources are strategic resources over which the state has exclusive 
rights. This is why, in part, the government was opposed to a national referendum (in 
addition to fearing that Yasunidos would win). Discourses of capitalist modernity, 
progress and growth; decades of government promises; and an elite that has profited from 
oil revenues; have all greatly contributed to the continued hegemony of extractivism.  
However, such hegemony is eroding. I propose that when Yasunidos came along 
in 2013, a partial shift in the social imaginary had taken place in the national 
consciousness (especially among young people) with regard to ecological matters. Values 
that undergird this imaginary include a non-capitalist, biocentric concept of Buen Vivir 
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that emphasizes harmonious co-existence between humans and other beings; viewing the 
role of human beings as guardians, not masters, of the rest of the species; a belief that 
resource extraction ultimately does not benefit the majorities, and it is not the answer to 
Ecuador’s economic development; the belief in the need to overcome oil dependency; an 
emphasis on biodiversity and territorial rights, and therefore the non-commercial value of 
the Yasuní. Another key value is that of democratization: which includes public control 
over resources and solutions from below (Acosta et al., 2013). The table below contrasts   
the extractivist perspective with post-development values.  
 
Table 4.3. Extractivist Perspective vs. Post Development Values 
 
Ecuadorian government development ideals, 
values, discourses 
Yasunidos post-development ideals, values, 
discourses 
Based on a combination of ideals of western, 
capitalist modernity; economic theories of 
growth and modernization; normalization of 
colonial practices; post-neoliberal thought 
(strong state leads and reaps profits from 
resources); dominant conceptions of 
sustainable development which believe that 
new technologies lessen the harmful impacts of 
development; rational appropriation of nature 
Based on Indigenous cosmovisions; 
transnational feminist, ecologist, territorial 
rights social movements; Latin American post-
development and post-extractivist approaches; 
Ecuador’s institutionally-backed discourses of 
Indigenous rights to their ancestral lands, 
territorial rights, and rights of Nature; the 
protection of non-contacted Indigenous groups 
Notion of Buen Vivir that is anthropocentric-   
put people first, they need to live well (even 
though, in reality, few people live well in 
communities where there is oil extraction). 
 
Closer to indigenous cosmovisions -  
 
Buen Vivir/Sumak Kawsay – biocentric, 
harmonious co-existence bet human beings, 
other beings, nature to maintain biodiversity. 
 
Kichwa principle of relacionality.  
 
Selva Viviente or Kawsay Sacha (living forest) 
philosophy of the Kichwa Sarayaku. There is 
no “centric” rather there are no divisions; the 
space of life of all beings, all are in all parts.  
Extracting natural resources will bring 
prosperity to the Amazon and to Ecuador 
Resource extraction is not the answer. We need 
to transition from oil dependence to viable 
  
 
 
 
 
171 
 alternatives. 
Ecuador gains profit, not transnational 
corporations 
Non-commercial value of keeping the oil 
underground.  
Natural resources are strategic resources over 
which the state has exclusive rights 
We have an ethical responsibility to indigenous 
communities and the rest of the species to 
safeguard nature for future generations,  
Ecologists want to keep Amazonians living in 
the past. They are unrealistic about ending 
extractivism.  
Respect for cultural diversity, territorial rights, 
cultural survival.  
The government has the approval of the 
Ecuadorian people as it voted in this 
government. 
Questions who has power, who makes 
decisions. The “Democracy in Extinction” 
campaign proposes that Ecuadorian people 
have the right to decide the fate of the Yasuní. 
Democratization from below also involves 
public control over resources, and citizen 
involvement in the transition away from oil 
dependence. It should not be the state that has 
this role. 
New, cutting-edge technologies lessen the 
harm done to human beings and the eco-
system.  
No technology can prevent the enormous loss 
of biodiversity; resource extraction endangers 
the very survival of indigenous communities 
(contacted and non-contacted), their cultures, 
and milenary practices that have cultivated, not 
destroyed, diversity.  
“Scientific evidence” and pro-extractive 
experts propose that the cutting-edge 
technologies will only damage one in a 
thousand.  
Interculturality as valorization of traditional 
practices and knowledges that have taken care 
of the biodiversity of the Amazon 
This government is the most ecologically 
friendly ever. 
The government is engaging in ethnocide and 
destruction of fragile ecosystems.  
In line with transnational hegemonic discourses 
of benign sustainable development; overlooks 
environmental concerns and destruction of 
cultures; ignores connection between extraction 
and inequality. 
In line with transnational discourses of 
alternatives to development; post-development; 
post-extractivism; the interdependence of 
rights; indigenous rights, climate change, 
cultural diversity, biodiversity.  
 
In the next section, I analyze how the post-development ideals, values and 
discourses translate into the creative expression of post-development imaginaries.  
4.4. Yasunízarte! Movement-based post-development imaginaries   
 After the first wave of protests that followed President Correa’s decision to 
commence extractive activities in the Yasuní, protest fatigue coupled with government 
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efforts to argue its pro-drilling stance and delegitimize protest, increasingly gave way to 
more sustained, diverse movement practices that integrated artistic and cultural 
interventions. These practices included weekly zapateadas61, concerts, art exhibits, 
carnivals, flash mobs, theater and street performances. The greatest, prolonged and most 
effective practice was the occupation of streets and plazas to gather signatures for a 
national referendum. These creative expressions, which came to characterize Yasunidos, 
communicated their values directly to citizens, brought heightened visibility to the 
movement, and helped them build a stronger base of support. Public calls to attend these 
events, and the sharing of images and videos after they took place, were circulated across 
media platforms, mainly Facebook, nationally and internationally. In addition to the 
protests and and spontaneous happenings that involved art, there were countless planned 
artistic events throughout that first year. Many of them took place simultaneously with 
signature collection. They included: the Yasunízárte, a concert benefit, in which some of 
the most popular performers entertained a sold out venue (September 27, 2013); A day of 
artistic protest outside of the National Assembly (October 3, 2013); a Yasuní caravan that 
travelled coastal towns and cities; and dozens of zapateadas.  
 The majority of the images, videos, graphics, events, and actions that were 
disseminated on multiple media platforms by Yasunidos and others did not depict oil 
contamination. Rather, very much in the spirit of prefigurative politics, they often chose 
to highlight healtlhy indigenous communities, diverse wildlife, clean rivers, the cultural 
survival of the isolated indigenous groups, and other positive images of the Amazon. 
                                                          
61 Joyous protest events in which people bring instruments and zapatear, dance in a circular motion. This 
Andean dance is practiced in community, often during Inti Raymi. Another meaning of the zapateada is 
that it helps participants push through difficulties and gather strength for the struggles ahead. 
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Created and circulated by artists, citizens, children, and people of all ages, diverse artistic 
and cultural expressions resonated widely with Ecuadorian citizens. On their website and 
Facebook page, in their press conferences, public appearances, and on the street, 
Yasunidos always literally and symbolically set a stage imbued with images that 
presented alternatives to the kind of development now being proposed by the 
government. And, try as the government would to criminalize Yasunidos, these cultural 
mediations helped to counteract negative representations of the collective. And, it was 
difficult to criminalize that which the government once promoted.  
 Other social movements, with a few exceptions, have mainly utilized the more 
traditional confrontational protest strategies such as militant-style marches and alignment 
with specific political parties; also road closings and the occupation of institutions. 
Regarding the last two, this is far less common now, after the Correa administration 
revised the Penal Code. Such formerly common movement practices as occupation of 
public buildings and road blocks are now considered to be terrorist acts and carry stiff 
prison sentences (for example, in the last Indigenous national uprising in August 2015, 
hundreds of indigenous activists were detained and jailed).  
 However, Yasunidos was not the first social movement in Ecuador to utilize 
creative expression. Before Yasunidos, indigenous, ecologist, and feminists movements 
also occasionally integrated performative actions into their repertoire. For example, in 
Vázquez (2015), ecologist Ana Maria Varea recalled a march led by Amazonia por la 
Vida (a direct precursor of Yasunidos) in which women dressed as petrol workers. One 
interviewee recalls: 
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Acción Ecológica, in a certain moment, released rats in the Congress, there are 
many of these kinds of symbolic acts. Yasunidos has been nurtured by this. Some 
of Yasunidos are children of the women of Acción Ecológica.62 (Alberto Acosta, 
personal communication, April 10, 2015). 
 
A woman involved in both Amazonia Por la Vida and Yasunidos analyzes some 
of the key differences between older and newer movement practices:   
Sure, we (feminists) used to go out a lot to do graffiti. I remember that we did 
graffiti actions. One time we put a sign on the Virgen del Panecillo (a prominent 
statue of a virgin in Quito’s historic center), announcing where to get safe 
abortions. In a march about three years ago we dressed as nuns and played 
drums….What I do see as a first are many people, many young people, mobilizing 
for a territory, for its biodiversity, for the defense of nature, and for the isolated 
indigenous groups…and these are mainly urban mestizos that don’t live in this 
territory. But they have been able to recognize the importance of this territory for 
the peoples that live there, and for their own lives. So, these characteristics seem 
new to me, of what I have seen of other mobilizations.  
 
And also what is new is that there are various artistic expressions, including 
musicians, and a diversity of creative spaces … they have linked their art work to 
this struggle. Creativity flourishes. I remember that there were a group of young 
painters there, painting signs, and they called on people to do theater….These 
were people from diverse collectives, not just the campaign…Each one felt it 
important to express their rejection. And this was very different from the march 
that supported Correa’s declaration, who were there with their green flags… 
 
The other [difference] is that we have said no to flags, no to martial marches, no 
to the typical slogans, no to the typical voices. We do things in a different way – 
with song, joyously giving this movement an identity with art, costumes, theater, 
music and also diversity…I believe these are new tendencies that we haven’t seen 
in other spaces….these are new tendencies that break with old structures….  (RG, 
personal communication, March 12, 2015). 
 
The above extended citation is important on a number of levels. The interviewee 
is analyzing the new, creative modalities that are enacted not only by Yasunidos, but by 
many groups of young people (many of whom had not been politically active, like many 
                                                          
62 Far from there being a split between ecologists and feminists, Acción Ecológica, one of Ecuador’s most 
important ecologist organizations (now 30 years old in 2016), was founded by a group of feminists.  
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members of Yasunidos). When she discusses how urban youth mobilize for territories 
that are not their own, including for uncontacted indigenous groups, she is describing a 
shift in the social imaginary, in which such actions against Nature, against indigenous 
peoples, are viewed as unacceptable, as illegitimate.63  
Regarding the creative movement practices, older generations of activists did not 
always understand these new forms of protest. One activist from an older generation said 
of the zapateadas:   
We didn’t understand them, the old politicians didn’t understand…for me it was 
something strange...To me it didn’t have a meaning….It was for them, but not to 
join in. The zapateadas were never massive, but they did given an identity to 
Yasunidos. It gave them strength, but it didn’t give them the possibility of 
expanding…(Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015). 
 
Unlike Acosta, I do believe the zapateadas helped them expand, in that it 
attracted other people of their generation, or others that share a post-development 
sensibility.  
 In Chapter Two, the discussion about movement identity and practices, I 
examined the candlelight vigils, zapateadas, initial wave of protests, the signature-
gathering process, and the ebullient march in which Yasunidos delivered the signatures to 
CNE, as examples of mediated cultural politics of post-development. In this next section, 
I focus on a visual analysis of the art that Yasunidos used in its campaigns, to examine 
how they express post-development imaginaries.    
 
                                                          
63 At the time of writing, there has been an ongoing, indigenous-led mobilization against the North Dakota 
Pipeline that is attracting support and solidarity by a wide range group of people (including indigenous 
Ecuadorians, who were some of the first to show up at the protest site). I see this as another example of the 
partial shift towards a post-development imaginary that is occurring transnationally.  
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4.5 Art and the post-development imaginary 
Artistic expression has been a powerful way for Yasunidos to communicate what 
it stood for, and to disseminate post-development imaginaries. Arguably, it competed 
with statist media power, given the resonance that it had with so many people, 
particularly younger generations. Here, a member of Yasunidos underscores the 
importance of the artwork in gathering signatures: 
The fight for the Yasuní, and the diffusion strategies that were used did not only 
subscribe to the impact that they could generate in public opinion, through the 
media or social media. No, the work of the artists was fundamental in all aspects. 
In the signature collection, the images that generated impact were the images of 
children collecting signatures with their families, and also those of animales. 
Artists donated many depictions of animals: dolphins, jaguars, etc. That we would 
take and put in the points of signature collection, and that would generate impact.  
(BB, personal communication, May 7, 2015). 
 
While much of the mediated cultural politics of the movement rose up 
spontaneously, as described in the previous section, there was also a strategic element at 
play, in terms of the images that were used in Yasunidos campaigns. They made use of 
opinion polls to understand which kinds of images moved people. One member of 
Yasunidos analyzes how they sought to have a broad impact:     
One of the tools that we used was the polls from different firms that were 
dedicated to analyzing Ecuadorian public opinion in relation to different themes 
… and with this we could read how we might build our strategies, something that 
I feel is fundamental for absolutely any national political actor in whichever 
theme that one wants to have incidence. For example, we would see that we had 
great acceptation with younger people of 18, 35, 40 years, those who had clarity 
about the defense of Nature. We also read that people did not like violence, even 
discursive violence. So on these readings we would elaborate our messages, in 
defense of Nature….  
 
One thing that struck us, and that I find sad, was that a majority of Ecuadorian 
citizens were interested in biodiversity in the Yasuní, the flora, fauna, animals, 
etc, more so than the survival of the peoples in voluntary isolation….But it is 
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strategic to position a theme and then, the other is derived from it, meaning, if we 
are going to position the theme of the isolated peoples, first we are going to have 
to deal with the theme of biodiversity. People also preferred colors, proposals, and 
joyous, protest, full of music.  
 
 Here we see that Yasunidos sought to respond to what would generate positive 
impact in public opinion, but at the same time we can see that they had an agenda beyond 
success with public opinion. They used their increasing visibility to foreground the issues 
that were important to the collective, such as the danger of extraction to the survival of 
the uncontacted indigenous groups who live in the Yasuní. I also find it interesting that 
opinion polls revealed that people rejected even discursive violence. My reading on that 
(not just from these polls, but from ethnographic observation over several years) is that 
people were tired of the discursive violence enacted each week on the EC.  
 Polls also showed that people favored colorful, musical protest, and concrete 
proposals. I interpret that as a preference in younger generations for a different way of 
doing politics. Recall that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ecuadorian citizens had had 
their fill of “politics as usual” and democratically deposed three presidents in one decade. 
This sense of disillusionment with politics as usual is still prevalent today, which is 
another reason why the mediated cultural politics of Yasunidos was so refreshing to so 
many people. Additionally, the desire to see actual proposals, I believe, is partially a 
reaction to the campaign of delegitimation of Yasunidos and ecologists in general, in 
which they were depicted as ignorant or unrealistic about alternatives to development 
(they were often branded as “childish ecologists” on the EC). Citizens were hungry for 
actual information about how to transition out of resource extraction.   
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 Returning to the question of the artwork, its strategic use in campaigns not only 
corresponded to a post-development imaginary deeply felt by Yasunidos (see Table 4.3), 
it also corresponded to the preferences of the public, in terms of the kinds of art and 
protest they appreciated. One of the most used images was this one below.64  
Figure 4a. Yasunizando the landscape  
 This image has many of the characteristics previously described: the presence of 
youth, the theme of the future; a utopic image of a young girl repainting, or transforming, 
the old, black and white image of the oil tank that is seen all over the Northern Amazon, 
with colorful images of nature (bird, butterflies, the print of a leopard).  
                                                          
64 Most of this artwork has been created by a movement-allied artist, Angie “Vanessita” Cárdenas Roa. Her 
work with Yasunidos and on behalf of many other ecological and feminist struggles can be accessed at 
sakuritadesign.blogspot.com.  
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Figure 4b. Poster for the Second Encounter of “infantile ecologists” 
 Image 2 is a poster that was used for the II Encuentro Nacional de Ecologistas 
Infantiles (II National Gathering of Infantile Ecologists). The very name is a 
reappropriation of the insulting way Correa refers to ecologists, “infantile.” Ecologists 
have used this denomination to celebrate ecological gatherings. This particular one 
advertised in the poster was organized during the early emergence of Yasunidos, two 
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months after the announcement of the declaration of national interest to exploit the 
Yasuní. This colorful poster depicts the tree of life, filled with animals. Yasuní Vive 
(Yasuní Lives) was also used by the government as a slogan in its campaign to convince 
citizens that the impact on the Yasuní would be minimal given the “cutting edge 
technology” that would be used.  
 
Figure 4c. Together for Utopia  
 The above image depicts young people, as well as a diversity of generations, 
subjectivities, and ethno-racial groups from various regions of Ecuador (there are 
characters representing indigenous people from the Amazon and the highlands. There are 
mestizos, afro-descendent, white, animals, flora and fauna. The colorful imagery depicts 
diverse people coming together to support the Yasuní. It bears the logo of Yasunidos, and 
the signature of the artist is also visible in the bottom-right corner.  
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Figure 4d. Yasunízarte Concert Announcement 
 The above image is the poster from one of the first large concerts held in defense 
of the Yasuní, and that featured popular local artists. The silhouetted landscape depicts a 
sunset in the Amazon, with flora, fauna, and musical performers and notes.  
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Figure 4e. Yasunidos Referendum Question  
 The image’s background shows a landscape which depicts inhabitants of the 
Yasuní. The humans in silhouette likely represent the uncontacted indigenous groups, 
although their contacted relatives, the Waorani, also use spears for hunting. 
Superimposed over the image is the question that was posed in the bid for the national 
referendum: Do you agree that the Ecuadorian government maintain the oil of the ITT, 
known as Block 43, indefinitely underground? We also can see the Yasunidos logo, the 
often-invoked slogans Yo firmo por ti Yasuní (I sign for you, Yasuní) which references 
the fact that the uncontacted groups as well as animals and other living beings cannot 
sign, but we can sign for them. The other slogan is Resiste YAsuní (Yasuní resists, with 
an emphasis on YA [now], translates as Resiste Now as well).  
 The image below, translated, is Climate Justice from underground. It depicts 
indigenous Waorani, or their uncontacted relatives, the Taromenare and Tagaeri groups, 
all of whom are inhabitants of the Yasuní. 
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Figure 4f. Climate Justice from under the soil  
 The use of the Yasunidos logo was very important in the art, to verify the origin 
of the images because the government had helped to create and promote parallel 
movements. These groups also sought to depict a healthy, vibrant Amazon. In the table 
below, I go into more detail as to how the post-development ideals, values and discourses 
correspond to Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics that express a post-development 
imaginary.  
Table 4.4. Post-development ideas deployed by Yasunidos  
Yasunidos post-development ideals, values, 
discourses 
Yasunidos mediated cultural politics 
themes deployed through images, texts, 
artistic actions, political actions that  
express post-development imaginary 
Based on Indigenous cosmovisions; Ecuadorian 
feminist, ecologist, and indigenous. social 
movements    
 
In line with transnational discourses of 
alternatives to development; post-development; 
post-extractivism; Indigenous rights, climate 
change, cultural diversity, biodiversity.   
The future – the future of  peoples who live in 
the Yasuní and all our futures. 
“one of the arguments for the defense of the 
Yasuní is the theme of the future, the future of 
the people who inhabit this planet, and the 
future of the peoples who inhabit the Yasuní.” 
(RG) 
Buen Vivir - harmonious co-existence between 
human beings, other beings, and nature to 
maintain biodiversity 
Zapateadas – symbol of protest and defense 
of the Yasuní. 
Posters and art that depict harmonious 
relations between humans and other living 
beings.  
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Resource extraction is not the answer. We need 
to transition from oil dependence to viable 
alternatives. 
One of the most ubiquitous images is that of 
the girl transforming the oil well. See Image 
1. 
Non-commercial value of keeping the oil 
underground.  
 
Wealth is having clean wáter, and healthy 
lives.  
 
Images that critique putting a monetary value 
on the Yasuní. 
We have an ethical responsibility to the rest of 
the species, and to safeguard nature for future 
generations. 
Images of animals that inhabit the forest and 
the rivers 
Respect for cultural diversity, territorial rights, 
cultural survival.  
Images of cultural diversity, as seen in 
various posters (see images 2, 3 and 6) 
The “Democracy in Extinction” campaign 
proposes that Ecuadorian people have the right 
to decide the fate of the Yasuní. Democratization 
from below also involves public control over 
resources, and citizen involvement in the 
transition away from oil dependence. 
There are many versions of the Democracy in 
Extinction poster, most of which show the 
wildlife of the Yasuní.  
No technology can prevent the enormous loss of 
biodiversity, and extraction endangers the very 
survival of forest dwellers (contacted and non-
contacted), their cultures, and millenary 
practices that have fostered, not destroyed, 
diversity.  
Although positive images are predominant, 
there are also mages that show destruction of 
ecosystems. 
Interculturality - valorization of traditional 
practices and knowledges that have safeguarded 
the biodiversity of the Amazon. 
There is much art that depicts indigenous 
peoples that inhabit the Yasuní.  
See images 5 and 6.  
The government is engaging in ethnocide and 
destruction of fragile ecosystems.  
Las veladas (candelight vigils), peace and 
peaceful protest 
 
Indigenous woman poster: Ethnocide. 
 
 Yasunidos was not the only group that was enacting mediated cultural politics. In 
the following section, I highlight an important action by Amazonian women, in a key 
event that took place in defense of the Yasuní. This event was important, in that it clearly 
communicated resistance from the Amazon.    
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4.6 Allies from the Amazon march on Quito 
 On October 3, 2013, the National Assemby, with 108 votes in favor, declare that 
it is in the national interest to exploit the Yasuní. The next day, a group of over 60 
Amazonian women leaders set out for Quito, walking from various Amazonian 
communities, accompanied by their children and the Indigenous Guard. They walked in 
order to tell the government they were against exploitation in the Yasuní, as well as the 
licitations of oil blocks in their territories. This was a notable example in which mediated 
cultural politics of post-development were enacted, not in coordination with Yasunidos, 
but with a similar message. This walk was at once an act of resistance against the 
political figures in the communities that were giving their blessings to exploitation, and 
part of a post-development imaginary in that the women were assuming their power and 
putting forth their vision of the Amazon and their communities. The walk to Quito 
publicly expressed their rejection of government plans to drill for oil in the Yasuní, as 
well as other extractive activities in the Amazon. Their activism is rooted in La Selva 
Viva (the living forest), a philosophy in which the Amazon is considered an integral 
being, a complex, balanced system. Facebook and Twitter reports from Yasunidos and 
other allies tracked their progress every day of the walk towards Quito through photos 
and chronicles. Images of indigenous women leaders and the joyous welcome they 
received in each town offered powerful testimony and images of their resistance to 
extractivist policies. The march signaled that there was opposition coming from the 
Amazon, despite government attempts in the ECs and elsewhere to present a picture of 
solid support. 
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 The indigenous women’s arrival to Quito was greeted by a well-attended march 
organized by a several collectives and organizations.65 While in Quito, the women met 
with diverse social actors, Yasunidos included. A drive for warm clothing and food to 
support their stay in Quito spread virally throughout social media. They came to meet 
with Correa personally, but the government barely acknowledged their presence. The 
women were finally granted permission to address the National Assembly, though their 
passionate statements were met with silence. Nevertheless, the photos, videos and 
narrative accounts were generated and shared by supporters, and picked up by private 
media. They disrupted government narratives that framed indigenous groups as grateful 
supporters of oil extraction. The words and images they circulated spoke of real wealth as 
living in harmony with La Selva Viva (the living forest). This kind of symbolic currency 
that was generated, exchanged and transformed into on-the ground action and material 
solidarity is an example of a way in which mediated cultural politics was collectively 
constructed. The visit brought needed legitimacy to Yasunidos; helped build relationships 
across ethnicity, class and region; and brought new energy to the movement. Direct 
contact with the indigenous Amazonian women, many of whom have been prominent 
leaders for decades, helped fill the need for articulation from below between Quito and 
the Amazon. I would argue that in this conjuncture, Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics 
trumped the government’s media power. In fact, I suggest it was a political error for the 
government to ignore these women and their claims. If they were so concerned about the 
Amazon, why did they dismiss the women that walked hundreds of kilometers to Quito.  
                                                          
65 See Coryat (2015) for a previously-published account of this event.  
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 In addition to the mediated cultural politics, Yasunidos also focused on media 
strategies. The rest of the chapter examined the multiple ways that they used media, from 
their own practices to leveraging private and public media.  
4.7 Confronting statist media power: Yasunidos media practices 
4.7.1. Representing the movement 
 Yasunidos emerged as a movement during the first wave of protests, and given 
that the national referendum process got underway nearly immediately, there was very 
little time to ponder a media strategy. They literally had to hit the ground running because 
of the enormous task ahead of them to collect signatures across the country, which also 
involved energizing other Yasunidos groups in other towns and cities. Given the 
enormous task of facing statist media power, various members of the collective dedicated 
time and energy to crafting the movement’s communicational strategy. They knew that 
they had to act swiftly and wisely to counter the mediated insults and attacks. Compared 
to the government, Yasunidos had few resources. One member of Yasunidos did have 
experience as editor of an ecologist website, Tegantai, 
(http://www.agenciaecologista.info/) that disseminated news about on the latest extractive 
activities that were taking place or planned across Ecuador, information for the press, and 
social movement activities. But most of the members of Yasunidos had little to no 
experience relating to the media.   
To help craft their strategies, Yasunidos reached out to experienced, allied media 
analysts for advice and training. Public opinion polls also provided them with pertinent 
information about how the public perceived of them as a group, and whether or not they 
approved of their actions. Yasunidos launched a website and a Facebook page very 
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quickly, to explain who they are, what they stand for, to answer commonly-asked 
questions, and to disseminate information about their upcoming events. The website also 
published pertinent reports about extractivism and sustainable options. A member of 
Yasunidos describes some of their practices: 
We did not have a clear path for where we wanted to go. We did not have 
previous experience in relation to spokespeople. Many of the people that acted as 
spokespeople during the whole time period, started with the collective in the first 
press conferences. Their first brush with the press was with a tape recorder, a 
camera. I am talking about young women of 17 or 18 years old. Ten young people 
of 17 or 18, that for the first time, faced a television camera as spokespeople for a 
collective that didn’t even know where it was headed. I had worked for some 
newspapers but I found myself in a much larger communicational scenario, in 
which the link with private media turned out to be fundamental in terms of 
proposing all that we would go on to propose. (BB, personal communication, May 
7, 2015). 
  
I recall the first Yasunidos press conference. They had set up a table in the 
backyard of Acción Ecológica, which became their headquarters. During that first press 
conference, some of the youngest members were the spokespeople. They received a little 
bit of coaching and then, with about a dozen cameras and audio recorders focused on 
them, they opened the microphones and began to address the press. While their lack of 
experience was evident, their passion for and knowledge of what was going was 
impactful. The excitement among those that attended this first press conference, 
including the journalists that were present, was palpable. After all, many of the journalists 
were also unhappy with the decision to exploit the Yasuni. Over the next few months, I 
observed how these and other Yasunidos members sharpened their skills and relations 
with the press. They also did not have just one or two spokespeople, rather they rotated 
those responsibilities among at least ten people at a time. For Ecuadorian citizens, it was 
refreshing to see many young people speaking out on the issues, instead of just one or 
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two seasoned political individuals. This practice differed greatly from that of the 
government, in which Correa was the main spokesperson, and was also unlike vertically-
organized social movements and political parties. One member comments on this and 
other media practices:  
One of our main strengths was obviously Facebook. Many people were there, and 
I think that was our principal communication channel that legitimated our posture, 
because we did not have resources to pay for television. Well, also [important] 
was the print media. We gained the respect of the [private] media and they gave 
us a lot of space. They would attend our press conferences – they even applauded. 
And they interviewed us all the time. (RG, personal communication, March 12, 
2015). 
 
Yasunidos’ communication remained singularly focused on the issues, without 
personalizing the conflict by attacking President Correa or other members of the 
government. Such practice was, in fact, opposite to the way in which the government 
communicated, which did personalize issues and attack individuals and organizations 
related to the movement. One Yasunidos member describes the conscious decision to 
focus on issues, not attack the President:  
Many political actors would have loved for Yasunidos to attack the President but 
we wanted to criticize a development model that impoverishes, that contaminates 
and that eliminates not only the forests but also the populations that depend on 
them to exist.  (PE, personal communication, April 30, 2015).  
 
With respect to Correa and the EC, Yasunidos developed a strategy that one 
member referred to as their “Jiujitsu strategy.” 
The collective does not have economic resources; it can’t pay for campaigns in 
social media, the collective can’t deploy cadenas nacionales (obligatory national 
broadcasts produced by the government) to delegitimize other political actors in 
the national political scenario, and we wouldn’t want to anyway. But we did use 
other strategies.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
190 
There is a practice in Jiujitsu, the martial art, in which you use the power of your 
enemy. The first time that the President attacked Yasunidos (in the EC), it was 
totally unexpected, but it was impactful. He referred to Yasunidos as liars that are 
collecting signatures, and you know, he would see us at the polls…. and the 
moment that he did that, the next day we collected so many more signatures than 
we generally did, because people were mad. So, the President would attack us, 
and we would use all of that visceral energy in our favor, and get him to speak 
about themes that we wanted to position. Then we would use that strength to 
collect more signatures, and it was successful, as were a whole bunch of 
complementary strategies that served our objectives. I believe that it was a great 
success to provoke the agents of power, in social media, in interviews and other 
media. (BB, personal communication, May 7, 2015). 
 
Another member of Yasunidos told me that when Correa would attack Yasunidos 
on the EC on Saturdays, their phones would ring off the hook on Monday with people 
wanting to know when and where they could sign. Another member commented: 
At some point, Yasunidos´ great strength was that it was not reactive; the 
government was on the offensive. At some point, it was the government that had 
to answer to Yasunidos´ claims. (SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015). 
 
Another member argued that Yasunidos’ communication strategies were not 
limited to media, in fact they could not have been successful without on-the-ground 
organizing, and leveraging the family, which is still a dominant feature of Ecuador´s 
social structure. 
The work was much more that of worker ants, and I think it is more about the 
information that people received, and how people communicated that information 
to their closest circle. It is what I always said to people. They would ask where 
they could sign, and what could they do, and I would always say that the most 
important thing they could do would be to convince their whole family and 
friends, tell them what is happening, and convince them to talk to their friends and 
family….or as they say, radio bemba (word of mouth), and convincing people 
like that is the work of ants, and that is what made the signature campaign 
successful. We didn´t have television campaigns asking for people´s signatures. 
(PE, personal communication, April 30, 2015). 
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 Instead of a televised signature campaign, Yasunidos did spread the word through 
posters that said Yasuni, yo firmo por ti (Yasuni, I sign for you). Many people took 
photos of themselves with those words, and circulated them in social media platforms.  
 
Figure 4g. I sign for the Yasuní. 
The above photos represent the ongoing campaign in which people in Ecuador, 
and internationally, shared their support via Facebook and other social media, in support 
of the Yasuni and the signature gathering campaign. The upper left photo is that of 
Vandana Shiva. When she was in Ecuador, she met with Yasunidos and other anti-
extractivist groups.   
4.7.2 Yasunidos and the private media 
Possessing their own website and Facebook page, Yasunidos used social media to 
post, aggregate and disseminate powerful photos, videos, images, graphics, music, 
combined with alternative proposals, environmental studies, personal testimonies and 
their positions, all of which helped to articulate a common ground of struggle among 
diverse sectors of society. However, given that Internet access is not universal in 
Ecuador, nor do all those who access the Internet use it to listen to on-line radio or read 
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political analysis, Yasunidos’ reach via the Internet was limited (INEC, 2013) 66. So, 
while they made good use of their own media (Facebook pages and website), and other 
alternative media (mostly other people´s social media sites and blogs; online radio, digital 
magazines; posting video on YouTube), these did not constitute the most significant 
contributions to circulating their messages. In the first place, alternative media is still not 
very developed in Ecuador so while the efforts were helpful and done in solidarity with 
Yasunidos, it did not represent the way in which most people found out about what was 
happening. In terms of media, the most significant coverage happened through private 
media, mostly radio interviews and newspaper coverage (still very popular ways people 
receive their news). Yasunidos often did several interviews a day for a variety of different 
radio stations.  
 Private media attention was due, in part, to these media’s desire to highlight 
opposition to government policies. In the EC, Correa frequently chided private media and 
journalists, often asking since when are private media environmentalists? And public 
media, owned, and financed by the government, followed Correa´s cues. Members 
ofYasunidos member discuss media coverage: 
¨La prensa corrupta¨ (the corrupt press, Correa´s most utilized insult for private 
media) was a help, but even they had their limitations, and it isn´t as if they gave 
us publicity all the time…. And the space in the daily La Hora cannot compare to 
the efforts of the government media, there is no comparison.   (PE, personal 
communication, April 30, 2015). 
 
Yes, for the [private] media, it was also a way for them to express their bad 
feelings, I believe, and to support a struggle that is so legitimate, so morally 
strong a theme as Yasunidos, so they said, lets open this space….a space in which 
                                                          
66 In 2013, 40.4% of the Ecuadorian population used the Internet in the last 12 months, with 47.6% in urban 
populations and 25.3% in rural areas (INEC, 2013, p. 14). 
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a movement is so forcefully questioning Correa. (RG, personal communication, 
March 12, 2015). 
  
 In this section, I have examined some of Yasunidos´media practices. This analysis 
has shown that Yasunidos has relied on a great diversity of media that included a mix of 
private, public, independent, community allies and outlets. At the same time, we need to 
take into account that some of the most successful ways in which they gathered allies, 
fans and followers was through radio bemba (word of moutn) by using the strong social 
structure of the large, extended families. The Yasuní was part of the dinner conversations 
in many urban households throughout Ecuador, and that is a real triumph in movement 
standards. Many have agreed, too, that Yasunidos´ greatest source of visibilization was 
from the President´s nationally televised attacks on the EC. Yasunidos was able to 
perceive a direct connection between the attacks on Saturdays, and the growing citizen 
support that poured in on Mondays. Indeed, this is when we can really see the cracks in 
the edifice, when statist media power reaches some of its limitations. Such limitations 
will be further explored in the conclusion.  
4.8 Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been the role of movement-based art, media and 
embodied practices in the cultural battle between two competing imaginaries: the long-
standing, hegemonic extractivist one, with a newer, emerging post-development 
imaginary that has been cultivated by ancestral communities and social movements. After 
theorizing the notion of a post-development imaginary, I identified some of the factors 
that have led to its emergence in Ecuador. In fact, I propose that Ecuadorian ecologist, 
feminist and indigenous social movements have been at the vanguard of imagining, 
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proposing and implementing alternatives to development in Ecuador, as well as beyond 
its borders. Certainly, Yasunidos has been able to tap into this rising imaginary, and is 
one of the reasons the movement received so much citizen support, especially among 
younger generations.  
This chapter seeks to contribute to the growing attention being paid in social 
movement scholarship to the visual and cultural dimension of protest. McCaughn (2012) 
argues that the political importance of the images produced by movement artists become 
apparent when read against prevailing social structures, regimes of accumulation, and 
systems of representation. To undertake such a task, I made explicit the underlying values 
of each positon, and analyzed how the poster art used by Yasunidos proposed a different 
way forward than the dominant paradigm. I argued that Yasunidos’ mediated cultural 
politics of post-development, by engaging with a hoped-for future free of resource 
extraction, has been able to challenge and resignify dominant notions of development and 
extractivism.   
Another contribution of the chapter is that it highlights Yasunidos’ movement 
practices within the context of statist media power. At the same time, I do not reduce 
movement practices to only being reactive. In fact, for most of the year, the government 
was on the defensive. By focusing on the multiple ways in which hegemonic notions of 
development have been interrupted, I suggest that the movement’s communication 
practices went beyond the use of social media and private media. Certainly, focusing on 
the use of social media alone, without taking into account the richness of Yasunidos’ 
diverse symbolic strategies, would not sufficiently capture their mediated cultural 
politics. The dissemination of the images, on the streets, in the plazas, and through 
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mediated platforms, worked together in a way that put the society in movement as no 
other ecological movement before it has achieved, argues Esperanza Martínez of Acción 
Ecológica.  One of the most successful aspects of Yasunidos; mediated cultural politics 
was its ability to weave all these practices together. This interwoven mediated tapestry 
reached almost all citizens in Ecuador in 2013-2014, and still resonates several years 
later.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DEMOCRACY IN EXTINCTION? CHALLENGES TO PROCESSES OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION  
5.1 The aftermath: the Ethical Tribunal delivers a verdict 
 On August 15, 2014, exactly one year after President Correa announced that he 
was bringing to a close one of the most beloved programs of his presidency, the Yasuní 
ITT Initiative, Yasunidos and allied actors held an ethical tribunal for the rights of 
Nature. It was preceded by two other ethical tribunals held in Quito that same year; one 
on January 17, 2014, presided by Vandana Shiva, and the other on April 11, 2014, led by 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Since the last tribunal, so much had happened, particularly 
the elimination of 60% of the signatures that had been delivered, with joy and hope. 
Yasunidos has called this and related actions, “democracy in extinction.” This Tribunal 
asked, “What happened with the Yasuní, and who are responsible for what has 
happened?”  That day, with hundreds in attendance, the tribunal delivered its verdict from 
the following material and symbolic spaces:  
… from the skin of the pink dolphins, of the howler monkeys, and the free 
peoples living in voluntary isolation; from the feet of Yasunidos, all, threatened 
by oil exploitation and the destruction of the life of the Yasuní, those who defend 
life and democracy pronounce …  (Verdict of the Ethical Tribute for the Rights of 
Nature, the Yasuni Case, August 15, 2014, p. 2) 
  
The judges of the tribunal went on to list the offenses of the Ecuadorian 
government, other governments, as well as private and state enterprises that finance the 
depredation of Nature: violation of: the rights of Nature; the rights of the peoples in 
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voluntary isolation; the duties of the Constitutional Court to exercise its obligations to 
uphold the Constitution; and the rights of political participation.  
 This tribunal, and others like it, have been held because at the government level 
there was and has been until today, complete impunity in terms of these violations. The 
signatures were never recounted; the direct democratic mechanism of the national 
referendum was severely curtailed in a constitutional amendment, and most egregiously, 
the exploitation of the Yasuní began in earnest on March 28, 2016 by Petroamazonas, 
Ecuador’s state oil company. Such tribunals are now held to formally register 
recriminations and demand accountability. The participation of high-profile activists and 
academics such as Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Vandana Shiva, among others, attests 
to the international importance and visibility of the case.  
 I have chosen to begin the concluding chapter of this dissertation with this verdict 
to underscore again what was at stake. Yasunidos, despite the social and political changes 
that were put in motion, and their fight against extractivism, was not able to stop the oil 
exploitation. This is the sobering reality. At the same time, it is important to account for 
the important gains, and also on the limitations - of statist media power, and of Yasunidos 
– for they speak to larger constraints in processes of democratization. This chapter brings 
into focus my own and others’ reflections about such gains, losses and limitations of 
statist media power, but also of Yasunidos as a new social movement in its first year. It 
also seeks to outline some of the contributions of this study, and to suggest directions for 
future research.  
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5.2 Statist media power, mediated cultural politics and implications for processes of 
democratization 
 The Yasunidos case makes visible the rising tensions between the “so-called” 
progressive Latin American governments and the social movements that are resisting 
large-scale extractivist projects across the Americas. In the Ecuadorian context, although 
the government used its full arsenal of statist power and statist media power to promote 
resource extraction while delegitimizing those in opposition, it was not able to stifle 
activism, dissent or the post-development imaginaries that continue to circulate. What I 
have argued throughout this thesis is that we cannot fully understand what transpired that 
year without taking into account processes of mediation, on the part of the government, 
and on the part of Yasunidos. Chapter 3 focused on the implications of statist media 
power. Chapter 4 examined ways in which Yasunidos deployed mediated cultural 
politics. I found it necessary to examine its movement practices beyond the media, as 
they were so rich, and actually helped to counteract statist media power more so than did 
their social media practices.   
 In addition to protests and other performative mediations, Yasunidos initiated a 
direct democracy mechanism, demanding a popular referendum so that citizens could 
decide the fate of the Yasuní. While their efforts were blocked at every turn, the process 
sparked a national dialogue. The mediated attacks, the many disruptions to the process, 
and ultimate annulment of over 60% of signatures evidenced the lack of democratization, 
and lack of independence of government bodies. And, while the government might have 
prevented a direct democratic process, it has not been without political cost, as these 
events continue to reverberate in the collective imaginary. In fact, citizens across Ecuador 
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now regularly hold unofficial popular referendums in areas where large-scale mining has 
been proposed so that their voices can be heard. The government is not interested in these 
processes; in fact, a constitutional amendment that eliminates most referendums was 
passed. Extractivist practices also involve the erosion of democratization, though they are 
seldom specified as such in the mainstream literature on the subject. Documenting these 
anti-democratic practices has also been a contribution of this dissertation.  
 With respect to statist media power, we have seen in this thesis how the 
government put in place a novel form of interaction with Ecuadorian citizens that 
removed the ‘middle man’ that has been prominent for over a century, the private media, 
once the principal source of diffusion of official and non-official news and information. 
After 2007, Correa used the EC to speak directly to the nation. We have seen how such 
mediated, but direct dialogue with the citizenry has sought to push extractivist agendas 
while delegitimizing its opposition. In Chapter 3, I empirically examined just how media 
power has been reconfigured, with the state gaining a great deal of symbolic and material 
mediated terrain in a short span of 5 years.  
 This thesis also suggests the power of the state to shape imaginaries through its 
laws, policies, practices and mediated communication. Here we have seen that the 
Ecuadorian government, for a brief period, played a progressive, generative role. Though 
the government subsequently broke its promises and laws, it undeniably helped to shape a 
new generation of ecologists through its support and promotion of the rights of Nature, 
the rights of uncontacted indigenous peoples, and the innovative proposal to ‘keep the oil 
in the soil.’ This had the effect to help pry open new propositive terrains for citizens to 
imagine other ways to understand fragile ecosystems and communities, and our 
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responsibility towards them. These spaces originated with indigenous and ecological 
movements, and then supposedly embraced by the new political culture. When the 
government sought to rescind its pledge regarding the Yasuní, its publicity campaigns 
turned out to be more durable. Repeatedly, members of Yasunidos told me that one of 
their best allies was the Yasuni ITT initiative’s campaigns produced by the government.  
 There is also the question of statist media power, and its effect on processes of 
democratization. Throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that statist power, combined 
with statist media power, eroded processes of democratization. De la Torre (2008, p. 281-
282) very clearly perceived the grave implications that such media power carried: 
In Latin America, the rise of an extreme form of the plebiscitary presidency in the 
Andean region has turned the permanent campaign into far more than just a 
package of techniques used to promote presidential popularity: it is a vital practice 
that presidents use to stay in power and to pursue political projects aimed at 
reconfiguring power relations. But while the permanent campaign is a tool that 
presidents wield in their quest to transform politics, its utility in enhancing 
presidential power comes at the cost of exacerbating a broader problem affecting 
the quality of democracy in Latin America: the relative absence of functioning 
mechanisms of accountability….As executive power increases during the course 
of plebiscitary presidencies, the temptation for presidents to abuse the 
communications apparatus is substantial. In countries where the struggle for 
democratic accountability is still ongoing, the need to wage the permanent 
campaign invites an unfair use of government resources and blurs the distinctions 
between government and partisan activity. Where civil liberties are not fully 
consolidated, the chronically confrontational tone of the permanent campaign 
readily turns the public sphere into a chilly environment for free expression. The 
polarizing rhetoric characteristic of the permanent campaign runs the risk of 
turning the president’s real or imagined opponents—in parties, civil society, and 
the media—into permanent enemies.  
 
 Ecuadorian citizens, like many others throughout Latin America, are indeed quite 
wary of the dangers of excessive executive power. Correa’s campaigns to tarnish the 
reputation, insult, and render illegitimate his opponents have made citizens deeply 
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uncomfortable. The talk is not just talk, it is enunciated by the President, and the bully 
pulpit has often been followed by repressive judicial, legislative and other actions.  
 While we need to recognize the force of statist media power, I have also argued 
that we must attend to the limitations of such power. As Freedman (2014, p. 117) reminds 
us, media power is not as “predictable, solid or immoveable” as often thought. He 
suggests media power (and I will add, statist media power) is “open to challenge, 
particularly when their frames don’t match experiences or aspirations” of its consumers 
(2014, p. 119). The idea that oil-drilling is an enterprise that brings wealth to the Amazon 
region did not match Ecuadorian’s decades-long experience as a petrol state, in which the 
financial resources did not benefit the Amazon region. Even more dissonant, we saw in 
Chapter 3 that the government’s vision of development did not match its own previously 
stated vision. In the case of Yasunidos, cynicism only increased once the government 
introduced the changes, and with them, a media campaign that sought to convince about 
the positive aspects of drilling for oil. I would argue that the growing cynicism is a sign 
of the limits of media power.  
 There is also resistance to statist media power. It is not the passive resistance that 
is often referred to, as when people critically analyze the media, or just stop listening; 
rather it can translate into very concrete actions. In Chapter 4, we read about how, on 
Saturdays, when Yasunidos was the target of criticism, the following day they received 
even more support. Yasunidos quickly understood that there were positive effects of 
having President Correa as their main interlocutor. In fact, once they discovered the 
connection, they often planned actions on Thursdays, so that Correa could respond to 
them on Saturdays. In Chapter 4, I argued that challenges to media power also arise when 
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social movements powerfully deploy alternative conceptualizations that resonate with 
citizens. Yasunidos interrupted the government’s nefarious framing of them by deploying 
art, embodied actions and media that embraced, and even echoed, post-development 
imaginaries that were already in motion. One member of Yasunidos discusses his idea 
about statist media power: 
I believe that from a cultural viewpoint, especially in the Sierra (highlands, 
Quito’s location), Correa’s media power starts to have many limits….Correa 
insults a lot, and that does not go with the Serrano culture (highland culture) 
which is respectful. Correa’s communication reaches its limits also because of the 
lies, like when he denies there is unemployment….The government promotes the 
defense of the Yasuní, and then decides to drill for oil. Denying the referendum 
also was a breaking point. 82% of the population wanted a referendum, even 
Correa followers. This eroded their political support. (PE, personal 
communication, April 30, 2015). 
 
5.3 Accomplishments and limitations of Yasunidos  
 Yasunidos provided a powerful, fresh, and courageous stand against planned 
extractive practices in the Yasuní. Their movement practices helped reinvigorate 
practices of democracy and citizen participation, at a moment in which participatory 
democracy was at a very low point in Ecuador. The following citation from a Yasunidos 
member speaks to how their bid for direct democratic processes brought these issues to 
the foreground: 
With the theme of the referendum, we gained so much support, a lot of affection, 
and in the imaginary of the people we were and still signify a space that has 
fought so that people could participate, that all people have the right to say what 
they want in relation to the Yasuni….Yasunidos generated one of the most 
important mobilizations we have had in these times, and there have been others 
called by the indigenous movement. We have generated questions about the 
attitude of the government with respect to citizen participation. The theme of the 
Yasuni has also caused many people to distance themselves from the politics of 
the government, because it has shown that it does not want to dialogue with the 
people, it doesn’t want to listen, and doesn’t invite participation. That was very 
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evident in this case. Also, the level of persecution that could be reached by this 
government, this and many other cases....  (RG, Personal communication, March 
12, 2015). 
 
Indeed, as I reflect back on my own sense of the potential importance of this 
study, I recall that witnessing Ecuadorian citizens reawaken to protest and dissent 
impacted me, as I had not seen much spirited protest since arriving a year earlier in 
August 2012. Alberto Acosta, an ecologist, scholar and former politician, and one of the 
original architects of Yasuní ITT, analyzes the contributions of Yasunidos:  
The emergence of Yasunidos was very important for many reasons: in the 
first place because it gathers the experience and accumulated history of 
resistance and the construction of alternative proposals. Secondly, because 
it confronts power and uncovers the lies. And in the third place, and I find 
this really important, it is able to resonate widely with the Ecuadorian 
society. It isn’t just the people in rural areas, it isn’t just those who were 
affected by Chevron-Texaco, but also people who have not directly been 
affected by extractivism, and I find this significant. Moreover, it opens the 
door toward the creation of a strong movement using the arguments of the 
government and tools of the Constitution, in trying to build another form of 
democracy, another way to do politics, and this is the great legacy of 
Yasunidos. (Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015). 
 
Another significant point is how Yasunidos not only captured, but helped to 
deepen a new ecological spirit, which has been gestating in Ecuador for decades. For an 
individual who has worked on the issue of indigenous peoples living in voluntary 
isolation for decades, Eduardo Pichilingue saw another contribution: 
Before Yasunidos, to speak of the uncontacted indigenous groups was one thing, 
and after Yasunidos, it is another, because there are many people that are 
conscious about what is happening. This has been an effort of Yasunidos. Before 
2013, no one had a clue. (Eduardo Pichilingue, personal communication, April 30, 
2015). 
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 There have been differences of opinions as to whether or not Yasunidos still 
constitutes a social movement, as the numbers of people actively involved declined 
dramatically after CNE eliminated 60% of the signatures. It is a valid dispute. On the one 
hand, there are those like Carlos Larrea, director of the Center for Environmental 
Research at the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, who proposes that Yasunidos is now 
much more than a platform for Ecuador’s youth who want to defend nature. Together 
with the country’s indigenous movement, he argues that Yasunidos has become one of 
the two strongest social movements in Ecuador (Coryat and Lavinas-Picq, 2016, p. 283). 
After listening to many people talk about Yasunidos for several years, I can confidently 
argue that whether or not one sees them as a movement, or a collective that led a 
powerful “moment”, there is most definitely a before and after Yasunidos. It is also 
important to analyze some of the limitations of Yasunidos, their strategies and 
campaigns. Yasunidos continues to analyze their role that first year and beyond. There 
are various themes here, and given this is a conclusion, I will only foreground a few 
perspectives. One theme was Yasunidos’ rejecting the adherence to their movement of 
politicians. Alberto Acosta shares his perspective: 
I do believe there were errors, because there was not sufficient capacity to 
negotiate with certain actors. It was “collect signatures, but you guys can’t present 
them….” Yes, there was not enough openness to receive the support they could 
have received. There were many people who collected signatures but were not 
integrated. (Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015). 
 
Another limitation, which was not discussed in my thesis but is worth mentioning, 
is the connection between Yasunidos (and other urban ecologists) and the Amazon. This 
topic also points toward the need for further research. This interviewee, who has worked 
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for a decade in Amazonian territories, and also embraces an urban identity, shared his 
view: 
One of Yasunidos’ weaknesses was its lack of connection to the Amazon, If you 
don’t have an initiative that is born in consensus with local populations, you will 
have difficulties in those territories. CONAIE and CONFENIAE were critical of 
the signature collection. For CONFENIAE, it was because Yasundos was entering 
into their domain – the complexity of the issue of the indigenous peoples in 
isolation. In general, they had a defensive attitude, as all organizations felt very 
hurt by the current government. They felt excluded…. Also, these are not 
populations that have a black and white position regarding resource extraction. 
They have accepted it to a certain extent, and have been deceived. And in some 
measure they have accepted it because they haven’t had an actor with which they 
could contrast, and analyze the situation. The greatest risk for me is that 
ecologists risk divorcing themselves from the local populations because their 
agendas don’t necessarily coincide. (SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015). 
 
 There were Yasunidos chapters in the Amazon (Lago Agrio, Macas, Puyo, Tena) 
but the terrain is highly complex, given community divisions about the issue of resource 
extraction. After the CNE disgarded 60% of the signatures, many members of Yasunidos 
began to travel to the Yasuní and other parts of the Amazon to work with local 
populations. Members of Yasunidos from other regions have continued to work in their 
own localities in anti-extractivist initiatives.  
 Finally, I mention here what was perhaps the biggest blow dealt to Yasunidos, the 
way in which they were treated by the CNE and other government agencies after they 
delivered the signatures. Some Yasunidos members have seen this moment as its lowest 
point. They were so confident that they could collect the needed signatures, they did not 
plan for a loss. They didn’t foresee the dirty government campaign that would be 
launched against them. This translated into another limitation, not of Yasunidos, but of 
the citizenry, the lack of mobilization in the face of such deception. One member 
analyzes that moment:   
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At that moment I believe that everyone fell into apathy, I even felt apathetic. I had 
to fight against my own apathy. I mean, the power of the government seemed so 
immense, that we could not stop….we made such a huge effort, we succeeded, we 
had it, and it doesn’t function. When that happened, and people began to fall into 
apathy, there was a certain break up of some Yasunidos groups in some parts of 
the country, and that is the moment in which the government hits us with all their 
force, and begins saying that we are losers, that we couldn’t do it, we didn’t 
achieve it, and they begin communicating that we are liars… media power and 
apathy won. It was a bit of both. The shock of this forced defeat, the media power 
of the government, came together at the same point and our “democracy in 
extinction” campaign didn’t work. People no longer wanted to be involved. Well, 
this has changed over time. This past year (2015) has been important as people 
are mobilizing again, and they also mobilize for the Yasunidos. And this is 
important, a recognition that we were done an injustice….that we did collect the 
signatures but an authoritarian and corrupt government did not permit the 
referendum to go through….Yasunidos is far from gone…. (BB, personal 
communication, May 7, 2015). 
  
 Yasunidos suffered a huge loss; citizens suffered a huge loss; the lack of 
institutionalization of state agencies was exposed; and the Yasuní and its inhabitants are 
suffering the elimination of the initiative to keep the oil in the soil. Still, people continue 
to mobilize, and, what happened still lives in the memory of Ecuadorians. Since then 
dozens of local struggles against extractive projects have been waged by Yasunidos and 
other collectives. Now, other urban collectives ally with the Shuar communities to fight 
against mega-mining in their communities. I conclude this section with the words of a 
Esperanza Martínez, who has been waging anti-extractive struggles for 30 years:  
There was this strike, and the core group remained together, though the theme is 
not currently on the national agenda, it is on territorial agendas. I continue to see 
Yasunidos as a social movement. They are a voice, people still want to know what 
they think about the issues. I heard one young guy say “we have a brand.” They 
have an identity. On May 1st (2016) we went out to march with our drums, and 
people felt that they could join in with us, it is a space where people who want 
change can be….The impact of Yasunidos has been important. More than 
anything I believe that the contribution of Yasunidos was having put the society 
in its totality in movement. (Esperanza Martínez, personal communication, July 
22, 2016).  
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5.4 Contributions of the dissertation 
 To conclude, my dissertation argues that a communication perspective is 
necessary to grasp how the Yasuní mediated ecological conflict has played out. I 
examined how the Ecuadorian government has used its expanded media power to try to 
convince Ecuadorians that extractivism in the Yasuní brings wealth, development and 
Buen Vivir. I then examined how Yasunidos, lacking substantive media power, deployed 
mediated cultural politics that project alternative ways of thinking, being, and acting. 
Such symbolic power created and circulated by Yasunidos and many others has helped us 
understand some of the limitations of statist media power. We have seen how multi-
million dollar campaigns can be received with deep cynicism, and countered by low-
budget, horizontal citizen communication and cultural production.  
 This dissertation project hopes to make theoretical, methodological and empirical 
contributions, above all, to the growing literature that analyzes the intersection between 
social movements and media.  It also contributes to a much needed discussion about the 
neo-extractivist politics of the wave of progressive government, and the social 
movements that struggle against them. Theoretically and methodologically, I also 
contribute to a body of scholarship about media power by mainly focusing on the statist 
media power, its excesses and limitations, in a Latin American progressive government. 
Certainly, the Ecuadorian media system, and the vast changes it has undergone, deserves 
attention due to the complexity of the issues at hand and implications for the 
democratization of the media in Ecuador and the region.  
 Regarding my other theoretical-methodological framework, that of mediated 
cultural politics, I have argued and demonstrated that attention to the mediated cultural 
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politics of post-development are movement practices that deserve close study. Moreover, 
beyond the importance of understanding this new wave of movements, there needs to be 
attention to the way in which culture, media and politics are interrelated in current 
disputes between governments and social movements. The mediated, embodied and 
cultural strategies of this growing continental movement need to be seen as an integral 
part of the struggle, and here there is rich material for further research.  
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